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“The Selection and Consequences of Selling Processes in 
Takeovers: Evidence from the U.S. and U.K. Takeover Markets.” 
 
Executive Summary 
There are various selling mechanisms applied to facilitate takeovers. What determines a seller’s 
choice of a specific selling mechanism? And what are the consequences of selecting a particular 
mechanism on takeover outcomes? These are important questions, both theoretically and 
practically. This thesis investigates two important datasets from the U.K. and U.S. markets, 
respectively.   
The first empirical chapter examines two important selling processes in the U.K. market: tender 
offers and schemes of arrangement. Under tender offer, an acquirer purchases the shares of a 
target firm directly from the market, without the need of approval from the target’s board. A 
scheme of arrangement is a court-approved agreement between a company and its 
shareholders/creditors on the takeover by a potential acquirer. Scheme of arrangement require 
75% approval from target’s shareholders with voting powers. Compared with tender offers, 
schemes are a relatively safe, yet prolonged, way to implement takeovers. 
This thesis attempts to answer the two questions raised above. To correctly identify the 
treatment effect of selecting a specific selling process, the selection bias problem need to be 
addressed. Here the propensity score of matching (PSM) has been adopted to deal with the 
consequences of self-selection problem into the group that choose scheme of arrangement. 
Using a sample from takeovers within the U.K. market between 1995 and 2015, this study 
shows that deals structured through tender offers generate significantly higher premiums for 
the target’s shareholders in comparison to those structured through schemes. The logit 
regression results show that the probability of choosing schemes increases if the target firm is 
larger and more established, or if the target’s termination fees increase, and so on. The results 
of this study were found to be stable after various robustness tests. 
The second empirical chapter investigates the two selling mechanisms of auction and 
negotiation on takeovers using data from the U.S. market. Auction has an obvious advantage 
in terms of increasing competition when compared to one-on-one negotiation processes. And, 
therefore, auction is more attractive for a seller; competition between bidders may require the 
winning bidder to effectively overpay for the target —a phenomenon known as the ‘winner’s 
curse’. This second chapter investigates the existence of the ‘winner’s curse’ in the context of 
the U.S. takeover market, with the PSM method applied.  Using a sample from the U.S. 
takeover market during the period between 1984 and 2014, the auction process was found to 
have a negative impact on bidder returns during the short-event period in comparison to 
takeovers structured through negotiations. Therefore, the empirical results support the 
theoretical prediction that the “winner’s curse” exists within U.S. takeover markets. However, 
the overbidding results become less clear when examined over the long-event period. The logit 
regression results collected show that the probability of a firm choosing an auction transaction 
increases if the target initiates the deal, has higher levels of leverage, more tangible assets, 
faces bankruptcy, or if the bidder already has a ‘toehold’ stake in the target firm.   
In summary, this thesis studies the determinants of selecting different selling mechanisms in 
takeovers within U.S. and U.K. markets, and it evaluates the exact effects of selecting a specific 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 







“Winning is not everything: it’s the only one thing” 
Vince Lombardi1  
 
1.1. Background and Research Questions 
 
The impact of bidding strategies between counterparties in the takeover process is an area of 
increased attention in economics and finance. Bidding theory addresses all the details related 
to the takeover process from the initiating of bids by either target or acquirer firms to the final 
contest outcomes (Eckbo, 2009). This is hardly surprising; takeovers have increasingly become 
an almost routine corporate strategy and the complex nexus of economic imperatives; market 
dynamics and psychological drives are fertile ground for research.  
Each action by either sellers or bidders throughout the takeover process has costs and 
consequences, particularly with agents that have different motivations for securing a deal. 
Target firms prefer to discriminate between potential bidders, by raising the cost of entry to the 
negotiation process.  According to Bruner (2004a, p.782) preparing for a takeover negotiation 
is considered a costly process in terms of acquiring information about a bidder and hiring 
financial advisors and law firms, in order to help with reaching agreement on particular issues 
related to financial and legal affairs. Therefore, it is optimal for target firms to raise the cost of 
negotiation by encouraging other bidders to bid in case they reject the offer price of initial 
bidders. However, Hansen (2001a) argued that target firms always face a trade-off in raising 
the competition between bidders and the cost of information where target firms must, as both 
a matter of strategy and, to different degrees in the U.S. and the U.K., to satisfy regulatory 
requirements provide full disclosure of sensitive information to a wide range of potential 
bidders that could include competitors, customers or suppliers. This is not so much a cost-
                                                          
1  Vince Lombardi was an American football player but more famous as the coach of Green Bay Packers 
(Anandalingam & Lucas Jr, 2004, p.193). Regarded as one of the greatest sports coaches of all time he coached 
his teams to win five of the first seven Super Bowls.  
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benefit analysis as an all-or-nothing commitment to the process where merely showing a bit of 
ankle is not an option.  
Bidder firms, however, will seek to deepen their commitments with a target firm in order to 
reduce the costs of negotiation throughout, setting deadlines for due diligence and requesting 
for termination fees. Bidders might use different forms of bidding strategies such as tender 
offers, negotiation a merger, or even aggressive acquisition techniques such as hostile bids. 
Bidder firms could build a stake in a target firm (referred to as a toehold hereafter) in order to 
pay a lower premium or jump the initial offer price in order to deter other rival competitors.  
However, Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) argue that bidders also face a trade-off between the 
cost of bidding in the form of tender offer for example, and the fast execution of the bid. If the 
bidders choose to ask the shareholders directly to tender their shares that could signal that the 
target has a high value for them and therefore the target shareholders could raise the reservation 
price. For either target or bidder firms, the choice always matters.  
Creating values and making successful deals is an important issue in business practice. In 
general, target firms on average significantly gain large and positive returns around the date of 
announcement while the performance of bidder firms vary between negative, positive and 
insignificant results.2  The performance of bidder and target firms in the long-term analysis is 
less clear and it is largely influenced by the choice of methodological approach used to measure 
firm’s performance (Betton, Ekbo &Thorburn, 2008a). More specifically, around 61% of US 
acquirers’ shareholders endure significant losses in M&A. The buyer’s share price typically 
loses 25% points, while sellers create an extra value for their shareholders of on average 19% 
in comparison with their industry peers (Anandalingam & Lucas Jr, 2004,p.68-69).3 The total 
value generated in M&A activity in the U.S. market increased sharply from US$ 87.75 billion 
in 1984 to US$2.2 trillion in 2016.4  Yet, despite the rapidly increased volume of M&A activity, 
outcomes were notably mixed, ranging from successes such as Disney and Pixar in 2006, to 
                                                          
2 In the Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008a) survey that includes most recent empirical literature for the US 
takeover bids over the period 1980-2005, concludes that bidders tend generally to significantly lose returns if the 
size of bidders is large and if target firm is publicly-traded, while positive returns are associated with small bidder 
size and if target firm is private. Using a large sample for the U.K. takeover bids over the period 1981-
2001,(Draper & Paudyal, 2006) find that bidders enjoy significantly large returns if target firms are private and 
the method of payment for those firms is cash deals. Moreover, bidders create significantly positive returns when 
the relative size ratio (bidder/target size) is low. 
3 This statistical information comes from a study by BusinessWeek, (2002) that investigates 301 US deals over the 
period 1998-2000 with the total deal value US $ 4 Trillion. The study concludes that M&A activity does not pay 
to bidders particularly if the size of bidders is large. 
4 Thomson Reuters, 2016. 
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failures that resulted in heavy losses and financial drains such as Daimler Benz and Chrysler 
in 1998, and AOL and Time Warner in 2001 (DePamphilis, 2012a).5 
Being a winner in an M&A contest is not everything. Indeed, it is as often a grotesquely pyrrhic 
victory accompanied by a ‘curse’ on the acquirer firms. One possible explanation for the 
negative returns to bidder firms in M&A empirical research is that bidders overpay to win a 
deal. Overbidding and paying for the target’s assets that could and often has led to huge 
financial drains. This overpayment in M&A activity is termed “the winner’s curse”.  
Most of the theoretical explanations and empirical works for the possibility of the winner’s 
curse in M&As are based potentially more on realistic behavioural assumptions rather than the 
traditional rationality assumptions. For example, Roll’s hubris-based hypothesis (1986) is 
considered the first work that focuses on the ‘emotional’ motivations for merger and tender 
offers.  Roll (1986a) argues that hubristic motivations of the boards lead them simply to overbid 
for the target.  While in a fully rational equilibrium, bidders are less aggressive, and the offer 
price is more likely to reflect the underlying financial value of the target, rationality should not 
permit expected overbidding. Jensen’s agency-based hypothesis (1986) argues that if the board 
of the bidder firm has an excessive level of cash, then an agency conflict issue could emerge 
between the shareholders and the board.  And the board, instead of paying out cash to their 
shareholders, chooses to invest it on wasteful vanity projects, of which the destruction of the 
shareholder value by overbidding could be a symptom. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, Brummer (2012, p.79-80) argues that takeover activities in 
the U.K. in general are unprofitable, and the shareholders of target firms are the only 
beneficiaries from such activities. 6  Based on a study conducted on behalf of the U.K. 
government in 2014, takeover activities pay for short-term shareholder gains, more specifically 
the benefits of positive returns mostly generated by the large size deals. However, in the longer-
term analysis the result is far less clear (Faelten, Driessen, & Moeller, 2016, p.xiv).7 
                                                          
5 In the book of “Beware the Winner's Curse: Victories that Can Sink You and Your Company” by Anandalingam 
& Lucas Jr, 2004, There is an informative discussion about the timeline of implementing each deal; Daimler Benz 
– Chrysler, and AOL – Time Warner, and the main events that lead bidders to overpay for such activities.  
6 Brummer (2012) built his argument based on a survey by Meloria M. Meschi at London’s South Bank University 
in 1997.    
7 The UK government asked Cass Business School’s Merger and Acquisition Research Centre (MARC) in 2014 
to provide an empirical work that investigated what exactly was the effect of M&A activities in the UK arket. The 
MARC use a sample of public target and acquirer firms over the period 1997 - 2007 (Faelten, Driessen & Moeller, 
2016, p.xiv). 
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The outcomes in the UK takeover market are also quite mixed, with successful deals such as 
Diageo and Centrica and notoriously unsuccessful deals like Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
and ABN Amro in 2007 and HBOS and Lloyds TSB in 2008.8 The UK takeover market is 
considered one of the most active markets in the world after the US and Chinese markets. The 
value generated in the UK for takeover activities increased from UK £269 billion in 1984 to 
around £321.5 and £ 144.5 billion in 2015 and 2016 respectively.10    
Companies in the UK are vulnerable to another source of risk arising from tender offer as one 
of the main methods of takeover. In tender offer an acquirer offers to purchase outstanding 
shares directly from the target’s shareholders, which offer may or may not be endorsed by the 
directors of the target company.11 The U.K. company law in this respect favours this type of 
takeover due to the primacy it grants shareholders and the decision-making that they ultimately 
exercise. However, most of the highly important, indeed totemic firms in the U.K. have been 
taken over by overseas predator acquirers who now control many of the most important British 
brands. Selfridges (founded 1909) was acquired by Canada’s Galen Weston in 2003, Boots 
(founded 1849) was acquired by the U.S. private equity firm, KKR and the Italian tycoon Stefan 
Pessina’s company in 2006, and Cadbury (founded 1824) was acquired by the U.S. food 
company, Kraft’s (Brummer, 2012, p.121-122) 
Nevertheless, a bidder can acquire the target company by using scheme of arrangement which 
is a “cheap” and “easy” method in comparison to using the tender offer process. Scheme of 
arrangement requires the involvement of a court and the approval of a majority of the target’s 
shareholders, representing a minimum of 75% of the target company’s voting rights.12 Bidders 
therefore are more certain of obtaining the approval of shareholders in acquiring all of the 
target’s shares, while in tender offer a bidder needs to acquire 90% or more of the target’s 
shares, in order exercise a “squeeze-out” procedure.13 Moreover, Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) 
shows that a tender offer in the U.S. market is considered a fast process in comparison to merger 
in case of implementing a takeover bid, however, it is an expensive method requiring bidders  
to offer a high premium to obtain sufficient control of the target firms. 
                                                          
8 Indeed, RBS’s share price was driven upwards largely because of an aggressive and astonishingly irrational 
takeover corporate strategy in which – channelling their inner-Lombardi – RBS acquisition of rivals became an 
end in itself, far removed from the notion of being part of any wider strategy of growth. 
9 Thomson Reuters, 2016 
10 Thomson Reuters,2016 
11 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.979      
12 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.895 and 899(1) 
13 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.979      
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Equally, schemes of arrangement necessitate longer periods for completion than tender offers 
due to their complex structures and requirements. Therefore, there is always a trade-off 
between the cost of using a tender offer and the fast execution of a bid. 
There are various selling mechanisms applied in takeovers. Yet, far few studies in the field of 
economics and finance that investigate the cost and consequences of the choice to bid in the 
various aspects of selling mechanisms. The main objective of this study is, therefore, to 
estimate the causal impact of bidding upon target and bidder returns within specific selling 
mechanisms.  Moreover, this thesis will investigate what determines the choice of a specific 
selling mechanism by a bidder.  And what are the consequences of selecting such a mechanism 
on takeover outcomes.  They are very important questions of both theoretical and practical 
importance.  This thesis investigates two important cases in the U.K. and the U.S. markets 
respectively.   
This thesis therefor will study two separate empirical works. The first empirical work studies 
the causal impact of selecting a specific selling method (tender offers versus scheme of 
arrangements) upon the bid premiums in the U.K. takeover market. The main motivation of 
this study is to examine whether there is a significant difference in bid premium between tender 
offer and scheme of arrangements.   
The frequent use of scheme of arrangements to implement takeover deals has recently become 
an issue for debate both in the press and among U.K. regulators. Particularly those schemes 
involving large companies and the concomitant financial worth of such companies. These 
debates have focused on whether bidders can acquire the target company for a low premium in 
comparison with tender offer. This concern arises because of the low threshold of the value of 
the shares voted that is required for schemes, which then allow the bidder more certainty in the 
acquisition of all the issued shares of the target firm. Yet, there is no evidence in the empirical 
works show that the shareholders of target companies who accept schemes of arrangement 
obtain a lower premium in comparison to tender offers.  
Using a comprehensive sample that is sourced by Thomson One Banker - the SDC Merger and 
Acquisition Database for the U.K. takeover market between the period 1995 and 2015, this 
study answers two important questions. First, what are the main target and deal characteristics 
that determines the choice of scheme of arrangements and tender offers.  
The empirical results reveal that the targets that adopt schemes are typically larger and older 
than those that choose tender offers. Target termination fees are higher for schemes. Both 
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methods are likely to be financed using cash as the means of payment, but tender offers are 
more likely to be conducted using cash payments. Schemes were found to be a favoured 
takeover method during the financial crisis, and remain the mainstay of the U.K. takeovers. 
Bidders use scheme of arrangements to make private bids, and are less likely to use a stake-
building strategy before the announcement date. 
Second, this study investigates whether scheme of arrangements have a causal impact upon bid 
premium. However, the target or bidder firms self-select their takeover methods. Therefore, a 
simple comparison or regression applied to the mean difference in the bid premium between 
scheme of arrangements and tender offers subsamples would result in a biased estimate. This 
study will, then, address the issue of self-selection by employing the propensity score matching 
(PSM) method. Therefore, this study is the first in the empirical literature to examine the impact 
of using scheme of arrangement as method for takeover in the U.K. market upon the bid 
premium, using PSM techniques to control for the consequence of self-selection problem into 
the treatment group.   
Propensity score matching is based on the seminal work of Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983a).  The 
basic idea of their framework to correct the selection-bias problem is that, the choice of 
treatment is determined by a certain set of observable covariates, and in consequence, when we 
condition on the set of covariates, we can regard the treatment (for example scheme of 
arrangement) as being essentially randomly-assigned, and therefore the potential outcomes are 
independent of the treatment choice.   
After correcting the selection-bias problem, the empirical investigations show that deals that 
are structured through tender offers generate significantly higher premiums than those 
structured through schemes. The results are robust in case of applying alternative measures of 
the bid premium.  
The second empirical work studies the causal impact of bidding in a specific selling method 
(auctions versus negotiations) upon bidder cumulative abnormal returns in the U.S. takeover 
market. The main motivation of this study is to examine whether the event of the winner’s 
curse exists in the takeover activates, particular with the high level of competition exists 
between bidders.  
There is much theoretical literature which highlights that the number of competitors that bid 
for the same target firms is one of the important factors that may exacerbate the winner’s curse 
problem. Bazerman & Samuelson (1983) and Kagel & Levin (1986) argue that bidders will be 
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more aggressive when there are a large number of bidders bid for a target firm, and that this 
makes negative the winner’s consequent payoff.  Bulow & Klemperer (1996a) argue that 
increasing the number of bidders in a standard auction will lead to an increase in the 
competition between bidders (and thus) raising the profit for the seller rather than engaging in 
one-to-one negotiation procedure.   
However, most deals in the real market are structured using one-to-one negotiations, where 
there is only one buyer negotiating with the target firm. Boone & Mulherin (2007a) is 
considered the first empirical work that examined such puzzling observations in the real market 
by investigating the private-phase competition of the takeover processes, before the public 
announcement of the deal. They concluded that the private stage is not free from competition, 
even if there is only one buyer revealed at the announcement stage. This means that even 
publicly observed non-competitive negotiation deals are not free from competition.   
Boone & Mulherin (2008b) tested whether selecting a different selling mechanism would 
induce different abnormal returns to target and acquirer firms. They define deals as an auction 
if there is more than one bidder bid for a target firm during the private selling process, while 
negotiation deals determine if there is only one bidder bid for a target firm. Boone & Mulherin 
(2008b) show that there is no significant difference between negotiation and auction upon 
target and bidder returns. Therefore, increase in competition between bidders does not increase 
a target firm payoff. Moreover, the possibility of the winner’s curse does not exist in the U.S. 
takeover market. 
Since the publication of Boone & Mulherin (2007a), many recent empirical works have moved 
to measure the exact competition level between bidders in auction and negotiation, and how 
the competition levels would affect different returns for the acquirers or target firms. The most 
prominent of these are Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn (2009b),Aktas, De Bodt, & Roll (2010a),and 
Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, Paap, & Teunissen (2012).  
In order to assess the impact of competition between bidders on bidder returns, this study 
measures the level of competition between bidders in takeover bidders based on the number of 
bidders who publicly bid for the same target firm. Because the level of competition is related 
to the bidders’ characteristics, where the presence of a strong bidder would create or at least 
heighten the prospect of the winner’s curse for other possible bidders, scuttling gains that might 
be expected to be generated through auction (Bulow & Klemperer, 2002b). Moreover, Boone 
& Mulherin (2007a) built their arguments using unrepresentative samples that included 
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only large firms with a deal size above $100 million. But a large number of M&As are 
conducted between small firms, which has drawn much attention in the press recently. 
According to Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz (2004) small firms generally outperform large 
firms in the market of acquisition, because bidders in larger firms are more to prone to hubris 
and therefore to overbid for target firms. Moreover, Boone & Mulherin (2008b) have found 
that the size of the bidder firm is inversely related to the level of competition when there is 
more than one bidder for the same target. More precisely, the mere presence of a large firm 
presents an opportunity to deter small bidders and, consequently, it is therefore more beneficial 
for the target to avoid conducting a full-scale auction when the size of the bidders is markedly 
different. 
As such, measuring the level of competition based on the public competition phase could reflect 
the type of bidders, which represents a substantial source of competition that has an enormous 
impact on the selling process. 
Using a sample from the U.S. takeover market during the period between 1984 and 2014, the 
second empirical chapter will answer two main questions. The first of these is what are the 
main bidder and deal characteristics that determines the choice of bidding in auction and 
negotiation bids. 
The main empirical results show that bidders who chose to conduct takeovers using auction 
frameworks have high levels of leverage and tangible assets, while bidders are more likely to 
bid using an auction if either the target initiates the deals, or is facing bankruptcy, or if the 
bidders already have a stake “toehold” in the target.  Bidders are also more likely to bid using 
an auction if they use (or their target uses) an investment bank with a high reputation. Auctions 
are, then, associated with tender offers, hostile techniques, and, most surprisingly, with 100% 
stock offers. Bidders are less likely to bid in auctions for private firms.   
Second, this study will investigate whether bidding in auctions have a causal impact on the 
bidder cumulative abnormal returns because if bidders has a negative return, this is evidence 
for the event of winner’s curse. Again, target firms self-select their selling mechanisms, 
therefore PSM will be used to correct the problem of self-selection.    
The empirical investigation reveals that the auction process has a negative impact on bidder 
returns during the short-event period when compared to takeovers structured through 
negotiations. This seems to confirm the theoretical prediction that auction, as a selling 
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mechanism, is less beneficial to bidders than negotiation due to increasing competition. 
Therefore, this research finds the existence of the winner’s curse in such activates. However, 
the results are less clear across the long-event period.  
The emphasis of this thesis therefore is to bridge the gap between rational choice of bidding 
strategy in takeover market and its real-effects on the shareholder’s wealth. Moreover, this 
thesis will investigate how the selecting of different bidding strategies could determine the 
exact factors that affect takeover deals. As mentioned before, the choice always matters for 
either target or bidder firms whereby buyers face a trade-off between the cost of selecting a 
particular selling mechanism and the fast execution of the bid. From the other side, sellers face 
a trade-off in raising the competition between bidders and the cost of information.   Each 
movement from buyers and sellers is a matter in different degrees in the U.S and the U.K 
takeover markets whereby both parties must satisfy regulatory requirements to protect target 
shareholders and to ensure that they obtain a good price for the sale of their shares. It will be 
instructive therefore to explore the bidding behavior and contest outcomes of selecting different 
selling mechanisms in different markets in order to address the broader debate about whether 
bidder and target firms are rational about the consequences of bidding strategies.  
This thesis is not however a comparative analysis of business practice in two markets. Rather, 
two markets have been chosen to allow the consideration of variables which – although hidden 
– might distort the findings of the research. The U.S. and the U.K. were chosen because they 
are markets where M&A activity is a prominent factor in commercial practice. Indeed, in the 
U.K. M&A activity it can be argued is sometimes a managerial exercise to create value through 
artifice with increases in the size of the balance sheet achieved not through the diligent building 
up of an enterprise but from simply buying size. The U.S. and the U.K. are linguistically and 
culturally sufficiently similar to provide robust base-level consistency necessary in any 
research. Nevertheless, they are, at the same time, sufficiently different in terms of M&A 
acquisition to highlight some of the key findings of this research. This is especially pertinent 
in the socio-economic analyses provided in this research which underpins the purely economic 
findings and provides an extra tier of ‘control group’ rigour.      
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1.2. Potential Contribution 
 
There have been several contributions in this thesis to the existing literature. The main 
contribution of the first empirical study (Chapter Two) is that the chapter introduces the relation 
between the choice to bid in different legal forms (scheme of arrangement versus tender offers) 
and acquisition premium in the U.K takeover market. The debate on this matter in the U.K., 
both in the regulatory authorities and in the press, is very narrow and defined in terms of the 
‘cheapness’ or ‘ease’ of the scheme of arrangement in comparison with the tender offer process. 
Further to this, even by these measures the previous analyses have focused on highly limited 
timeframes which places the ‘process’ not just above outcomes but, in so doing, excludes 
almost all contextual analysis, both before, but particularly in the mid- to long-term aftermath 
of the takeover process. This research addresses those lacunae and, in so doing, provides 
evidence which is the first in the literature that confirms a significant difference between bid 
premium across scheme of arrangement and tender offer, whereby the former significantly 
reduces the gain of target shareholder in comparison to tender offer. This research and the 
evidence presented demonstrates a far more sophisticated analysis and new insight into the 
absolute and relative understanding of what is truly ‘cheap’ or ‘easy’. 
 
Further to this, the second contribution in this chapter is to analyse the main determinants of 
the choice of a specific selling method in takeover activates. Such an investigation is important 
to explore why schemes became a preferable takeover method to a certain company at a given 
time. This research however examines the ramifications of this change, using more varied 
factors and synthesising them to provide significant new insights into the processes.  
 
Any analysis of changing trends in the corporate world cannot overlook the notion that trends, 
or changes of approach uncomfortably describe a fashion that is simply the new look and 
keeping up with the Joneses Plc and actually nothing more than the wisdom of the herd. 
However, as predicted, the results show that choosing scheme to implement takeover is not 
random: bidder firms that adopt schemes are typically larger than those adopting tender offers. 
This is consistent with the conjecture that bidders prefer schemes to takeover large target firms 
because schemes are commonly thought of as a friendly process, and it is more controlled by 
target directors who produce the documents, and it will only be completed by the 
recommendation of target directors.  Larger firms have larger numbers of tendered shares, and 
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this increases the uncertainty for a bidder in obtaining 100% share ownership, if this is 
necessary to the bidder. Therefore, adopting scheme of arrangement, which is a friendly 
takeover agreed between bidder, target shareholders and directors, will increase the likelihood 
that a bidder obtains the full control of the target.    
 
Relatively speaking, bidders could reduce the difficulty in financing large transactions by 
adopting a scheme as the takeover method. Under a scheme, a bidder can more easily achieve 
100% control of the target shares, which can then be used as collateral for loans, or alternatively, 
can be used to obtain financial assistance by re-registering the target as private firm.  In 
summary, the size of a target firm is one of the key determinants for bid premiums and for the 
selection of the specific takeover methods: schemes versus tender offers. This is could clarify 
as well why are a favored takeover method during the financial crisis, and schemes remain the 
mainstay of the U.K. takeovers, although the amendment in the takeover regulations give more 
power for a target firm to negotiate a deal.   
 
The second empirical study which forms the core of Chapter Three distinguishes itself from 
prior empirical works by measuring the impact of increasing the competition between bidders 
on their shareholders wealth during the public phase of takeover process whereby there are 
more than one public bidder bid for the same target. Constructing the competition proxy based 
on the interaction between public bidders provides a significantly better understanding of the 
consequences of bidding in a competitive deal where the presence of a strong or an aggressive 
bidder would create or at least heighten the prospect of the winner’s curse for other possible 
bidders. The main results show that comparing with negotiation, bidding in auction induces a 
negative impact on acquirer’s shar price in the short-term analysis which means that the 
winner’s curse issue exists in U.S. takeover activities. Proposing such relation between bidder 
returns and bidding in auction at public stage could answer the question of why auction is not 
a popular mechanism in corporate finance, because simply bidders avoid bidding in a 
competitive bid in order to avoid the high possibility of the winner’s curse. Rational bidders 
might (it could be argued) observe that the mechanism of competitive bidding leads them to be 
more aggressive and overbid for target’s assets, so, naturally they lose confidence in bidding 
in this kind of purchasing format.  
The second significant contribution in this chapter is to explore the main determinants of 
bidder’s choice to bid in a competitive deal in takeover activates. Such an investigation is an 
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important to understand whether bidders’ bidding strategies in corporate takeover are related 
to the psychological behaviour of humans rather than on entirely rational motives for bidders 
who bid in a competitive deal. The main results show that the larger size of bidder firms 
motivate them to engage in competitive selling procedures, where the larger bidder could deter 
other competitors as a result of the tendencies of management empire building or hubris, and 
this could reduce the level of competition and scuttle the possible gain for target firms from 
conduction an auction. While what is usually described as ‘insight’ or ‘instinct’ is as often post-
rationalisation for decisions which are not entirely grounded in sound commercial reason. This 
chapter combines two distinct academic disciplines – the psychology of human motivations 
and the rigours of economic data – in a unique way and provides new insight into the particulars 
of the U.S. takeover market which can provide evidence of far more useful and general 
application to future takeovers.  
 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
 
In addition to the chapter of introduction, there are three more chapters which form the structure 
of this thesis. The next chapter (Chapter 2) will explore first the main legal differences between 
schemes of arrangement and tender offers as the two main takeover methods in the U.K. market. 
Then the chapter will discuss regulatory issues that may affect the completion time of tender 
offers and scheme of arrangements. Later, the chapter will discuss how the legal structure of 
scheme of arrangements and tender offers could affect the final bid premium. The following 
empirical part describes the datasets and the methods of constructing the samples.  It also 
provides some discussion of the theoretical motivations for choosing the variables that will be 
used in order to estimate propensity scores. The empirical methodology section will discuss 
the main motivations of using propensity score matching to estimate the causal impact on bid 
premium of using scheme of arrangements; then the section will provide some theoretical 
background of the matching model.  Moreover, the empirical methodology section will discuss 
different methods to measure the bid premium, matching strategy and how to evaluate the 
selection strategies. The last section will present and discuss the main empirical results for t-
test, OLS and PSM. 
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Chapter 3 will explore the significance of winner’s curse in takeover, particularly when the 
competition exists between potential bidders in the US market. The first part will discuss the 
main theories concerned with auction and negotiation processes and the main explanations for 
the possibility for the winner’s curse to occur in takeover activates.  The thesis will then show 
how the empirical works are different in terms of measuring the competition between potential 
bidders during the selling process. Later, chapter 3 will discuss the main empirical works that 
investigate the impact of the level of competition between bidders upon bidder returns 
practically after the publication of the earlier work of (Boone & Mulherin, 2007a). The 
empirical part will discuss the sample and the main explanatory variables that will be used in 
the model to calculate the propensity score matching. Then, the methodological analysis will 
be discussed. Finally, the last section will present the empirical results for t-test, OLS and PSM.  
 
Chapter 4 will present the conclusion section that includes the significant results of this thesis, 
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The Selection and Consequences of Selling Processes in 
Takeovers: Schemes of Arrangement vs. Tender Offers 
 “[T]ender offers are the one area where the British acted before the Americans” 




Tender offers and schemes of arrangement are the two main methods for M&As in the U.K. A 
tender offer is a form of public takeover bid, where an acquirer offers to purchase outstanding 
shares directly from the target’s shareholders.  The directors of the target company may or may 
not endorse the tender offer by an acquirer.  Under tender offer, if the bidder acquires 90% or 
more of the target’s shares, it can exercise a “squeeze-out” procedure and compel the unwilling 
minority shareholders to sell their shares anyway. 15  A scheme of arrangement (hereafter 
“scheme”), which is less common and more cumbersome, requires the involvement of a court 
and the approval of a majority of the target’s shareholders, representing a minimum of 75% of 
the target company’s voting rights. It normally represents “a compromise or arrangement 
proposed between a company and its creditors or its members”.16 Nevertheless, under a scheme 
of arrangement, bidders are more certain of obtaining the approval of shareholders in acquiring 
all of the target’s shares.  Normally, there are two ways to implement a scheme, through either 
a cancellation or a transfer scheme.  Under a cancellation scheme, the shares of the target 
company are cancelled, and new ones issued to the bidder.17 Under a transfer scheme, the 
existing target shares are simply transferred to the bidder.18  
                                                          
14 For more information about the history of tender offers, see (Kenyon-Slade 2004) 
15 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.979      
16 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.895 and 899(1) 
17 [UK] Companies Act 2006, pt.17, s.641(1) 
18 [UK] Companies Act 2006, pt.28, s.895 - 901 
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Schemes of arrangement, in one form or another, have been recognised in English law for 
nearly 150 years, and were recognised formally in statute in 1862 (Companies Act 1862).19 
Schemes are used commonly in debt restructuring for insolvent companies, and for takeovers 
and mergers, as “a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and... its 
members”.20  In recent years, there has been a significant growth in the use of schemes in 
takeover transactions in the U.K. (Payne, 2014a, p.2).  For example, in 2007, six of the largest 
takeovers in the U.K. were structured through schemes, with an average deal value of £8 billion 
(Shikha, 2013) In 2011, among the fifteen takeovers with announced deal values of more than 
£50 million, nine were structured through schemes (O'Dea, Long, & Smyth, 2012, p.203).  And 
in 2014, around 65% of all takeovers in the U.K. were conducted through schemes, with eight 
out of the ten largest takeovers receiving the assistance of the English courts (Green, 2015). 
This growing trend is somehow due to the flexibility of English courts in providing the requisite 
terms and documents, to ensure reasonable prices for various schemes of arrangement (Shikha, 
2013). Moreover, in 2007, the U.K. Takeover Panel21 issued an Appendix 7, which further 
clarifies the rules of implementing schemes in the U.K. market  
Nevertheless, there are growing debates on the frequent use of schemes to implement takeover 
deals, both in the press and among U.K. regulators.  These debates focus on whether bidders 
can acquire a target company “cheaply” and “easily” in comparison to using the tender offer 
process.22  This concern arises because schemes allow for low threshold of target company’s 
shares for voting, which may reduce the bidder’s risk of acquiring all the issued shares of the 
target company.  However, there is no empirical evidences suggest that shareholders of target 
companies who accept schemes obtain a lower premium in comparison to tender offer.  
The academic research on takeover regulations suggests some advantages of using schemes.  
These include the avoidance of stamp duty on the target company’s shares when using 
cancellation schemes.  Stamp duty is paid on transfers of shares and tender offers, at 0.5% of 
                                                          
19 That such statutory provision were passed by parliament so soon after the statutory recognition of limited 
liability companies (Limited Liability Act 1855) and protection of shareholders (Joint Stock Companies Act 1856), 
show that the legislative was alive to the fact that the very existence of such companies would awaken the interest 
of acquisitive buyers. 
20 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.895(1)(b) 
21 The City Code (“the code”) in U.K. takeover regulations includes a set of statutory rules that are used by the 
Takeover Panel (“the Panel”), which is an independent body of the U.K. government that supervises and controls 
all matters related to takeover activities. For more information see: http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/. 
22 (Payne, 2014a) in terms of discussing the main disadvantages of schemes as a method to implement takeovers 
has used these two expressions “cheaply” and “easily”. And the two expressions appear in the most LexisNexis 
U.K. articles that discuss the disadvantages of schemes. 
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the target consideration shares.  Such raised concerns have encouraged the U.K. government 
to ban transactions by cancellation schemes in March 2015, in order to address this problem of 
tax loophole.23 The prohibiting on the cancelation scheme could affect the choices of the 
takeover mechanisms, which could shift back towards tender takeover offers that is relatively 
quicker than schemes.  
Nevertheless, scheme transactions still significantly outnumber tender offers.  In early 2015, 
there were around 23 transactions announced, of which 14 were structured as schemes and only 
9 as tender offers (61% versus 39%).  Moreover, in the first half of 2016, there were 20 
takeovers announced, of which 13 were structured as schemes and 7 as tender offers (65% 
versus 35%). 24 
In the early 1950s, the U.K. regulators first introduced and employed the tender offer method. 
The rationale behind tender offers is that acquirers should have access to a wide scope of 
strategies and actions to process takeovers.  In order to protect the benefits of the shareholders 
of target companies, English law puts the discretion and allows the shareholders to usurp 
executive decisions from the board.  Although it is expected that shareholders will seek counsel 
from the board, the final decision lies with the shareholders, and the board are strictly 
prohibited from taking defensive actions such as ‘poison pills’ against any bids.25  These 
regulations make tender offers a favourite method for bidders, and significantly shorten the 
time to complete takeover transactions.  However, they also induce the emerging of hostile 
takeovers in the markets (Armour & Skeel Jr, 2007).26 
According to Kenyon-Slade (2004, p. 51-53) bidders by using tender offer have evolved highly 
aggressive and effective takeover techniques to implement a takeover in the U.K. and U.S. For 
example, if bidders in the U.S. seek to takeover a target firm, they need only to offer premium 
bids for the controlling interest (or 51% of target shares) and then simply hoover up what is 
left through a technique known as a “long-form freezeout merger”. In order to able the acquirer 
                                                          
23 The Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 17) Regulations 2015, amended s.641 substituting s.641(2A). 
24 LexisNexis report, 2015, 2016. 
25 “Shareholders’ rights plans” are known as a ‘poison pill’ because they are one of the most frequently used 
preventive antitakeover strategies employed by target firms. The target firms issue new shares at a discounted rate  
of the actual share price for current shareholders, increasing the amount of existing shares. This increases the cost 
of the takeover for the bidder, whereby the acquirer needs to buy a huge amount of shares in order to gain control 
of the target (Rauch, Wahrenburg, Baker, & Kiymaz, 2011) 
26 Tender offers were introduce later in the U.S., and it was only in the 1960s that the tender offer strategy started 
to be formally used (Armour & Skeel Jr, 2007). Tender offer is therefore considered one of methods  where the 
British acted before the Americans.   
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to eliminate the remaining minority shareholders. This is clearly representing a significant 
degree of pressure on shareholders seeking to obtain the best deal for themselves and the devil 
takes the hindmost. 
 
The problem of coercion (or, more accurately, distorted choice) presents as a result of the 
differences between the offer prices before and after announcing the takeover.  Although there 
is no statutory merger mechanism to eliminate the minority shareholder by the way of freezeout 
merger in the U.K. as opposed to the U.S. law.  Nevertheless, as in the U.S., Kenyon-Slade 
(2004, p.516) argues that shareholders do suffer from the problem of coercion in the U.K. even 
though the power to “long-form freezeout merger” the minority does not formally at least exist. 
Shareholders in the U.K. however, could face a dilemma in a tender because they might not 
agree with the offer or might not be part of the offer (if it is a partial offer) and then be left as 
a minority shareholder and with devalued shares for not taking part on the tender. This fear 
creates a subliminal pressure at least for shareholders to take part in tender offers. This pressure 
would realistically and logically increase where a scheme of arrangement is used; the approach 
considered most analogous with the US statutory merger.  
 
One key difference between tender offers and schemes is about the threshold for squeezing-out 
minority shareholders.  If both the shareholders (at least 75% of the voting shares of the target 
company) and the courts approve a scheme, then the scheme is binding on all the target 
shareholders, and the bidder can exercise a “squeeze-out” measure on the unwilling minority 
shareholders to sell their shares.27  However, in a tender offer, the offer is only binding on those 
shareholders who agree with the offer.  If the bidder intends to own 100% of the target firm, 
the bidder must receive acceptances of at least 90% of target voting share, such that it can 
squeeze-out the remaining minority shareholders.28  Therefore, if the offer cannot reach the 90% 
“squeeze-out” threshold, this means that the bidder does not take 100% control of the target 
company. In the light of the above, schemes endow the bidders with more bargaining power, 
and they are more certain to obtain 100% of the target shares. 
 
                                                          
27 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.899(3) 
28 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.979 
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Both takeover methods are used to transfer ownership of a target firm in the U.K. market; 
however, there are a number of important differences between tender offers and schemes of 
arrangement that could affect the final bid premium.  Therefore, it will be interesting to 
investigate whether the choice of different takeover methods (schemes vs. tender offers) would 
affect shareholder premiums in the U.K. takeovers. In addition, this study is also interesting to 
investigate what are the determinants for the selection of different mechanisms.  
 
This chapter studies a sample of 759 takeover deals for listed- target firms in the U.K. over the 
period 1995-2015, as sourced by Thomson One Banker - the SDC Merger and Acquisition 
Database. Of them, 201 were structured as schemes and 558 as tender offers. The main 
objectives of this chapter are twofold.  First, this chapter investigates how the choices of 
different selling mechanisms (tender offers vs. schemes) are related to various target and deal 
characteristics. As predicted, the results show that target firms that adopt schemes are typically 
larger and older than those adopting tender offers.  Target termination fees are higher for 
schemes.  Acquisitions through tender offers and schemes are both likely to be financed using 
cash as a means of payments; yet the frequency of using cash in tender offers is higher. Schemes 
of arrangement are a favoured takeover method during the financial crisis, and schemes remain 
the mainstay of the U.K. takeovers. Acquisitions by schemes of arrangement prevail when the 
bidders are private, and bidders are less likely to use a stake-building strategy. 
 
Secondly, this chapter examines the causal effect of selecting a specific selling method (tender 
offers vs. schemes) on the bid premiums of takeover transactions.  Obviously, the choice of a 
specific selling method is self-selected by bidder firms or selected based on deal characteristics, 
and this study will address that self-selection problem by employing the propensity score 
matching (PSM) method.  
As normal in the literature, the analysis will apply logit regression to estimate the propensity 
scores, the probabilities for a target company to choose schemes as the selling method.  The 
key co-variants in the logit estimation include target size, a dummy of financial crisis, payment 
methods, whether the bidder is private or not, whether there are termination fees, whether the 
bidder owns a stake in the target firm.   
The main results, after implementing the matching strategies, show that deals structured 
through tender offers generate significantly higher premiums than those through schemes. The 
bid premium is defined as the difference between the actual offer price that is paid by the bidder 
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(the final price data in SDC), and the target closing price at one, two, and three months prior 
to the initial public announcement date and the SDC announcement date. The analysis applies 
various greedy matching strategies: nearest neighbour matching and caliper matching. In case 
of bid premium measured by one, two, and three months before the initial announcement date, 
where each target firm in the treatment group (schemes) matches with two or three nearest 
neighbours in the control group (tender offers).  The main result shows that schemes of 
arrangement strongly reduce the target shareholder’s premium by on average -11% (0.000).  
Similar results are also reported in the case of using caliper matching.  
In case of measuring bid premium by two, and three months before the SDC announcement 
date, where each target firm in the treatment group matches with two or three nearest 
neighbours in the control group. The main result shows that schemes of arrangement still 
strongly reduce the target shareholder’s premium by on average -9% (0.000).   
This study is the first in the empirical literature to examine the impact of using scheme of 
arrangement as method for takeover in the U.K. market upon the bid premium, using PSM 
techniques to control for the consequence of self-selection problem into the treatment group.   
One possible explanation could be that schemes are more amenable to the establishment of a 
firm and provide more certainty to the bidder of obtaining 100% of the target’s stock shares.  
This is particularly true in acquiring large-sized target firms.  The empirical evidences in the 
literature, such as Officer (2003),Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter (2008), and Betton 
et al., (2009b), normally report a negative relationship between bid premium and the target size.  
Another explanation may lie in the observation that a majority of the deals of schemes (66.17%) 
are associated with private acquirers, which may also lower the bid premiums.  Bargeron et al., 
(2008) and Fidrmuc et al., (2012) found that private acquirers pay normally less for the target, 
compared to the public acquirers, because the latter could gain from the expected synergies 
with the target from the transaction. 
The remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the main 
differences between tender offers and schemes in terms of legal structure and time to execute. 
Further, it also presents the existing literature and empirical results on the main determinants 
of bid premium in takeovers. Section 2.3 describes the datasets and the methods of constructing 
the samples. It also provides some discussion over the main variables to be used in the 
estimation of propensity scores. Section 2.4 is about the empirical methodology, and Section 
2.5 presents the main empirical results of this chapter. Finally, Section 2.6 is a short conclusion.




2.2. Literature Review  
 
2.2.1. Tender Offers vs. Schemes in the U.K. 
 
How to balance the power between participants involved in the tender offer process has been 
under public debate in the U.K. since 2010.  A recent example is the U.S. food company, 
Kraft’s, acquisition of the U.K.-listed chocolate maker, Cadbury.   Although, to some extent, 
it is an emotional debate, as Cadbury is a long-established firm whose range of chocolate and 
confectionary products were recalled by all from their childhoods, the takeover did prompt a 
legitimate examination of the rights and responsibilities of the parties as well as the public 
interest in takeovers.29 The commentators found that the current takeover regulations in the 
U.K. unduly and perhaps unfairly favoured any bidder over the target company; that the mere 
act of a takeover bid favoured a bidder company while a target company was automatically 
disadvantaged as a passive subject of a takeover bid.30  It was felt that such an imbalance should 
be addressed (Bismarck, 2013, p.151). As a result, in September 2011, the amendments to the 
Takeover Code has strengthened the hand of the target firms and given them the right to request 
information about all the financial or economic impact that could affect the future growth and 
direction of the firm, particularly any plans could affect the workers. 
Moreover, the recent amendments to the Takeover Codes give the target board more power to 
control the scheme process as well. Previously, the process of scheme was an “offer-related 
arrangement” between a bidder and target firm allowing the bidder to obtain some control over 
the scheme process.  Now, such implementation agreements are prohibited.31  These changes 
                                                          
29 Most recently, in February 18, 2017 the debate comes back to the press practically after the announcement of 
the American company -Kraft Heinz to acquire Unilever, one of the biggest Britain companies that operates in 
the food and drink industry with 7,000 employees across the country. And if the acquisition is successfully 
completed, it would be the second-largest takeover in history which could affect the economy if the biggest brand 
controlled by the American hand (The times, 2017). However, the deal fails as a result of political unease that 
related to British jobs 
30 Alex Brummer in his book” Britain for Sale: British Companies in Foreign Hands - The Hidden Threat to Our 
Economy” discusses how the tender offer process in the U.K. as main method of implementing a takeover 
transaction allowed for overseas predator acquirers to control the most important Britain brands. Such as the U.K.-
high end department stores -Selfridges (began life in 1909) was acquired by Canada’s Galen Weston in 2003. 
Moreover, in 2006- the US private equity firms KKR and the Italian tycoon Stefan Pessina company, acquired the 
UK-listed high street chemist, Boots (began life in 1849).  
31 [UK]Takeover code, Rule 21.2(a) 
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are broadly in line with the wide decision-making powers the common law and statute grant 
directors in all other circumstances.  However, in practical terms such mitigation is indeed 
illusory.  The board of a target company can simply withdraw its recommendation of the offer 
in order to avoid implementing the scheme.  Nevertheless, ascertaining a board’s true purpose 
can be factually difficult. However, in such cases, bidders can protect themselves by using 
long-stop dates32, whereby bidders can only withdraw an offer if certain agreements have not 
been reached in a scheme Bismarck (2013,p.129).  If boxes are not ticked, the protection for 
the bidders is then triggered. This approach seems to defeat sound commercial decision-making. 
Even if the main objective of the takeover regulations is to balance the powers between the 
participants, in both schemes and tender offers, it seems that a target board still has significant 
power to control the process in schemes, which might not serve the shareholders of either target 
or bidder.33   
The change in control power associated with M&As will normally create an interest conflict 
between a target board and the shareholders, if such activities affect negatively their jobs and 
perquisites (Jensen, 1986).  The legal provisions on takeover law are used to control the 
transaction process, and may mitigate the managerial agency problem. It is also important to 
understand the motivations of the involved parties to choose either schemes or tender offers as 
the selling method.  The board of target firms may use different defensive strategies to obstruct 
the takeover process, even if these actions are not in the interest of the shareholders.  Target 
boards may also manipulate the takeover processes such that some incumbent shareholders 
turn into minority shareholders, and this may enable acquirers to exploit the benefits of the 
minority shareholders (Martynova & Renneboog ,2011). 
Historically, the main feature of U.K. takeovers is the self-regulatory institution, which allows 
an acquirer to purchase shares directly from target’s shareholders, so as to protect the 
shareholders and to ensure that they obtain a good price for the sale of their shares (Kenyon-
Slade, 2004, p.496). This approach may be suitable in normal market conditions, yet no longer, 
so in an era of large-scale or widespread acquisition by takeovers that happened over the last 
few decades.  However, there is a serious issue with schemes, that is, a target board has a 
significant control over the implementation process and in persuading various classes of 
shareholders to approve a takeover offer.34   This is in contrast to tender offers whereby 
                                                          
32 [UK]Takeover code, Appendix 7,s3(b) 
33 This conclusion is to suggest that the law and regulations offer only a superficial protection to counterparties, 
which hardly surprising because the takeover law in the U.K. supports a laissez-faire approach 
34 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.895(1)(b) 
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acquirers ask the shareholders directly to buy their shares.  It seems that, a target board has 
more controls and more opportunities in schemes, to act based on their own interest even if the 
transaction does not create values for the shareholders.  Of course, interest conflict between the 
shareholders and target board can also arise in tender offers, as a target board retains the 
discretion to circulate their opinions on the transaction,35 but a target board does not have the 
power to control the tender process.  
From the discussion above, it then becomes clear that, to better understand the incentives of 
choosing different selling method in takeovers, it is very important to examine and understand 
the legal provisions behind each selling process.  It is commonly agreed that, a target board 
under schemes have less restricted power and more control over the takeover process, which 
means that the managerial agent problem may be more serious in schemes.  
This section next will investigate the important differences between tender offers and schemes 
from various perspectives, such as the level of threshold of the shares votes that are required to 
implement the two methods, completion timelines, method of payment, and finally, 
inducement fee and stake building and stealthy takeovers. 
One important difference between tender offers and schemes is that, under schemes, the 
threshold for a bidder to acquire 100% control of a target firm is lower than that under tender 
offers.  A scheme is approved by the court if a majority of the target’s shareholders, 
representing a minimum of 75% of the target company’s voting rights, accept the offer. 
Moreover, if both the shareholders and the court approve the scheme, the offer becomes 
binding on all the shareholders of the target firm.36 As a result, the acquirer obtains 100% of 
the target ownership if the scheme is approved, and therefore scheme is considered as an “all 
or nothing” transaction, which means that there is no risk that the minority shareholders retain 
influence (O'Dea et al., 2012, p.217). In contrast, under tender offers, the acquirer purchases 
shares directly from the shareholders, and the offer is binding only on those shareholders who 
accept it. The shareholders, who do not accept the offer, are not bound, and they retain their 
shares and any rights those shares entitle them to.  This means that the tender offer could 
involve acquisitions of less than 100% of the voting rights of the target, in contrast to a scheme. 
Therefore, bidders in scheme are more certain of acquiring the target firm without any 
remaining minority shareholders, while in the tender offer there is a possibility of remaining 
                                                          
35 [UK] Takeover Code, Rule 25.1.   
36 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s899(3) 
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minority shareholders.  Under tender offers, if it is necessary to bidders to acquire 100% of the 
target shares, they have to achieve 90% of acceptances by the shareholders, and the law then 
can force the remaining minority shareholders to sell their shares.37  This is known as the 
statutory “squeeze out” procedure, which reduces the bidders’ risk to some degree.   
Being able to automatically achieve 100% control is a key advantage of schemes, as it ensures 
that the acquirer does not have to deal with the issue of minority shareholders following the 
takeover.  From the other side, the legal structure of implementing a scheme needs more 
cooperation from the target company’s board to persuade the shareholders to vote in favour of 
scheme. It seems that, the interaction between an offeror and a target board is a cooperative 
game when a takeover is in the form of friendly process as it is in the scheme. The facilitation 
of information requests between the parties is more likely, as both parties are working towards 
the same goal and they both want a takeover to go ahead.  By scheme, acquirers and target 
boards can reach their agreement and they are certain to complete the transactions at the 
minority shareholders’ expense in case if the later does not accept the offer price. In contrast, 
the communication and cooperation between acquirers and target boards are likely to be less 
forthcoming in case of using tender offer.  
Such cooperation between target boards and buyers could increase when a target firm is large. 
Larger firms have larger numbers of tendered shares, and this increases the uncertainty for a 
bidder in obtaining 100% of the target company. The board of the acquirer firm needs greater 
collaboration from a target board, which is less likely to be in the case of the tender offer. 
Gorton, Kahl, & Rosen (2009) state that the likelihood of a target’s acquisition decreases with 
the increase in target size, because of the difficulty in financing such large transactions. To 
some extent, this is self-evident as difficulty will increase almost inevitably as financial 
leverage or exposure increases. For these transactions, however, the associated risk comes from 
two sources: the intrinsic risk of rising leverage and, more significantly, the extrinsic risk of a 
lack of control when the takeover is incomplete, and the effective control of a target firm is not 
yet obtained. However, bidders under a scheme can effectively reduce the intrinsic risk, as they 
can more easily achieve 100% control of the target firm, which can then be used as collateral 
for loans, or alternatively, can be used to obtain financial assistance by re-registering a target 
as a private firm.38  The main motivation to do this is that a public target cannot assist a bidder 
either by lending it money or providing security to finance the acquisitions.  The prohibition 
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on various forms of financial assistance in takeovers applies to both schemes and tender offers. 
However, bidders can obtain financial assistance from a target firm if the court allows the 
assistance. 39   Target size is a fundamental determinant on the choice of different selling 
methods, that is, schemes or tender offers. Therefore, adopting a scheme as a method of 
takeover can effectively reduce extrinsic risk and the concomitant uncertainty that a bidder 
could face.   
A further issue is that a public bidder is more likely to have stronger incentives to complete a 
takeover because failure carries more risk.  This can be an internal risk with corporate 
governance and decision-making being challenged or even an external risk that a public bidder 
having overreached itself might in turn become a target Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015). Target 
boards enjoy more control powers in schemes. They produce documents required by disclosure 
rules and make recommendations to shareholders.  Large firms typically have a highly diffusive 
ownership structure, and the board has less ownership in comparison to small firms. 
Consequently, the interest of large firms boards are therefore less aligned with their 
shareholders Demsetz & Lehn (1985). Moreover, the public companies in the UK typically do 
not have a single shareholder with control power of the company, and the shareholding is 
dispersed (Payne, 2011b). In the friendly process, target boards will inevitably have greater 
opportunity to discuss their private, post-acquisition benefits such as compensation or whether 
to they keep their jobs.  A conflict of interest problem is more likely to arise in a scheme 
whereby bidders and target boards are aligned in seeking a successful takeover; the later will 
be less aggressive in seeking to extract a high premium in order to obtain private benefits in 
post-takeover.  This collaboration between bidders and target boards could increase as well, 
when the transaction is a leveraged buyout.40  According to Bayar (2011) in private equity 
firms, target boards obtain a large equity (stock and options) upside to the extent that these 
upsides dictate their behaviour, especially when they cannot readily sell their equity until the 
value is materialised in an exit transaction. Such incentive problems are is considered to be a 
key differentiating factor when compared with a typical public company ownership structure 
(Pearl & Rosenbaum, 2013, p. 205-206), Therefore, adopting  scheme of arrangement, which 
                                                          
39 [UK] The Companies Act 2006, s.681(2)(e) allows that a court can approve transactions which would otherwise 
constitute unlawful financial assistance where such assistance is ‘done in pursuance of an order of the court under 
Part 26 (order sanctioning compromise or arrangement with members or creditors)’. 
40 Leveraged buyout (LBO) is defined as transactions in which private investors in order to meet the cost of 
takeover activities; they use a significant amount of debt to acquire other firms or division (Palepu, 1990). 
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is effectively a friendly takeover agreed between bidder, target shareholders and directors, will 
increase the likelihood that bidders obtain the full control of the large target.  
The other main difference between the two methods is the time needed to complete a takeover 
transaction and transfer a target ownership to the bidder.  Acquirers typically prefer tender 
offers in the U.S. market because it is substantially quicker than mergers.41  This is particularly 
true when there are more than one bidders bid for the same target or when there are a fewer 
external impediments on execution of the offer such as the existence or prospect of anti-trust 
reviews from regulators. However, there is an obvious trade-off between the cost of using a 
tender offer and the fast execution of the bid. If the bidders choose to ask shareholders directly 
to tender their shares that could signal that the target has a high value for them and therefore 
the target shareholders could raise their reservation prices (Offenberg & Pirinsky, 2015).  In 
general, schemes require longer periods for completion than tender offers, due to their complex 
structures and requirements.  The process of schemes will inevitably require the involvement 
of the courts.  In contrast, the process of tender offers does not require the involvement of the 
courts, which normally implies a shorter time of completion.  For instance, if no complications 
(e.g. competition law issues) arise during the tender offer process, the minimum timescale 
required to complete unconditional transfer is twenty-one days. 42   However, if a scheme 
proposal is approved by the high English court, it will normally take 7-8 weeks to complete the 
target ownership transformation (Payne, 2014a, p.96). In addition, the high English courts close 
during the summer holiday and Christmas times, which may lead to a longer waiting time. 
The difference in completion time between the two processes sheds important implications on 
the choice between tender offers and schemes. For example, if a target firm is strategically 
important to the bidder, or there are other potential bidders interested in the same target, the 
bidder normally prefers using the quicker method of tender offers, that would certainly lead to 
an increase of a target firm reservation price (Offenberg & Pirinsky, 2015). On the other hand, 
schemes are considered as an “all or nothing” transaction, which implies lower risk for 
acquirers if they want to have full control of the target firm.  Schemes also have longer time 
for completion than tender offers, and the longer completion time also implies that the risk of 
another bid to arise during the scheme process is higher (O'Dea et al., 2012, p.211). 
Consequently, the high level of competition could lead to an increase in the offer price, which 
                                                          
41 In merger; the acquirer and the target’s board of directors agree on a price, and the target’s shareholders then 
vote on whether or not to approve the proposal (Offenberg & Pirinsky, 2015). 
42 [UK] Takeover code, Rule 31.1  
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would be beneficial for all shareholders of the target.  The difference in the timescale to 
implement the two methods is therefore a significant factor to understand why bidder, target 
boards and shareholders prefer to choose one particular method over the other.  
The method of payment is another key factor that affects the choice between schemes and 
tender offers.  In the U.S., there is no obligation for an acquirer to have unconditional confirmed 
access to the funds at the time it makes offer (Kastiel, 2014). In the U.K., however, the Panel 
is unlikely to accept a precondition in the offer, stating that the offer is conditional on the 
bidder's ability to raise the cash, as this creates unacceptable uncertainty for the target and its 
shareholders.  The bidder therefore needs to ensure that it is able to raise the funds before it 
makes the formal offer.43  Consequently, the choice between cash and securities as payment 
methods may greatly affect the completion time and takeover costs for the bidders.  For 
example, if the bidders choose cash payment, it means that they have access to a large amount 
of cash, e.g., their own liquid assets or access to debt finance.  However, the access to debt 
finance largely depends on the bidder’s credit record and their relationship with the banks.  In 
addition, banks usually require some evidences of the viability of the proposed takeover before 
issuing loans, and applying for the required loans will also take time, due to investigation by 
and negotiation with banks.  
After access to the required funds is confirmed, the timetable runs as normal for a scheme and 
tender offer. Where shares are used, a bidder will often need to issue more shares, which 
requires approval from the bidder’s shareholders and compliance with various company law 
procedures specified by the Companies Act 2006. These procedures themselves have certain 
time stipulations such as minimum notice periods required for shareholder meetings which 
adds time to the whole takeover process. 
If raising the cash through borrowing is difficult and acquiring a 100% of the target is important, 
the bidder could choose a scheme to implement the takeover.  Moreover, the acquirer can use 
a scheme to obtain financial assistance by re-registering the target as private firm.44 However, 
using cash as method of payment could increase the cost of the transactions. Because target 
shareholders with cash offers will generate more tax liabilities in respect of capital gains, in 
comparison to security offers.  The natural corollary of this is that target boards will ask or 
                                                          
43 General Principle 5 of the Takeover Code states that ‘An offeror must announce a bid only after ensuring that 
he/she can fulfil any cash consideration, if such is offered, and after taking all reasonable measures to secure 
the implementation of any other type of consideration.’ 
44 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.681(2)(e)  
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even require the bidder to increase their offer in order to be compensated for the taxes (Huang 
& Walkling, 1987). Therefore, there is a trade-off between raising a cash by using loan and 
impose a cost on the bidder in case of using cash as method of payment. However, a target 
manager could be less aggressive to extract the high premium from the bidder in order to 
maximise their private benefits, which could arise as a result of choosing scheme process. From 
the other side, this cost of using cash as means of payment may be increased in case of using 
tender offer, whereas the likelihood of minority shareholders to remain is high. In the case of 
schemes, if there are minority shareholders does not accept the scheme offer, cash schemes 
could help them to obtain the desirable offer price.  
Another important factor, which could affect the choice between schemes and tender offers, is 
the inducement fee. The inducement fee (otherwise known as a “break fee”) is where the target 
agrees to pay the acquiring company a sum of money if certain events happen which effectively 
prevents a deal from going ahead, or from being completed. However, in order to balance the 
negotiation power between the parties involved in the transaction and to protect the target’s 
shareholders, the inducement fee has been prohibited in the U.K. since 2011.45  In the U.S., 
however, target firms must pay break fees to the bidder when a transaction  is not successfully 
produced or if a target firm accepts a competing bid, with fees up to 6% of the size of the 
transaction agreed (Kastiel, 2014). The Panel in the U.K. does not like inducement fees as they 
have the effect of locking a target firms into a deal, which may not be in the best interests of 
the target’s shareholders. In light of this, bidders may prefer using schemes over tender offers 
to offset the prohibition of the inducement fee, because bidders in scheme is more certain to 
complete the transaction if the courts approve the process. However, the risk of other bids 
arising is high in the process of schemes because of the long completion time.  Therefore, if 
the probability of other bid is high and if it is important for the bidder to acquirer the target 
firm, tender offer then is a probable method to implement the transactions.  
Finally, scheme is a less attractive mechanism if a bidder already owns a stake in a target firm 
(a toehold), and scheme bidders do not usually seek to build a stake in the target, as that stake 
will not be counted towards the threshold of 75% voting power.  In contrast, tender offer 
bidders can use the stake building strategy to reach the majority level of 50% of the target’s 
                                                          
45 This is one of the major change in the UK takeover regime particularly in the shadow of the public debt that 
following the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft (Kastiel, 2014). 
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shares, and thus gain control of the firm. Therefore, stake-building strategy is an attractive 
technique for bidders in tender offers.  
In conclusion, bidders will use a scheme if a target firm is large because they are more certain 
to obtain the 100% control of the target, if it is important. Particularly, target mangers are less 
aligned with their shareholders in large firm because they have less concentrated managerial 
ownership. Moreover, target boards can increase their benefits in the post- acquisition periods. 
However, if the probability of other competing bids to be exist is high, bidders will prefer to 
use a tender offer because it is quicker.   
If it is important for bidders to control 100% of target shares and if it is difficult to raise the 
cash, bidders will use scheme in order to obtain financial assistance by re-registering target 
firms as private firms.46  The probability of choosing tender offer increases with a toehold.  
Because there is always a trade-off between costs and speed in case of choosing between tender 
offer and scheme, the next part will discuss the main regulatory reasons that could affect the 
completion time line in the scheme and tender offer. 
 
2.2.1.1 Completion Timelines 
 
The completion time of a takeover process is defined as the time between the formal 
announcement of a deal and its completion, and it is largely determined by various regulation 
rules (Bismarck, 2013, p.162-164). Yet, in general, restructuring through schemes normally 
requires longer time for completion than tender offers, due to their complex structures and 
requirements.  This section will discuss regulatory issues that may affect the completion time 
of tender offers and schemes.   
This section will first discuss the ways in which these deals are instigated. Initially, the bidder’s 
board or financial advisors will present an informal offer to the target company in order to 
discuss basic details such as the offer price and the due diligence process. If the key conditions 
and the offer price are agreed upon, then the due diligence process begins. Once the acquirer 
makes the required public announcement of “a firm’s intention to make an offer”, the acquirer 
                                                          
46 Companies Act 2006, s.681(2)(e)  
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needs to post the offer documents to the target’s shareholders within 28 days.47  In schemes, a 
target board has the responsibility to send the scheme document to the shareholders.  
There are several regulatory issues that can affect how long a takeover takes after the formal 
offer has been made. First, the City Code timetables for tender offers and schemes are different.  
For tender offers, strict timetables and deadlines are specified. For example, for a tender offer, 
after the announcement, the offeror needs to post the offer documents within 28 days, and in 
most cases, once the offer document has been posted, the offer must become unconditional 
within 81 days. In this period, if competition issues arise and competition authorities wish to 
investigate the case, the Panel may pause proceedings while the authorities investigate the 
offer.48  
Moreover, if a competing offer (from other bidders) has been announced, the Panel will force 
the timetable to accommodate the competing bidder.  According to Note 4 of Rule 31.6, under 
these circumstances, the Panel will normally allow the initial offeror to extend their offer, even 
when their offer has not become unconditional. This means that both offerors will be bound by 
the timetable initiated by the publication of the competing offer document.  Thus, it is likely 
that there will be changes to the offer timetable in the event of another competing offer being 
made. Conversely, if there is only one offeror, the timetable will not be altered.   
In contrast, there are no formal deadlines for completing schemes, but there are a few timing 
requirements specified by the Code. In general, the indicative timetable gives the parties an 
estimate of completion times, although these estimates are not strictly enforceable, unlike those 
relevant to tender offers. Once the bidder announces that they intend to make an offer that will 
proceed as a scheme of arrangement, and this is “recommended” by the target’s board, the 
target manager must ‘ensure that the scheme circular is sent to shareholders and persons with 
information rights within 28 days of that announcement’.49 The scheme circular document 
must contain details of the scheme, certain information required by the Takeover Code (Rules 
24 and 25, as for a tender offer), notice of the court meeting, and an expected timetable for the 
scheme.50 Nevertheless, the scheme’s timeline is contingent on arranging a date for the court 
hearing, which can result in delays depending on the availability of court time. To implement 
                                                          
47 [UK] Takeover Code, Rule 24.1. 
48 [UK] Takeover Code, Note 3 to Rule 31.6. 
49 [UK] Takeover Code, Appendix 7, para 3(a). 
50 [UK] Takeover Code, Appendix 7, para 3(d). 
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a scheme, two meetings should be approved by the court: a shareholder meeting and a sanction 
meeting.  
The type of schemes chosen can also affect the completion time. A cancellation scheme 
normally takes longer time to complete than a transfer scheme. There are some tax advantages 
to cancellation schemes, but there are also additional company law procedures need to be 
followed. For instance, cancelling shares (in order to re-issue new ones) requires a temporary 
reduction in share capital. Transfer schemes, however, have fewer procedural requirements 
(namely, because they do not involve any alterations to the total share capital; ownership of the 
shares is simply transferred), Therefore, in general, Transfer schemes can be carried out more 
quickly than cancellation schemes.  
Completion timelines can be further prolonged by the need to revise the scheme after the offer 
documents have been sent out. Once the bidder has made an offer, it is possible for this offer 
to be revised. However, any changes must be made no later than 14 days before the date of the 
shareholder meetings.51 If changes are made within this 14-day period, the consent of the 
Takeover Panel is also required. Moreover, the consent of the court must be obtained if it 
becomes necessary to send a new scheme document after revisions, which can result in further 
delays. In the case of a tender offer, however, the offeror can revise the document at any time 
up to the 46th day following the announcement without waiting for another shareholder meeting 
or court approval.52  
 2.2.2. Takeover Methods and Shareholders Value, and Hypotheses Development 
 
There has recently been debate in both press and among U.K. regulators about whether 
takeover transactions should be legitimately facilitated by way of schemes, particularly those 
schemes involving large companies. The debate is not new, nor is it uniquely English. Other 
common law jurisdictions which take similar legal and regulatory approaches such as Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong, and India, all operate under legal structures of schemes 
akin to Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 (Payne, 2014a, p.139 and p.325). These debates 
focus on whether bidders can acquire the target company “cheaply” and “easily” by using 
schemes in comparison to tender offers. One major concern is the approval threshold of the 
number of shares representing three-quarters (75%) in value of total shares, to allow a bidder 
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to be more certain of ultimately acquiring full control of a target firm.  This clearly marginalises 
minority shareholders, whose views can effectively be overridden easily.  For tender offers, the 
same issue arises; but it is normally more expensive and more complicated to achieve the same 
goal. A bidder needs to achieve 90% of the target’s shares in order to squeeze out the minority 
shareholders, at which point the minority is much smaller.  
Although the scheme process is usually considered a recommended bid, that is with the scope 
for a target board to be involved, this does not mean that the bargaining power of a bidder does 
not increase. For example, target mangers may collaborate with bidders in order to maximise 
their interests, yet at the expense of the shareholders.  In cases where the majority of the target 
shareholders approve a scheme, bidders gain immediate 100% of the target company. This 
naturally puts pressure on minority shareholders (25 % of the shareholders by value who do 
not vote in favour of the offer) whose interests and concerns might be wholly legitimate. This 
is not amount to coercion, duress or undue influence, but does present a fait accompli affecting 
the shareholders’ interests.  
Payne (2011b) however, argues that tender offer process could be more subtly inimical and 
more oppressive to target shareholders, because it does not prevent a strategy of divide and 
conquer by a bidder in respect of offer price or other inducements. Target firms cannot take 
any defence actions that would frustrate a transaction. Therefore, bidders can set up an offer 
based on his interest even if the design of the bid price or the nature of the overall bid is 
predicated on different inducements to different interests of particular shareholders. This effect 
would become more pronounced in companies where ownership is more diffusive.  Under 
schemes, concerns about distorted choice do not arise because there is no opportunity for 
bidders to control a bid (there is no divide and conquer) and there is no realistic opportunity 
for the collective action problem to exist. Therefore, there is no problem in respect of the 
minority shareholders, because oppression can only be exerted in respect of whether to accept 
or reject the deal, and the role of the Panel and the courts is to ensure the price is fair for all 
classes of shareholder. 
Even if tender offers could be controlled by bidders who are more able to divide and conquer 
the offer price, the threshold of 90% shareholder approval makes the approach of divide and 
conquer complex and probably financially prohibitive. For example, the mandatory offer is 
considered as one of the main rules to protect the minority shareholders in the U.K., but not in 
the U.S. (Betton et al., 2008a). The mandatory offer is applied through a mechanism triggered 
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when acquirers of shares are compelled to make a public bid once their total holding reaches 
or exceeds 30% of the company’s voting rights or if the acquirer holds between 30% and 50% 
and is seeking to buy additional shares of the voting rights. This is clearly to prevent stake 
building and takeovers by stealth at the expense of other shareholders.  
However, the level of protection that shareholders can exercise under schemes is low in 
comparison to tender offers, which weakens the power of the minority shareholders who do 
not accept the offer, but are obliged to accept it whatever they gain. Consequently, a bidder 
could bypass some legal requirements of schemes such as to what extent a bidder could satisfy 
the disclosure rules in the Takeover Code to protect minority shareholders. Under the scheme, 
the mandatory offer cannot be made without informing in advance the Panel and obtaining their 
consent.   Of course, a bidder with a stake in the target firms (a toehold) gains a competitive 
advantage over rival bidders, who do not possess such control. However, this can lead to a 
lower bid premium because a toehold imposes a cost on the target. As a result, target boards in 
the U.S. refuse to negotiate merger deals with bidders who own a stake in the target firms 
(Betton et al., 2009b). It is arguable that schemes could protect target shareholders from the 
cost of the toehold whereby a bidder prefers not to build a stake in the target, as the stake will 
not be counted towards the threshold of 75% voting power.  However, it should be noted that 
this formal requirement does not make any such toehold tactically advantageous for bidder 
firms. An acquiring firm, that already owns 10-15% of target shares, retains many advantages 
over outside bidders.  Moreover, once having obtained a further 75% approval, acquiring firms 
are left with a very small number of minority shareholders who do not agree on the offer.   
Another concern related to schemes is that they do not facilitate auctions for target control, and, 
therefore, might not maximize the wealth of the target’s shareholders (which is the English 
system prioritises). Bulow & Klemperer (1996a) have shown that when a seller in a friendly 
transaction has the opportunity to invite an extra, serious bidder to an English auction, this will 
generate an extra revenue in comparison to negotiating just with the winning bidder. Therefore, 
to achieve the best possible terms for the sale process, it is better for a seller to invite competing 
offers in a bid.  However, the announcement of a scheme does not prevent a competing bidder 
making a rival offer. A scheme is a long process in comparison to a tender offer and this would 
increase the probability of a rival bidder coming into play (O'Dea et al., 2012, p. p.211). In this 
regard, schemes may not necessarily result in lower premium levels.  
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Although, the two takeover methods, schemes and tender offers, have different effect on bid 
premiums, there is no evidence in the empirical works show that there is a significant difference 
in bid premium between tender offer and scheme takeovers.  Particularly, it is arguable that 
bidder in tender offers are more able to divide and conquer, whereby they can use potentially 
wide bidding strategies that allow them to gain at the expense of target shareholders, 
particularly if the structure of target ownerships is dispersed. Therefore, shareholders could 
face a dilemma in a tender offer because they might not agree with the offer or might not be a 
part of the offer (if it is a partial offer) and then be left as a minority shareholder and with 
devalued shares for not taking part on the tender. This fear creates a subliminal pressure at least 
for shareholders to take part in tender offers. This pressure would realistically and logically 
increase where a scheme of arrangement is used. scheme is considered as an “all or nothing” 
transaction, which means that there is no risk that the minority shareholders retain influence. 
Therefore, target shareholders in scheme transactions could face a high degree of coercion or 
distorted choice, which could lower the target shareholders wealth. This advantage of schemes 
leads the research to test the proposition: 
Hypothesis 1: Schemes of arrangement have lower acquisition premiums than tender offers. 
2.3. Data and Variables  
 
2.3.1. Sample Construction  
 
We construct a sample of U.K. acquiring firms using the Thomson One Banker, Thomson 
DataStream and LexisNexis databases. Thomson One Banker provides the acquisition data 
from the SDC U.K. Merger and Acquisition Database, and the relevant information on deal 
characteristics, such as the target name, acquirer and target status, and deal types (i.e. fields 
acquisition technique, synopsis and history file event) that help to define tender offers and 
schemes of arrangement. The SDC provides information related to the classification of the 
target and acquirer’s advisors that are most used in the sample. Moreover, all the information 
related to the calculation of bid premium such as the share price paid by the acquirer for target 
shares (filed HOSTPR) and deal values, the SDC announcement dates and the dates of 
completion, and the calculated SDC premiums (filed PREM4WK) have been taken from the 
SDC. Thomson DataStream provides the data on share prices, market value, and various 
variables related to target characteristics, such as total assets, returns on assets, market-to-book 
values, total debt to total assets and cash holdings. Finally, the Lexis Nexis U.K. database is 
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used53, first, to find the final offers paid by bidders for target shares in cases where this data is 
missing in the SDC, and second, to check whether the deal has been implemented by a scheme 
of arrangement or tender offer, as, in some cases, the SDC acquisition technique file indicates 
both when cataloguing single deals.  
Table 1 shows the main steps for the construction of the sample. The whole sample of 67,471 
includes all the completed deals for the U.K. target firms between 1 January 1984 and 31 
December 2015.  In step one, the original sample is restricted to meet the following criteria: 
• Targets are publicly listed firms trading on the London Stock Exchange.  
• The acquirers are UK firms in order to guarantee that both the target and acquirer are 
subject to UK takeover regulations. This will ensure complications that arise from 
differing foreign tax and legal regimes are avoided—as recommended by (Offenberg & 
Pirinsky, 2015) 
• The acquirers should be either private or public companies, or subsidiaries. 
• The deal value must be at least £1 million to control for the size effect (Alexandridis, 
Fuller, Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013)54  
• The sample is limited to deals where the acquirer holds more than 90% of the target’s 
shares and the acquirer must hold less than 50% of the target’s shares before the 
announcement date. This section chooses to examine a tender offer deal that exercised 
a “squeeze-out” of the remaining minority shareholders in order to achieve sufficient 
compression on the scheme of arrangement, without the pressure that tender offers have 
to achieve a certain level of shares to eliminate the remaining shareholders.  
• Self-tender, recapitalisation, exchange offer, repurchase, privatisation and creditor’s 
scheme of arrangement transaction are excluded, because they are not catered for by 
scheme of arrangement takeover regulations.55 
                                                          
53All the information that is taken from the Lexis Nexis database should be published by London Stock Exchange 
PLC  
54 Moreover, in order to sustain the appropriate compression between tender offers and schemes, the latter tends 
to be the main choice for the bidder if the transaction is large. 
55 This thesis chooses not to exclude uitility and finacial industries as suggested by the the most  most prominent 
research that investigate the impact of bidding in a specific selling mechanism on bidder or target shareholders 
wealth  such as  Boone & Mulherin (2007:2008), Fidrmuc et al., (2012), Aktas, De Bodt & Baker (2010:2011): 
and Akts, Xu & Yurtoglu (forthcoming). Of course, it is true that utility and fanatical industries have different 
capital structure and book to market ratio which could affect the final results. However, studying the impact of 
bidding on schemes or tender offers on the shareholders wealth aims to investigate how the selecting of different 
bidding strategies could determine the shareholder wealth, and this is does not relate to the capital structure and 
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• The form of payments is cash, stock or a combination of both.56 
• The selected transactions do not include deals that switch from tender offers to scheme 
of arrangement, or vice versa, in order to study the observed effect of each takeover 
method.  
 
After step one, there are 1,404 observations.  In step two, we next divide them into two 
subgroups according to the takeover methods (scheme of arrangement versus. tender offer).  
Here this section uses the SDC provided information for each deal on acquisition technique, 
synopsis and the history file event, which are related to the specific takeover methods, the 
parties involved in the transaction, and a summary of bid history.   
SDC and Takeover Code define a transaction as a scheme of arrangement if the transaction 
requires the involvement of a court, while tender offer is conducted without the involvement 
of the courts.  The field of acquisition technique provides information on the bidding strategies 
that are used to implement the takeover. That information may be used to determine whether 
the takeover is implemented by the schemes or tender offers.  Sometimes the field of 
acquisition technique reports a deal as both scheme and tender offers.57  In this case, we then 
exploit further information in the fields of synopsis and the history file event to determine the 
main takeover method of the deal.  These two fields summarise the event history of the 
transaction, such as whether the court is involved in the transaction procedures, and other 
relevant transaction information i.e. the defensive tactics, the target attitude with the 
challenging bid.  After this step, we construct a sample of 230 deals by schemes and 1,174 
deals by tender offers.  Moreover, as SDC does not report sufficient information on scheme 
                                                          
book to market ratio which is more related to the accounting studies. In other words, there is no core reasons in 
the litureture works to exclude exclude utility and financial industries. 
56 One of the main regulation changes that reduces the complexity of using schemes is the availability of scheme 
documents that ensure a reasonable and fair price — particularly for “hybrid” schemes that use cash and non-cash 
offers (Shikha, 2013). In order to study the impact of the means of payment on the choice between the two methods, 
this analysis restricts data to only include transactions where payment information is known.  
57For example, deal number 2252525040 in the SDC database –the takeover between the BH Acquisitions Ltd 
(BH) and Northern Foods PLC (Northern Foods)— was implemented by the way of a tender offer. However, the 
filed acquisition technique states that a tender offer and scheme of arrangement were the takeover methods. 
Moreover, the information in the filed Synopsis shows that BH Acquisitions Ltd (BH) offered GBP 0.73 in cash 
per Northern Foods PLC share, or a total value of GBP 342.124 million, via a scheme of arrangement. Back to 
the documents published by the London Stock Exchange PLC in the LexisNexis U.K. database about the deal: the 
transaction is stated as implemented by the way of a tender offer, and the offer documents were sent to the 
shareholders as a tender offer. In the offer documents there is a provision stating that the offeror has the right to 
implement the transaction by the way of scheme in case the tender offer was not completed. The deal was 
implemented without the involvement of the court. Therefore, the deal is classified as a tender offer.  
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deals prior to 1995, this analysis then removes all the observations before 1995 and focus just 
on those in the period of 1995-2015.  Then this step has a sample consisting of 228 deals by 
schemes and 890 by tender offers. 
In step three, this analysis further uses the information of the LexisNexis database to verify the 
actual takeover methods of the deals. The LexisNexis U.K. database provides information 
about all the significant events from the offers date to the completion date, such as updating 
the offer price, regulatory approval, whether other competitors exist, and the methods of 
takeover whether the deal is implemented by the way of schemes or tender offers.   After step 
three, we have a sample of 222 scheme deals and 700 tender offer deals.  Finally, step three 
further downsizes the sample by imposing some additional requirements on deal information, 
after which the sample ends up with 201 schemes and 558 tender offers.58  
Figure 2 shows the trend and distribution of the scheme and tender offers in the UK market in 
the period of 1995-2015, and the number of schemes is measured by the right vertical axes.  In 
the 1990s, both the U.K. and U.S. markets have experienced a significant fall in the number of 
hostile takeovers, yet there was no significant growth in the number of schemes, as it is 
commonly considered as a friendly process.  Since 2005, there has been a significant growth 
in the number of schemes, which have now become one of the main takeover methods in the 
UK market.  Between 2006 and 2007, seven of the largest takeover transactions in the UK were 
structured by schemes with an average value of £8 billion, such as Scottish Power, Alliance 
Boots, Reuters Group, Gallaher, Course and Hanson (Shika, 2013).  In addition, about 30% 
scheme deals in the period of 1995-2015 are processed during the period of financial crisis of 
2007-2010.  The popularity of schemes as method to implement takeover deals during the 
period of the financial crisis could be related to that bidders are typically interested in obtaining 
100% share ownership, any they may face difficulties in raising enough money to finance that.  
The scheme is a preferable method for takeovers during finical difficulties, as it is easier for 
                                                          
58 Transaction data was deleted if it did not have DataStream codes, or if it did not have information related to bid 
premium calculations (such as the share price paid by the acquirer for target shares (failed HOSTPR) and the stock 
price in the selection period). Transactions that have the same name for the target and acquirer were deleted. All 
data for transactions without sufficient information related to the main control variables, such as total assets, sales, 
intangible assets and leverage and market-to-book value, was deleted. This section chooses not to delete 
transactions that do not have information related to profitability, cash holding and stock performance in order to 
not to reduce the sample size. The main reason for this, because there are no academic papers that have been used 
in this research, was to find a strong relation between these variables and the bid premium. This section will use 
these variables as control variables  
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the bidders, if compared with tender offers, to use the 100 % of the target shares as collateral 
for debt-financing.  
2.3.2. Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
 2.3.2.1. Dependent Variables 
 
 Bid premium is considered one of the main observable outcomes of takeovers.  The bid 
premium can be defined as the difference between the offer price that is paid by the bidder and 
the target closing price before the date of public announcement (Aktas et al., 2010a) and 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2012). This chapter therefore aims to investigate whether the choice of 
mechanisms (tender offers and schemes of arrangements) has a significant impact on the level 
of bid premiums. Section 2.4.1 set out in details how this chapter calculates the bid premium 
and the relative theoretical literature.  
2.3.2.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of target firms and deal characteristics, for the takeover 
methods of schemes and tender offers. It contains a set of variables that are considered in the 
literature to be relevant to the variation in bid premiums or to the selection of takeover methods 
(schemes vs. tender offers). Table 2 provides more detail about the rationales for the decision 
procedure for selecting some covariates to be included in the model to calculate the propensity 
score. The final column presents the p-value for the mean based on t-test that test the difference 
between scheme and the tender offer subsamples. Most of the variables such as target’s size, 
earnings before interest; taxes; depreciation and amortization over total assets 
(EBITDA/Assets); cash holding; stock performance; total debt-to- total assets; and tangible 
assets are measured for the period of twelve months before the announcement date.59 
Panel A presents the main variables about the target characteristics. There are number of 
important differences between the target with tender offer and scheme of arrangement. The 
first is the size of target firm. There has been much debate in the field, as covered in the 
                                                          
59 This research decides to measure the effect of target characteristic upon the level of bid premium or the choice 
between tender offers and schemes twelve months prior to the date of the announcement date because scheme of 
arrangement takes longer sales procedure to be organised and completed than tender offer.   
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literature review, as to whether the acquirer might overpay for a large target because the 
bargaining power of the target increases with its size. The large target can negotiate the offer 
price and extract a higher price from the acquirer that could lead to pay more which will be 
worse when there are another competitor exist (Dutta & Saadi, 2011). Bidder firms could pay 
a lower premium, however, if the target is larger. It is well documented in the literature that 
there is a negative relationship between target sizes and bid premiums. See :Officer (2003), 
Bargeron et al., (2008), Betton et al., (2009b),and Boone & Mulherin(2011c) regardless the 
measurements of the premium either by using the actual offer price to calculate the premium 
or the target announcement returns.  
 
The causes of the lower premium paid for the large target could be related to the degree of 
certainty about the true value of the target’s assets. For example: acquirers could be more 
certain about the accurate value of the target because they own a high value stake in the large 
target’s firms, which, therefore, could lead the acquirer to offer a low premium. However, the 
complexity of integrating the asymmetric size firms (whereby the target is larger than the 
acquirer) could heighten uncertainty regarding the expected synergies. As a result of this, 
acquirers are more reluctant to offer a high premium for the target in order to mitigate the 
additional potential complexity costs. In similar vein, the complexity of the integration between 
a small size acquirer and a large target could reduce the number of potential acquirers who 
compete for the same target. This could mitigate the possibility of the winner's curse, and this 
could lead to a lower bid premium. Along similar lines, the larger sized firms tend to be subject 
to more insider shareholders and less managerial ownership, which could lead the former to 
accept a small premium (Alexandridis et al., 2013) 
 
However, there has been no deep discussions in the literature about how the bidders would 
choose the takeover methods in order to buy the large target with regard to the bid premium. 
In this section will try to answer this question by analysing the characteristics of target size that 
are acquired by a scheme and tender offer practically if the bidder is more certain to obtain the 
target firms regardless it sizes.  
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This paper uses the natural logarithm of the total sales (relative to total assets and market 
capitalisation) to measure target sizes.60 Target firms adopting schemes are typically larger than 
those adopting tender offers.  A scheme is commonly thought of as a friendly process, and it is 
more controlled by target directors who produce the documents, and it will only be completed 
by the recommendation of target directors.  Larger firms have larger numbers of tendered shares, 
and this increases the uncertainty for a bidder in obtaining 100% share ownership, if this is 
necessary to the bidder.  Therefore, adopting scheme of arrangement, which is a friendly 
takeover agreed between bidder, target shareholders and directors, will increase the likelihood 
that the bidder obtains the full control of the target.   
 
Relatively speaking, acquiring large targets associate with the risk of rising the debt according 
to (Gorton et al., 2009). Bidders could reduce the difficulty in financing the large transactions 
by adopting a scheme as the takeover method. Under a scheme, a bidder can more easily 
achieve 100% control of the target shares, which can then be used as collateral for loans, or 
alternatively, can be used to obtain financial assistance by re-registering the target as private 
firm.61 In summary, the size of a target firm is one of the key determinants for bid premiums 
and for the selection of the specific takeover methods: schemes versus tender offers. 
 
The targets adopting tenders offers are normally younger than those adopting schemes whereby 
the age of the firm is measured in year since DataStream holds information about the target.  
This result consistent with Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) who find that targets adopting tender 
offers tend to be both younger and smaller.  Typically, younger and smaller firms have greater 
scope for growth (Jovanovic, 1982), and this might explain why bid premiums are normally 
higher in tender offers. This section obtains similar results by using total assets and market 
value of target firm as alternative measures for firm size. In this model, target firms that accept 
schemes must have substantially larger total assets and market value in comparison to target 
firms that accept tender offers.  
Market-to-book value (M/B ratio) is considered on of the main variables that could determine 
the bide premium (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2009a). M/B ratio is used as a proxy for the probability 
of firm growth, whereby target firms with high M/B ratio indicates high growth opportunity 
                                                          
60 The analysis will use the total sales as measure for firm size in order to avoid the correlation between market 
capitalisation as a proxy of firm size with the bid premium and performance variables. See for example (Dang & 
Li, 2015)  
61 [UK] Companies Act 2006, s.681(2)(e)  
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(Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). Therefore, target firms that have low growth opportunities 
obtain low bid premium. Moreover, target firms could earn a lower bid premiums in case if the 
M/B ratio of the target firms exceeds the industry medium of the same ratio (Eckbo & Thorburn, 
2009a) 
Boone & Mulherin (2008b) use M/B ratio as a proxy for uncertainty whereby there is a positive 
relation between M/B ratio and the uncertainty of bidders about the value of target’s assets. 
Therefore, they argue that target firms with a high M/B ratio could obtain high premium, 
because bidders are overpaying for target’s assets. However, Boone & Mulherin (2008b) 
conclude M/B ratio does not support the prediction of overpayment.  
Table 2 shows that target firms adopting tender offers have a smaller M/B ratio than those 
adopting schemes.62  This may indicate that the target firms adopting schemes have higher 
probability of growth, despite of their larger sizes and ages.  However, this difference in M/B 
ratio between these two groups is not significant. The difference is also insignificant in case of 
calculating an industry-adjusted M/B by subtracting the yearly median of M/B of the target 
firms in the same two-digit SIC code as suggested by (Bargeron et al., 2008) 
The sales growth rate is also used as a proxy for growth opportunities. It is defined as the 
difference between the sales level 12 months (𝑡−12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) and 24 months (𝑡−24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) prior 
to the date of announcement, that is, the sales growth ratio of ( 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 -
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 )/ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 .  Table 2 shows that target firms adopting schemes have a 
higher sale growth rate than those adopting tender offers, yet, as in the case of M/B ratio, the 
difference is not significant. 
The variables of total debt-to-total assets and tangible assets ratios are also included in Table 
2. Total debt-to-total assets (TD/TA) is used as a proxy for the target’s bargaining power.  A 
target with a high level of debt cannot deter the takeover attempt by using defence tactics, such 
as restructuring and recapitalisation strategies, and this can affect the bid premium. 
Alternatively, target firms of a high level of debt could gain more because of such highly 
leverage firms have a highly concentrated ownership which could force the winner to pay more 
(Bargeron et al., 2008). Regardless the relation between the level of target debt and bid 
                                                          
62 M/B ratio is measured one month before the date of announcement. 
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premium, the difference of TD/TA ratio between the two subsamples is insignificant. 63   
Tangible assets ratio (or collateral) is determined as the ratio of plant, property, and equipment 
to assets. Targets adopting tender offers tend to have significantly higher collateral ratio than 
those adopting schemes. This ‘credit slack’ is essentially a form of internal leveraging where 
the necessary financing is obtained through the unused ‘asset’ of the target firm’s available 
credit. This means that the acquirer can use the target firm’s tangible assets to increase the level 
of unused debt at tender offer targets where there is a positive relation between tangible assets 
and leverage, as indicated by Jensen & Meckling (1976).   This information begs the question 
of why tender offer targets choose not to be involved in friendly negotiation processes through 
schemes of arrangement when they often occupy excellent positions for negotiation. Such 
targets could help the acquirer to access more debt. It will be interesting to add TD/TA and 
tangible assets variables to the model in order to understand whether the level of target debt 
influences variations in bid premiums.  
 
Schwert (1996a) finds a positive relation between target run-ups and bid premiums. The main 
cause of this relationship is that the run-up may reflect an increase in the target’s stand-alone 
value, and, consequently, acquirers respond to this information by updating their bid with a 
mark-up. Panel A provides the data for the target run-up as a cumulative target abnormal return 
from -42 to -1 days prior to the announcement date (day 0). Here the average tender offer run-
up is shown to be significantly higher than that of schemes.64   
Panel A also provides the relevant financial indicators for target firms related to target 
profitability and performance. These include earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization over total assets EBITDA/Assets ratio, cash holding, past stock performance. It 
                                                          
63 Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) use a dummy variable to differentiate between firms that have significantly high 
debt levels to investigate whether the high level of debt could affect the choice of selling mechanisms between 
merger and tender offers. The high debt dummy takes the value of 1 if leverage (the ratio of total debt to total 
assets) exceeds 0.5, and 0 if below this figure. In this study, tender offer targets, significantly, have higher debts 
than scheme targets (84.69 % versus 78.21%). A high debt of a target firm in a tender offer is more likely to 
weaken their bargaining powers during the takeover process, and, therefore, target shareholders could obtain a 
lower premium in comparison to schemes.   
64 For an analysis of robustness, the target run-up is extended from day -63 though day -1, and finds that the tender 
offer run-up is still higher than the target run-up for schemes. 
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is natural that a target firm’s financial status could influence both the choice of takeover method 
and bid premiums.65  
First, there is a negative relation between target performance in the period prior to the 
announcement date and the bid premium; poor target performance is associated with a high 
acquisition premium. The prediction of this relationship is based on Manne’s hypothesis, (1965) 
which proposes that if a manager fails to use a firm’s resources efficiently, stock prices will 
fall,  and this will indicate whether a firm is an attractive target (Offenberg & Pirinsky, 2015). 
Consequently, removing an inefficient manager who has caused this poor performance prior to 
takeover could therefore increase the bidder’s likelihood of improving the target performance 
after the acquisition is completed. This can, therefore, increase the target shareholders’ chance 
of enjoying a high premium (Bugeja & Walter, 1995). As a profitability measurement, a 
scheme target has a lower EBITDA/Assets ratio than a tender offer target, but the difference 
between them is not statistically significant.  
Second, Fidrmuc et al., (2012) finds a negative relation between the past stock performance of 
the target and bid premiums, which, in part, explains the poor stock performance associated 
with large premiums. Such findings however, add to the puzzle of the bid premium variations 
between tender offers and scheme of arrangement, where the tender offer has a higher stock 
performance than the scheme. However, Fidrmuc et al., (2012) states that using previous stock 
performance to study bid premium variations in the literature review is still puzzling, and is 
has not yet explained in relevant studies. Tender offer targets tend to have stronger levels of 
stock performance than scheme targets, though these differences are also not significant. 
Moreover, it could be that using a past stock performance is could be imperfect measure of the 
true value of the company based not so much on it is worth but on what someone is prepared 
to pay for it.  
Finally, although there is a relationship between the target’s cash level and the probability of a 
takeover (where a high level of cash at the target firm, as shown on the balance sheet, indicates 
that the target is more likely to be acquired) there is no link between levels of the target’s cash 
and the bid premium, as has been shown by Fidrmuc et al., (2012) and Pinkowitz (2000). This 
study will use control variables to investigate whether an acquirer’s choice of a scheme can be 
attributed to the quality of target firms.  It will be demonstrated later in this study that the 
                                                          
65 This section chooses not to delete the missing DataStream information relating to the EBITDA/Assets ratio, 
cash holding, past stock performance. This is because such ratios will be used as proxies for the target's preferences. 
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majority of the buyers in the scheme subsample are, on average, 64.85% private equity firms. 
A nexus between target’s cash level, private equity buyers and the choice of the scheme, can 
be predicted, at least in broad terms, in the following manner: a target with high cash is more 
likely to be acquired by private equity, as shown by Fidrmuc et al., (2012), in order to either 
pay out cash or finance the acquisition by using the target as collateral for the necessary loans 
particularly if the target has substantial fixed assets. Further, private equity will ensure the 
acquisition of the full target ownership by using scheme of arrangement.  The cash level is 
measured by the ratio of cash over total assets at twelve months prior to the announcement date. 
The target firms adopting schemes have a much higher cash level, but the difference between 
the two groups is not statistically significant.66 
Panel B provides summary statistics of the deal characteristics. The first observation is that the 
transaction values of scheme deals are larger than those of tender offer deals. It is not surprising 
that the value of scheme transactions is significantly greater than those under tender offers, as 
the scheme involve transactions of larger targets. This consistent with the expectation of that 
scheme of arrangement is a preferable method with large transaction deals. 
Second, takeovers facilitated through tender offers are much faster than those run through 
schemes, by an average of 53 days. This may be due to the more complicated regulatory rules 
for larger firms (Moeller et al., 2004), or as a result of the length of scheme of arrangement 
procedures in comparison to tender offers.  
 
Part B also reports bidder and target termination fees. Officer (2003) reports a positive 
relationship between bidder termination fees and bid premiums. In the sample used in this study, 
bidder termination fees are lower in tender offers. This could be as a result of bidders signalling 
their intents to ensure the quick completion of the deal, rendering termination fess a redundant 
insurance, as pointed in Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015). However, the difference in bidder 
termination fees across the scheme and tender offer groups is not significant. Target 
termination fees are more common in takeovers. In the sample used here, 109 target firms have 
paid termination fees in case transaction is uncompleted. Target termination fees are much 
higher in scheme deals than in tender offer deals (10.989% versus 1.404%), and the difference 
is statistically significant. This could suggest that the bargaining power of target firms is lower 
                                                          
66 This analysis will not use the ratio of cash over sales as an alternative measure for cash holdings because the 
aim of the acquirer is to obtain 100% control of the target.  
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for schemes than tender offers. These results run in contrast to Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) who 
found that there is no significant difference between the size of target termination fees between 
tender offers and mergers. However, Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015). state that the effect of target 
termination fees on the selection of takeover methods is ambiguous. It could be that, however, 
the bidder knows that scheme of arrangement as a takeover method gives them a certainty about 
the acquisition completion, but corollary is that such a process takes a long time to insure the 
target intent to complete the deal over the long period to process the scheme, bidder therefore 
ask for higher termination fees. Consequently, the bargaining power of the bidder increase in 
the schemes, which can affect the bid premium. The target will then be in a trade-off position 
between accepting their current offer, which could be lower than the predicted, and being 
required to pay the cost of terminations if offers are rejected. Target termination fees, therefore, 
are obliquely associated with bid premium valuations and the selection of takeover methods, 
with risk apportioned as per agreements between parties. 
The cost of transactions is an important determinant in leading the target company to choose 
between reducing the competition level between bidders or selling the company using more 
competitive procedures to extract a higher premium. Aktas et al., (2010a) and Offenberg & 
Pirinsky (2015) use the cost of waiting proxies to investigate whether the level of competition 
can impact the choice of takeover methods, and, therefore, the bid premium. The cost of waiting 
proxies measures unobservable competition before the announcement date particularly when 
the target is under pressure to sell. For example: if the target initiates the bid it signals their 
willingness to sell, which weakens their bargaining powers during negotiation.  Moreover, if 
searching for potential bidders and organising auctions are costly procedures, the target might 
prefer to negotiate with one bidder. The trade-off between competition and transaction costs is 
still figures in this context and such information is useful in investigating the choice of selling 
mechanisms and, therefore, the level of premium that targets will receive across schemes of 
arrangement and tender offers. 
Negotiation and auction are related to the level of competition in takeover transactions. In this 
chapter, an auction is defined as a transaction where there is more than one public bidder 
bidding for the same target within a month from or before the announcement date.  Accordingly, 
negotiation is defined as a transaction where there are no other public bids for the same target 
within a month from or before the announcement date.67 One observation gleaned from the 
                                                          
67 Betton et al., (2009b) defines the period for the second bid in order to classify the bid as an auction or not as six 
months. During this period the target board has a fiduciary responsibility to consider any rival offers until the 
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sample is that most of the deals, roughly 94.6%, are structured through negotiations, regardless 
of the exact takeover methods of either a scheme or tender offer.  
The majority of takeover transactions, say 95.5%, are initiated by bidders. Among deals 
initiated by the target firm, it is interesting to observe that the majority are structured through 
schemes. For bidder-initiated deals, however, the majority are structured through tender offers. 
This may indicate that tender offers are more likely to be initiated by bidders, while schemes 
of arrangements are more likely to be initiated by target firms. 
Aktas et al., (2010a) uses a target debt ratio as a proxy for waiting costs.  The target debt ratio 
is defined as long-term debt plus current liabilities over total assets. This means that such 
indicator of debt gives more weight for the debt that should be paid at the end of the year, but, 
at the same time, this ratio does not necessarily indicate the poor financial situation of the 
company. Aktas et al., (2010a) seeks to show that a high target debt ratio may signify that the 
target is under pressure to sell, because a high debt level will lead to a longer selling procedure. 
Therefore, target firms with a high level of debt ratio generally prefer to use a fast procedure, 
such as tender offers. Our sample also shows that the target debt ratio is higher for tender offer 
deals than for scheme deals at 51.246% versus 46.191%.68 
The means of payment is one of the main elements that could explain bid premium variations, 
where the higher bid premium is associated with cash payment (Betton et al., 2008a). Offenberg 
& Pirinsky (2015) use the percentage of cash paid by the acquirer as the main variable that 
could explain the variation in bid premiums across tender offers and meagre, because target 
shareholders with cash offers owe more taxes on capital gains in comparison to stock offers. 
This will lead the target to increase their offer in order to be compensated for the immediate 
taxes that due with the cash offers Huang & Walkling (1987). Across the groups of tender 
offers and schemes, tender offers are more likely to be met through cash payment (76% vs 
70%), and the difference is significant at 10% significance level.  In addition, use 100% of cash 
is the dominant means of payment (around 75%), compared with 100% of equity and mixed 
offers.  
                                                          
arrangement is finally approved by the shareholders under the Williams Act (which amended the Securities 
Exchange Act 1968) in the US. Under English law, the target board responds to the offer at day 28 after the 
announcement date, and this is the first day on which the offer may close (Rule 22.3). 
68 The information available in the DataStream to calculate the target debt ratio covers around 87% of the sample. 
This section chooses not to delete the missing variables based on this ratio because it will not be included in the 
propensity score matching model. The research uses the ratio as a proxy to obtain more information about the cost 
of waiting, rather than using it as indictor of the financial health of the company. 
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Over our sample period of 1995-2015, relatively few deals (about 1/6) happened in comparison 
to the period of global financial crisis from 2007-2009. Yet, across the two takeover methods, 
a significantly higher proportion of scheme deals (say, 29%) happened in this period, in 
comparison to only 13% of tender offer deals. It seems that schemes become a more popular 
takeover method during economic downturns. The high usage of schemes during this period 
seem to be due to bidders becoming more familiar with the judicial process and the forum of 
the courts to effect takeovers, especially with the amendments that were, by then, added to the 
scheme practice. For example, there is now no need to petition the court to commence a scheme 
(Payne, 2014a, p. 84).  
The change of regulation rules certainly influences the choices of takeover methods and bid 
premiums. There was a major regulatory change in 2011, and a dummy variable is introduced 
here, taking the value of 1 if the transaction occurred during the period of 2012-15, and 0 
otherwise. As mentioned before, this crucial regulatory change to the City Code came into 
effect after the Kraft/Cadbury takeover in December 2011. The change entails that a scheme is 
entirely in hands of the target, allowing previous bidders to lose some control over the process. 
After this regulatory change, the number of scheme transactions remained significantly higher 
than tender offers. Around 23% of deals in the data sample organised through schemes occurred 
after 2011, while only 3% of transactions conducted through tender offer deals were affected 
in the same period. The difference between the two samples is statistically significant. Payne 
(2014a, p. 84) also documents that, after the changes to regulations in 2011, around 15 of the 
takeovers announced in 2012 were structured as schemes, with only 4 as tender offers. 
Moreover, around 39 of the transactions announced in 2015 were structured as schemes, and 
only 19 as tender offers.   
on average, 28.855% of scheme bidders employed banks with a high reputation, while tender 
offer bidder firms employed 18.279 % of investment banks with a high reputation.69 The 
statistical information shows that there is a difference in the tendency to employ banks with a 
high reputation between tender offer and scheme. This result predicts that bidder firms that hire 
top-tier investment banks to negotiate scheme deals, and they encourage bidders to overbid for 
a target firm in order to guarantee completion of the bid, as in Rau (2000)’s argument. Rau 
                                                          
69 This section follows Boone & Mulherin (2008b) method of modelling the usage of investment banks. Top-tier 
banks are classified here using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is Rothschild &Co, UBS, 
JP Morgan, PricewaterhouseCoopers, HSBC Holdings PLC, the five banks that appear most often in the sample, 
all others take 0. 
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(2000) reports that bidders have positive returns in tender offer with a high reputation 
investment bank, while in merger, employing such banks lower bidder returns. Moreover, the 
author documents that in tender offer, there is a positive relationship between bidders that are 
supported by more prestigious bank advisors and target bid premium. In these scenarios the 
top-tier investment banks seem are more concern about deal completion than the stock price of 
client firms, as a result of this they advise their bidder to pay more for their target in order to 
motivate their shareholders to accept the offer.   
Moreover, on average, 29.353% of scheme bidder firms employ banks with a high reputation, 
while negotiation target firms employ 17.921% of investment banks with a high reputation. 
There is a difference in case target firms use of top-tier advisors between tender offer and 
schemes. This result predicts that scheme target firms that hire advisors with greater reputations 
increase their bargaining power, which increase their bid premiums— as suggested by (Kale, 
Kini, & Ryan, 2003). 
Another deal characteristic that may be related to differences in bid premiums is the public 
status of the acquirer, say, whether it is a listed or an unlisted firm. Bargeron et al., (2008) 
found that private acquirers pay less for their targets in comparison to public firms, as the latter 
could gain more from the expected synergies with the target.  Moreover, Offenberg & Pirinsky, 
(2015) found that public bidders have a stronger incentive to complete deals than private 
bidders do. As a result, tender offers are the preferred method for public bidders. This 
preference seems to stem from the fact that the impact of an acquisition failure has more 
adverse consequences for public than private acquirers. 70  As shown in Table 2, public 
acquirers are associated with a higher percentage of tender offer deals. This may also indicate 
why bid premiums for scheme deals are lower than those of tender offers. For example, private 
bidders acquire around 66% of scheme targets, while only 55% of tender offer targets are 
acquired by private bidders. 
The percentage of shares owned by the acquirer six-months before the announcement date is 
used as the proxy for toehold in this study. The statistics indicate that tender offer bidders 
normally own a larger share of the stake in the target firm than scheme bidders. This is 
unsurprising given that scheme bidders do not usually seek to build a stake in the target, as that 
stake will not be counted towards the threshold of 75% voting power. In contrast, tender offer 
                                                          
70 Fidrmuc et al., (2012) also finds a similar result: private equity pays a premium of 11% lower than strategic 
bidders, after controlling for target and deal characteristics. 
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bidders can use the stake building strategy to reach the majority level of 50% of the target’s 
shares, and thus gain control of the firm. Therefore, tender offer bidders have more incentives 
to obtain a stake in the target before the transaction than scheme bidders do.  Moreover, Betton 
et al., (2008a) have observed a negative relationship between stake building in the target before 
acquisition and bid premiums. As Betton et all note, the greater the toehold the acquirer has 
before the announcement date, the lower bid premium the target shareholder could gain. 
However, in Panel B, the difference in the stake owned before the announcement, across the 
two groups, is not significant.  
In summary, target firms that are associated with scheme takeovers are normally larger and 
older, in comparison to those of tender offers. There is no significant difference between the 
two groups in terms of M/B ratio, growth, and leverage levels.  Moreover, there are no 
differences between covariates that measure prior target performance and profitability in tender 
offers and schemes.   
 
Acquisition by tender offer is faster than through a scheme. Target termination fees are 
significantly higher for schemes; the measurements for the cost of waiting, associated with 
auction, negotiation and bidder or target initiated the deal do not sufficiently explain the 
differences between bid premiums across tender offers and schemes. Nevertheless, a firm 
engaged in a tender offer is under significant pressure to sell using a target debt ratio. 
Acquisitions through tender offers and schemes are more likely to be financed using cash as a 
means of purchasing the target; the frequency of using cash in tender offers is higher. Schemes 
of arrangement are a favoured takeover method during a financial crisis, and although the 
regulations have changed over time, schemes still remain the mainstay of U.K. takeovers. 
Acquisitions by schemes of arrangement prevail when the bidders are private, and are less 
likely to use a stake-building strategy. 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to estimate the treatment effect of selecting a specific 
takeover method (schemes vs. tender offers) on bid premiums. For this purpose, propensity 
score matching will be applied to address the possible endogeneity problem. To enable the 
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estimation of the relevant propensity scores, the relevant variables in Table 2 will be applied, 




The main aim of this chapter is to investigate whether selecting different selling methods 
(tender offers vs. schemes) may result in significantly different premium levels. This potential 
self-selection issue arises, because the choice of a specific selling method may be correlated to 
factors that also affect bid premiums.  Therefore, a simple comparison or regression on the 
mean difference in bid premiums (between the two sub-groups of tender offers and schemes) 
would result in biased estimate.  To address the self-selection problem, we apply the method 
of propensity score matching in this chapter. 
This section will provide a review of the theoretical background of the matching method, which 
is first introduced by Rubin (1974, 1977).72  Let us introduce some notations first, following 
the guideline of of (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) and (Wooldridge, 2010). This section denotes 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑖 as the potential premium for target firm 𝑖 that would be attained via the takeover 
method of 𝑗 , where 𝑗 = 𝑇, 𝑆 , representing tender offer and scheme of arrangements 
respectively.  Let 𝐷𝑖 be a treatment dummy, which takes the value of 1, if a target firm 𝑖 is 
structured through scheme, and 0 if through tender offer.  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚1𝑖  then represents the 
potential premium level of firm 𝑖 if it chooses scheme, and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚0𝑖 represents the potential 
premium level of firm 𝑖 if it chooses tender offer.  Our main interest is to estimate the average 
treatment effect of using schemes as the takeover method. 
The exact treatment effect for a target firm 𝑖 is 01Premiu Premiummi i i   , and the average 
treatment effect, denoted by ATE , and can be written as: 
 
                                   01(Premi ) (Premium )umATE i iEE  . 
 
                                                          
71 However, the target run-up will be excluded to avoid the correlation with the bid premium, as measured by 
using the final offer price. The effect of the target run-up will be investigated later using Schwert’s (1996) 
Abnormal Return (AR) Premium that takes into consideration the target run-up. 
72 The Rubin Causal Model that is developed based on the work of Rubin (1974,1977) and Holland (1986) and is considered 
fundamental to modern research on casual effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, p.14) 
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Where 𝐸 is the expectation operator.  The difficulty in estimating ATE  is that it is not possible 
to observe the both outcomes of 1Premium i  and 0Premium i  for a single target firm 𝑖; there is 
only one state of the world.  If we, in a naïve way, estimate the difference in mean outcomes 
between the scheme and tender offer sub-groups, what we actually get is   
1 0| 1) ((Prem Premiium um | 0)i ii iE D E D    
By manipulating the above formula, we obtain, 
 
1 000| 1) (Premium | 1(Premium (Premi) | 1) (Pu remi | )m um 0i ii i i ii iD E D DE E E D       , 
where the first part: 1 0| 1) ((Prem Premiium um | 1)i ii iE D E D   is the causal effect of 
treatment on the group that are treated, denoted by ATT .  The second part of this expression is 
what is known as the “selection bias’’ (SB), which represents the difference in bid premium 
for a potential tender offer that exists between the groups.  The SB term implies that a simple 
estimation of the mean difference across the two groups with different treatment is not equal 
to either the ATE  or the ATT , and therefore is biased.  Ignoring the self-selection problem 
would consequently lead to bias (and inconsistent) estimates.  
There are a broad range of strategies used to correct the selection bias problem, for example, 
the Heckman two-stage estimator and instrumental variables (IV) estimation.  More recently, 
propensity score matching has been widely used to estimate the casual treatment effect, in 
different forms: propensity score sub-classification, matching estimators, propensity score 
weighting, kernel-based matching estimators and finally dosage analysis of multiple treatment 
Guo & Fraser (2015, p.342).  
The seminal work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) proposes the method of propensity score 
matching (PSM).  The basic idea of their framework is that, the choice of treatment is 
determined by a certain set of observable covariates, 𝑿𝑖 , and in consequence, when we 
condition on the set of covariates, 𝑿𝑖 , we can regard the treatment are being essentially 
randomly-assigned.  This assumption is termed the “conditional independence assumption 
(CIA)”, and is represented mathematically as, 
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1 0Premium ,Premiumi i  ╨   ( | )i iD X
 
To see how the conditional independence assumption removes the treatment effect, consider 
the selection bias this section derived before, except now conditioned on 𝑿𝑖, 
                    0 0(Premium | 1, ) (Premium | 0, )i i i i i iSB E D X E D X                                   
0 0(Premium | ) (Premium | )i i i iE X E X   
                                                  0 , 
where this analysis has used the conditional independence assumption (CIA) to go from the 
first line to the second, since the potential outcome in the presence of covariates is independent 
of the treatment.   
In practice, this would require that we stratify the sample according to the covariates, and match 
individual firms across the two treatment groups according to this.  This results in an estimator 
of the form, 
Premiu( | 1, ) ( |m Pre , )i 0u ,m m
ATE i i ii ii
PSM E D X E D X      
where 
ATE
PSM is the estimated causal treatment effect using the approach of matching.  
However, the difficulty in implementing an equivalent estimator in practice is due to the 
covariate matching. As the dimensionality of the covariate vector increases, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to find reasonable matches across the two groups, meaning that we are 
unable to estimate a treatment effect for some unpaired individuals in our sample.  This lack of 
overlap in covariates between the two treatment groups motivates the use of propensity scores 
as an alternative matching criterion.  This analysis supposes that, for each firm in our sample, 
there is a probability of choosing the treatment of 𝐷𝑖 = 1, and this probability ( 1| )iiP D X  is 
a function of the aforementioned covariates in Table 2. The conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) states that the potential outcomes of a treatment are independent of the 
treatment decision given an appropriate vector of covariates.  The propensity score theorem 
extends this assumption, such that the potential outcomes of a treatment are independent of the 
treatment decision conditional on the probability of ( 1| )iiP D X which is known as the 
propensity score (Wooldridge, 2010,p.908). This can be written mathematically as, 
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1 0Premium ,Premiumi i  ╨   ( | ( 1| ))i i iD P D X
 
 
which is essentially equivalent to saying that conditional on the propensity score, the treatment 
is randomly assigned.  Compared with multivariate matching, the matching of propensity score 
is univariate.  This property is favourable because it becomes much easier to find matches in 
both treatment groups along a univariate score.  The collapse from a multivariate matching 
space to a univariate one therefore makes propensity score matching an attractive alternative 
to covariate matching.73 
An important requirement of using propensity score matching to estimate causal effects is the 
“overlap’’ assumption.  The overlap assumption states that there must exist individuals in both 
treatment groups that have similar propensity scores (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983a). For 
example, if there is a firm from the treatment group (schemes), but no one from the control 
group (tender offers) that has similar propensity score, the estimated treatment effect will not 
apply over the entire sample of observations.  The overlap assumption implies that, for all 
possible value of 𝑋𝑖, it follows 0 ( 1| ) 1iXP D< = < . 
 
2.4.1. Measures of Bid Premiums 
 
Bid premiums can be measured by a variety of different methods. In this chapter, two different 
methods will be adopted.  First, this section will use the SDC database to calculate the actual 
offer premium (Officer, 2003) and the four-week premium.  Second, following the event study 
approach, we will also calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) premium (Schwert, 
1996a:2000b) 
                                                          
73 In relation to estimate the treatment effect of implementing the propensity score matching, there is a concern 
can be made against any piece of work that uses matching (or other method such as multivariate regression). The 
main concern is that the estimated treatment effect will be biased in the case of using matching method because 
of there are unobservable variables that determine selling mechanism or bid premiums, and this would 
consequently lead to violate the conditional independence assumption upon which matching depends on. In this 
research, however, it is unlikely to be such unobservable variables whereby there are many variables that have 
been investigated as main determines either for the selection of takeover methods or bid premiums based on the 
literature review which are observed, not unobserved. Moreover, to know how large the effect of the unobservable 
variables affects the result of propensity score matching, section 2.4.2.3 will test the sensitivity of the results to 
the presence of omitted (hidden) variables that may affect the choice of takeover methods and bid premiums.  
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The target’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the date of announcement have been 
used extensively in previous literature to measure bid premiums in takeovers.  The researchers 
adopted the CAR measurements, because, until recently, SDC did not provide relevant 
information to calculate other alternative measurement of bid premiums.   However, the CAR 
measurement can be problematic, as it is prone to being skewed by market rumours over the 
takeover procedure and the probability of bid failures.  The SDC offer price database tends to 
reduce the rumour effect, as the target short-term run-up is included, and the pre-offer price 
should reflect all of the relevant information from various public resources about the takeover 
transaction (see: Eckbo & Thorburn (2008b),Betton et al., (2009b),and Aktas et al., (2010a)). 
The other main differences between the SDC offer prices and CAR measurement is that the 
later could be more sensitive to misspecification when the market model abnormal returns are 
used as benchmark returns to estimate the expected return over a long period (Kothari & 
Warner, 2007) 
 
2.4.1.1. SDC Premiums  
 
Based on the SDC database, two different measurements for bid premiums are provided: 1) the 
actual offer premium (Goeree & Offerman, 2003) and 2) the reported four-week offers 
premium as in (Aktas, De Bodt, & Roll, 2010a:2011b) 
The actual offer premium is defined as the ratio of the bidder’s offer to the target market value 
of equity before the date of announcement (Goeree & Offerman, 2003). The bidder’s offer is 
divided into two parts by the SDC price offers database: “component” data and “price” data.  
The component data defines the bidder’s offer as the aggregate value paid by the bidder for 
each payment method (i.e. cash or equity) , and the “price” data defines the offer price of 
intP and finP
, where the subscripts indicate “initial” and “final” prices per target share, 
respectively.  
Goeree & Offerman (2003) calculates the bid premium using target stock prices at 42 days 
before the date of announcement as the base. In this chapter, however, a longer pre-offer period 
is selected, in order to help decrease the influence of either takeover rumour or bid (Eckbo, 
2009) 
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The selection of the length of pre-offer periods also depends on the specific takeover methods 
(tender offers vs. scheme of arrangements), as they have different time scales for completion.   
Commonly, takeovers using schemes take longer time to complete than tender offers, and 
longer completion time may increase the likelihood of information leaking, before the relevant 
announcement dates.  There are two important dates relevant to the publication of the takeover 
information: the SDC announcement date and the initial (original) public announcement date 
(filed DAO in SDC).74 
Given the above discussion, we calculate actual bid premium as the difference between the 
aggregate value of all the payments (cash, stock and other securities), taking into account the 
percentage of shares acquired, and the market value of target either one, two, and three months 
before the initial public announcement date, or the SDC announcement date.  This is given by 
the following formula; 
 
, either -A or -E
(Total consideration offe % ) 100red
 Offer Premium













Where, t is the event date and i is the target firm. Total consideration offered𝑖 is reported by 
SDC as the aggregate value (£ million) of the total consideration of each method of payment 
paid by the acquirer (cash, stock or debt, etc.) to each individual target firm, excluding fees and 
expenses. The %𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖  (filed PCTOWN in SDC) is the percentage of target shares 
acquired by the bidder after the transaction has been completed. The 
Target market value of equity i,t=either−Aor−E  is the value of target equity (stock price × 
shares outstanding) in £ millions either one, two or three months before the SDC announcement 
                                                          
74 Scheme of arrangement takes usually longer time in compression to tender offer to be organised, to decrease 
the effects of information leakage on the stock prices, in this paper, we will choose to calculate bid premiums by 
selecting target firms' stock prices before the initial public announcement date as the base, following Aktas et al., 
(2010)and Fidrmuc et al., (2012).  As will be seen later, a tender offer is faster from announcement to completion 
than a scheme of arrangement, by an average of 45 (Around 2 months) days and the latter needs around 98 (on 
average three months) days to be completed. Moreover, scheme needs long time to prepare the legal document, 
meeting the shareholders in different classes, and book the court, etc.  Consider this; the calculation of the bid 
premium will be as the difference between the offer price and the stock price one month, two, and three months 
before the initial public date of announcement and the SDC announcement date. In order to consider all the 
possible pre-offer time of target stock price before the initial public announcement date or the SDC announcement 
date.   
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date as indicted by – 𝐴, or one/two and three months before the initial public announcement 
date as denoted by – 𝐸. 
The actual bid premium based on the price data will be calculated either by pint or  pfin . 
However, the initial prices that bidders offered to the target per share are not all available, 
because SDC only provides such information for deals where the terms are amended, and the 
price is in US dollars. Because of this, the final price offered per share indicated in the SDC 
database by (filed HOSTPR in SDC) will be used to calculate the premium.  This section then 
calculates the final actual offer premium as a ratio of the final offer paid by the bidder to the 
target stock price, adjusted for splits and dividends and measured at one,two and three months 
before the SDC announcement or the initial public announcement date, as follows: 
i
, either -A or -E





= -  
where  , either -A or -Ei tP =  is the target stock price one/two or three months before the SDC 
announcement date or the initial public announcement date, (adjusted for splits and price). 
 
Next, this section considers the reported four-week offer premium (filed PREM4WK) as 
another bid premiums measure, based on the SDC database.  PREM4WK is reported as 
percentage ratio of the final offer price (failed HOSTPR) to the closing price of the target stock 








= ´  
2.4.1.2. Event Study Premium  
 
Schwert (1996a) calculates the Abnormal Return (AR) Premium as target cumulative abnormal 
stock returns (CAR) over the event window, [-42,126] or until the target’s delisting date, 
adjusted using market model parameters. The event window [-42,126] divides into two parts: 
“runup” and “markup”.  The runup part is calculated as the target’s cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) from day -42 through to day -1 relative to the day of announcement (day 0) as follows: 
 
Schemes of Arrangement vs. Tender Offers 
58 
 
                                                                CARi,t= ∑ ARit
−1
t=−42                                                        
 
The markup is calculated as target cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from the day of 
announcement (t= 0) through to day 126, or until the day of the target’s delisting, if before day 
126. As bellow; 
                                                        CARi,t= ∑ ARit
min {126,delisting}
t=0       
                              
where ARit is the daily abnormal returns and is calculated as the difference between the target’s 
daily return Rit and the expected market return E(Rit) over the sample period (Brown & 
Warner, 1985) as follows:  
                                                                   ARit = Rit − E(Rit)                                                              
 
Here Rit is using the normal return using daily price data as a logarithmic return to avoid any 
statistical problems based on the formula: 
 
                                                                           Rit = ln(
Pt
Pt−1
)          
                                                   
where Pt is the initial target daily stock price and Pt−1 is the ending stock price E(Rit) for each 
day over the estimation window [-242, -43], calculated by using the estimated value of market 
model regression parameters 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 as follows: 
 
                                                                 E(Rit) = αi + βiRmt + εi     
                                  
The total bid premium is the sum of the cumulative abnormal return for runup and markup 
periods, adjusted for market movement as follows: 
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                        Abnormal Return premium i,t = ∑ CARi,t 
Min[126,delisting]
t=−42                       
 
2.4.2. Implementing Propensity Score Matching  
 
This section aims to explain the main steps used to calculate the propensity score, following 
the practical guidance of Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008), Imbens & Donald (2009),and Guo and 
Fraser (2015). There are generally three main steps in implementing propensity score matching: 
estimating the propensity score, matching strategies, and calculating the treatment effect.  
Below is a summary of the main three steps of propensity score matching. 
 
2.4.2.1. Estimating Propensity Score 
 
Estimating the propensity score involves a two-step decision: the choice of models, and the 
choice of covariates. As the choices of treatment method are binary choices, we will use either 
logit or probit models, both of which usually yield similar results in the case of binary treatment  
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). In this paper, specifically, we adopt logit model to estimate 
propensity scores.75  
Regarding the inclusion or exclusion of relevant variables in the regression, it is important to 
identify the covariates that, as suggested by both theory and empirical evidence, could affect 
the outcomes and treatment decisions.  There has been much debate in recent literature 
regarding the procedures and rules of selecting co-variates.  For example, Sianesi (2004), and 
Smith and Todds (2005) argue that only variables that have been thoroughly studied in both 
theoretical and empirical studies, should be included.  Meanwhile, Rubin and Thomas (1996) 
argue that it is preferable to include all the observed covariates in the analysis, and to exclude 
only those that, by consensus in previous studies, have been shown to be unrelated to the 
treatment outcomes.  
Researchers have proposed different approaches to the inclusion or exclusion of the relevant 
covariates in the propensity score estimation.  For example, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984b) 
choose to select variables by applying stepwise logistic regressions.  According to this method, 
                                                          
75 The results remain the same in case of using a probit model to estimate the propensity score. 
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only the variables that are significant based on t-statistics are included. If the linear terms are 
not sufficient, the propensity scores can still be adjusted by including high-order polynomial 
terms, interaction terms and stepwise logistic regression (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984b: 
1985c), or as Deheji and Wahba, (1999) who add a stratification in order to determine the terms 
of high-order polynomial terms and interaction.  
Recently, Imbeds and Rubin (2009) have introduced useful automatic procedures to include or 
exclude the relevant covariates in the estimation of propensity scores. Their procedures aim to 
calculate the propensity score in the logit model by including variables with different functional 
forms. The procedures start adding variables that are more likely to be associated with 
outcomes and the treatment assignment based on the literature review, in the simple linear form 
to estimate the propensity score. This step calculates the likelihood ratio of logit model for the 
test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the additional covariate is equal to zero. Then, 
the remaining linear covariates that are a prior viewed as other important factors for either the 
outcomes or the treatment assignment are added. Imbeds and Rubin (2009)’s procedure 
excludes variables that have likelihood ratio statistic exceeds than present constant 𝐶𝐿  = 1, 
corresponding to t-statistics of 1.645.76 Adding the variables in the linear form would be not 
sufficient to estimate the propensity score particularly with more control variables. As a result, 
the last step is to add these variables in the form of logarithm, or using higher order terms. 
However, the new forms of variables will not be included in this model if its likelihood ratio 
exceeds than some predetermine constant  𝐶𝑄 = 2.71, corresponding to a t-statistical of 1.645 
(10% level). Finally, the propensity score will be estimated using a selection of linear variables 
and a selection of different functional forms. 
As shown above, Table 2 provides a relatively comprehensive list of the variables that may be 
related to takeover outcomes and the selection of takeover mechanisms. These variables 
include the target size, M/B ratio, leverage ratio, and dummy variables that take the value of 1 
if target should pay termination fees, acquirer status (public vs. private), toehold, method of 
payment (cash vs. stock), whether a target initiated the deal, the period of financial crisis, 
whether the target and bidder hire a prestigious investment bank, auction, and other variables 
related.  This section will apply logit model to estimate the propensity score in line with Imbeds 
                                                          
76 The likelihood ratio statistic is double the difference in log likelihood values between the basic model and the 
model with extra variables  
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and Rubin (2009).  Table A2 shows the results of estimation the propensity scores using the 
logit model. 
 
2.4.2.2. Matching Strategies  
 
This step matches the treatment and untreated groups according to the estimated propensity 
scores.  These matched samples have the same probability of being treated, and it is hoped that 
the differences in the outcome variable just reflect the causal effect of the treatment.  There are 
different algorithm matching methods that have been discussed in the literature review, and 
can be divided into three groups: greedy matching, optimal matching and fine balance 
procedures Guo & Fraser (2015, p.132). 
First, let us introduce some notations that is summarised by Smith and Todd (2005) about the 
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The indictors 𝐼1 and 𝐼0 denote the set of firms that choose scheme of arrangement and tender 
offer respectively.  𝑆𝑃 is the common support of the covariates, and 𝑛1 presents the number of 
acquired firms in the set 𝐼1 ∩ 𝑆𝑃.  The expected premium is constructed as a weighted average, 
where the weights W(i,j) depend on the distance between  𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗, where 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑝𝑗  are the 
propensity score for scheme of arrangement target and tender offer target respectively.  
In this paper, we will use the greedy matching methods, which is the most commonly used 
matching algorithm in empirical work.  Greedy matching methods involve various strategies, 
such as Mahalanbobis metric matching with or without including the propensity score, nearest 
neighbour matching with or without restrict the distance between  𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗,or matching with 
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using predetermined tolerance (𝜀) or caliper for matching either if the control participant is 
nearest neighbor or not Guo & Fraser (2015, p.145-147). Here this section will adopt two 
greedy matching strategies: nearest-neighbour matching and caliper matching. First, the 
nearest single neighbour matching is based on the use of the smallest absolute difference of 
propensity score between all the possible pairs as follows; 
 
                                            
0( ) min ,i i j
j
C P P P j I= - Î‖ ‖     
 
where, C(𝑃𝑖) is neighbourhood for each i in the control participant 𝑗,  and ( 𝑗 ∈  𝐼0). 
The nearest-neighbour matching strategy allows for the unit i to be matched to n participants 
who fall into  𝐶(𝑃𝑖 ).  Here this section will match each treatment unit i to one, two and three 
possible neighbours that fall into 𝐶(𝑃𝑖 ) .  Nearest-neighbour matching can be applied in 
matching with replacement, which allows each target firms in the control group to be matched 
to more than one target firm in the treatment group.  On the other hand, matching without 
replacement does not allow the use of the untreated firms more than once.  For example if 𝑗 is 
matched with i, 𝑗 will not be used again and it will be removed from the set of untreated 
participant 𝐼0.  (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002) and Smith and Todd (2005) argue that matching the 
Nearest-neighbor with replacement or without replacement has a trade-off between bias and 
variance. The equality of matching is increased on average by using the untreated units more 
than one as a result of increasing the set of possible match. However, matching with 
replacement reduces the number of matched observation, particularly if the distribution of 
propensity score is very different between the two groups (treatment and untreatment), 
therefore the variance of the estimator will increase.  – it is essentially a bias-variance trade-
off.  In contrast, matching without replacement could force the treatment unit to be matched 
with the nearest neighbour in the control group that are quite different in terms of the value of 
propensity score, risking a higher level of bias.  Moreover, estimating the treatment effect by 
using matching without replacement is also sensitive to the order of propensity score.77 
                                                          
77 The estimation of treatment effect will use matching with replacement as a common method in the empirical 
works.  
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Second, caliper matching implies matching the nearest neighbour with using different size of 
calipers.  It could help to avoid poor matching practically when the distance between the 
matched unites is large Smith and Todd (2005).  Although there is uncertainty about which 
level of caliper should be used, it is considered a way of imposing the condition of common 
support.  Matching by caliper means that j will be selected based on an absolute distance of 
propensity score between all possible pairs by using predetermined calipers, where the target 
firm i is selected only if ∥ 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑗 ∥< 𝜀, 𝐽 𝜖 𝐼  and the neighbourhood in control group that is 
matching to i within caliper is; 
                                                   ( ) |i j i jC P P P P    ‖ ‖   
Where, e  is a pre-specified caliper. 78  
2.4.2.3. Post-Matching Analysis 
 
Post-matching analysis is divided into two steps to evaluate the matching strategy and 
sensitivity analysis to the hidden bias. First, after applying different matching strategies, it is 
important to evaluate how well the treatment and comparison group are balanced in the 
matched sample. The main aim of the PSM estimator is to make the outcome of a bidding 
strategy conditionally independent of the selected treatment. Therefore, if the estimator is well 
specified, this means that the covariates that are used to estimate the propensity score are 
balanced. Imai & Ratkovic (2014) show that the covariates are well-balanced if their 
standardized difference is zero and the variance ratio is one.79 This section will use tebalance 
as a technique in STATA to calculate the standardized difference and variance ratio in order to 
test the balance of covariates after each matching strategy.   
 Second, this section will test the sensitivity of the results to the presence of omitted variables 
that may affect schemes and bid premium because of the bias is removed from the observable 
variables but it is important to know how large the effect of the unobservable variables affects 
the result of PSM. The basis for propensity score method is that the potential outcomes of a 
                                                          
78  Applying a quarter of standard deviation (i.e.,  𝜀 ≤ 0.25𝜕𝑃 ) of the estimated propensity is suggested by 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985) as size of caliper, where 𝜕𝑃  is the standard deviation of the estimate propensity score.   
79 Imai and Ratkovic (2014) introduce the covariate balancing propensity score (CBPS) model to check the 
balance of covariates. Moreover, this section will use histograms to check the balance between covariates as 
suggested by Guo & Fraser (2015, p.198-200) 
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treatment are independent of the treatment decision conditional on a propensity score.  
However, the results depend on unbiased estimation of propensity scores, which may not be 
true in practice. Suppose an omitted variable is correlated with both the probability of treatment 
and the outcome variable.  In this case, the differences in outcome between two matched 
individuals will reflect the composite of the treatment effect and the effect of the omitted factor.  
Such a problem that is created by the omitted factor is called “hidden bias” problem Guo & 
Fraser (2015, p.375-359). Therefore, it is important to test the sensitivity of the results to the 
presence of omitted variables that may affect the treatment and outcome.  This section will 
follow the guidelines of Guo & Fraser (2015) and Becker & Caliendo (2007) to provide the 
appropriate theoretical background to the test. 
The test is best described using Rosenbaum bounds. This section assumes that the probability 
an individual participates in a treatment is a function of observed covariates X (a vector) and 
unobserved covariates U (also potentially a vector)  
)(),|1( iiiii UXFUXDP    
Where, for this analysis it is assumed that F(.) is the logistic sigmoid, and γ is the effect of the 
unobservable covariates on the decision to practice the treatment.   
This section supposes that 𝑃𝑖  and 𝑃𝑗  are the probabilities that individual i and individual j 
receive treatment after applying the matching strategy.  We can then calculate the odds ratio of 
two individuals receiving treatment, 
 
Pi/(1 − Pi)
Pj/ (1 − Pj)
 = 
Pi(1 − Pj)
Pj (1 − Pi)
 = 
exp(𝛽𝑋𝑖 − γ𝑢𝑖)




If two individuals are matched according to their propensity score, then we have that, 
 
ji XX    
And the odds ratio becomes exp[γ (ui −uj)]. 
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Propensity score of matching  will yield unbiased estimates of the treatment effect if either γ = 
0, or (ui −uj) = 0,  meaning that either the observed factor does not affect the probability of 
treatment or the unobserved factors influence the probability of treatment in the same way for 





Pi(1 −  Pj)
Pj (1 −  Pi)
≤ exp (𝛾) 
Using the null hypothesis, γ = 0, the probability that the matched pair, i and j, will receive 
treatment is the same.   
 
In order to explain how to test the sensitivity of the estimated treatment effect to unobserved 
covariates, this analysis introduces a test for treatment effect significance either if the outcome 
variable is a binary dummy. 
 
Guo & Fraser (2015, p.342) suggests a way of testing for significance of treatment effects for 
a binary outcome variable using the non-parametric Mantel and Haenszel statistic, QMH (Mantel 
and Haenszel, 1959). The null hypothesis of this test is that there is no effect of treatment. This 
means that the outcome of scheme of arrangement is not affected by whether a company 
chooses scheme of arrangement or a tender offer. However, to implement a test we require a 
binary outcome variable, while 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 is a continuous variable.  This analysis therefore 
requires that to convert 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖  into a binary outcome variable.  The STATA program 
(rbounds) can test the sensitivity to the hidden variables regardless if the outcome variable is a 
binary dummy or continuous.  
 
Under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, the distribution of Y follows a hypergeometric 
distribution (Becker and Caliendo, 2007), with a mean of  (𝑁𝐷 𝑌1 /N), where 𝑁𝐷 is the number 
of treated individuals in a sample, N is the total sample size and 𝑌1 is the number of matched 
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where 𝑌1𝑆 , 𝑌0𝑆 and 𝑌𝑆  represent respectively the total number of successful target firms that 
received a treatment and the number of successful target firms from the control group, and the 
total number of all the successful units in sample stratum s.  
The QMH statistic above assumes that we have correctly matched individuals in the treatment 
and untreated groups. However, it is possible to modify the above statistic to account for 
unobserved covariates (Rosenbaum, 2002) Specifically there are two bounds of the test statistic, 
as we vary exp (γ),: a lower (𝑄_𝑚ℎ−) and upper (𝑄_𝑚ℎ+) bound. The upper bound represents 
the test statistic given that we have overestimated the treatment effect, and the lower bound is 
the statistic if we underestimated the effect. In examining the sensitivity of a significant 
estimated treatment effect to unobserved omitted variables we accordingly examine the upper 
bound. As exp (γ) increases these boundaries move apart to reflect the increased uncertainty of 
the test statistics when a hidden bias is present since these bounds are calculated for a given 
level of exp(γ), the results of this sensitivity test are reported across a range of exp(γ). The exp 
(γ) represents the odds of differential assignment due to omitted factors that we will called Γ. 
In particular, we consider the p value from the upper bound of the test statistic. If p<0.05 at a 
given level of exp (γ) then we reject the null of no-treatment effect (at the 5% level) in the 
presence of an observed variable that increases the odds of treatment by a factor of exp(γ). 
 
2.5. Empirical Results  
 
2.5.1. Bid Premium to Target Shareholders for Scheme of Arrangements and 
Tender Offers 
 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of bid premiums offered for target shareholders of 
schemes and tender offers. The bid premium measures are the actual bid premiums based on 
the final price data before the initial public announcement date and the SDC announcement 
date. Later, different bid premium measurements will be used in Table 4. These include the 
actual bid premium based on component data, the four-week premium (field PREM4WK) 
calculated by the SDC four week relative to the original date of public announcement, and the 
abnormal return (AR) premium. The final column denotes the p-value of means test that tests 
Schemes of Arrangement vs. Tender Offers 
67 
 
the null hypothesis based on t-tests of whether there are no differences between the schemes of 
arrangement and tender offer.  
Panel A shows the actual gain of the target shareholders measured by the target’s stock price 
at one/two and three months prior to the initial public announcement dates, based on the final 
price data and classified by the takeover methods.  First, the bid premium is calculated from 
the price offered at one month before the initial public announcement date, which shows that 
the scheme deals earn on average 34.96% (0.000), the tender offer deals earn 42.90% (0.000), 
and the difference between the two-subsamples is a statistically significant.  If this section takes 
the stock price two months prior to the announcement dates as the base, then the premium level 
of tender offer deals is 43.50% (0.000), and that of scheme deals is 35.36 % (0.000), and the 
difference is significant difference between the two sub-samples.  Similar results are also 
reported in the case of three-month premium.  
Panel B reports the premium levels, where this analysis takes stock prices prior to the SDC 
announcement date, rather than the initial public announcement dates, for calculation.  For the 
one-month period before the SDC announcement date, the premium level of scheme deals is 
on average 33.72% (0.000), and that of the tender offer deals is 34.39% (0.000).  On average, 
the premium level of scheme deals is 0.668% lower than that of tender offers, yet the difference 
is not significant.  
When selecting the target’s stock price two months before the SDC announcement date as the 
base, the premium of scheme deals is 34.705% (0.000), and that of tender offer deals is 39.208% 
(0.000).  Again, the difference is not statistically significant.  Similar results are also reported 
in the case of using stock price three-month before the SDC announcement date.   
Table 4 reports results that are obtained using different bid premium measurements: the actual 
bid premium based on component data, the four-week premium that is calculated by the SDC 
at four weeks respectively to the initial public announcement, and, finally, the abnormal return 
(AR) premium. The sample sizes of the last two measures depend on the availability of (field 
PREM4WK) in SDC for the four-week premium and the target stock price in DataStream for 
the AR premium. The final column denotes the p-value of means test that tests the null 
hypothesis based on t-tests of whether there are no differences between the schemes of 
arrangement and tender offer.  
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Panel A shows the actual gain of the target shareholders measured by the target’s stock price 
at one/two/three months prior to the initial public announcement dates, based on the component 
data and classified by the takeover methods.  The one-month premium for scheme deals is on 
average 35.000 % (0.000) premium, and for tender offer deals is 41.015 %(0.000). On average, 
the gain of target schemes is less than that of tender offers by 6.014%, yet the difference is not 
significant.  Panel A also reports the results for two-month and three-month premium levels.  
The similar results are reported that the premium levels of tender offer deals are higher than 
those of scheme deals, yet the premium differences are not significant. 
Panel B reports the bid premium calculations based on the component data during a pre-offer 
period before the date of the SDC announcement.  For the one, two and three-month premium 
levels, we receive similar results as in Panel A.  That is, the premium levels of tender offer 
deals are higher than those of scheme deals, yet the difference across the two sub-groups are 
not significant.  The other observation is that, the bid premium levels of Panel B are generally 
lower than their counterparts of Panel A. 
Panel C shows the bid premiums using two alternative bid premium definitions: the four-week 
premium (field PREM4WK) and the abnormal return (AR) premium. The four-week premium 
indicates a significant gain of 33.637 % (0.000) for scheme deals, and that for tender offer deals 
is 42.733 % (0.000).  The difference between them is significant.  Panel C also reports the AR 
premium levels.   
 
From the univariate analyses in Table 3 and 4, we find that, for various calculations of the bid 
premiums, the premium levels of scheme deals are lower than those of tender offer deals, by 
5%.   The differences are statistically significant in the case of Panel A in Table 3, where we 
calculate the bid premiums using the final price data and the initial public announcement date, 
and in the case of four-week offer premium in Table 4. 
 
2.5.2. OLS Analysis 
 
We next move on to the multivariate analysis, to see whether the observable target and deal 
characteristics that are found in the literature review and that have been discussed in Table 2 
could affect the bid premium.  Specifically, this section runs the simple OLS regression, and 
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the results would be compared to those in the next section, where the matching method is 
applied. 
Tables 5 and 6 report the OLS regression results.  In Table 5, the calculation of the bid 
premiums is based on the initial public announcement dates.  In Table 6, the calculation is 
based on the SDC announcement dates.  We consider the cases for one, two and three-month 
bid premiums, and for each case, model (1) and (2) correspond to different sets of covariates.  
In the regression, this analysis uses a dummy variable to indicate the corresponding selling 
process, i.e., it is equal to 1 if a scheme mechanism is applied.  The selection of covariates in 
model (1) and (2) is based on the existing literature, as the bid premium or the selection of the 
takeover methods determinants.  These variables include target size, M/B ratio, target 
termination fees, acquirer status (public versus private), toehold, and method of payment (cash 
versus stock), the period of financial crisis, and the regulation shock.80  Moreover, both models 
also include other variables that are related to the transaction environment or to the bidding 
strategy such as auction, target initiated the deal, whether the bidder and targets hire top 
investment bank. Finally, the other control variables that relate to the targets' financial health 
status such as EBITDA/AT, ROA, cash holding, and stock performance will be included.    
 
Tables 5 shows the results for the cross-sectional of the bid premium that is calculated at one 
/two and three months prior to the initial public announcement date. After controlling the target 
and deal characteristics, the results show that the bid premium of scheme deals is roughly 8% 
lower than that of tender offer deals, which is, not surprisingly, consistent with the results of 
univariate test.  However, the results are statistically significant only at 10% level in Model (1).   
 
Table 5 shows that the bid premium increases with the size of the target, yet the result is not 
significant.  In the literature, there are two opposite opinions about the relation between the 
target size and bid premium. One is that bidders may overpay for large targets, because the 
later have strong bargaining powers, which could lead to higher premium levels (Dutta & Saadi, 
2011). The other is that large targets could obtain lower bid premiums for many reasons.  For 
                                                          
80 There is a correlation between the variables of the two variable public bidders and using 100 % of stock, because 
a private bidder is less likely to offer stock as a method of payment for a target firm. The sample consists of 446 
private bidders, and only 5 firms offer non-cash offers. However, the sample consists of 313 public bidders 
offering all cash (all stock) as the payment method in 129 (109) of the sample transactions. As a result, this analysis 
decides to separate the two variables in the model as (1) and (2). 
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example, bidders may not be certain about the resulting synergies with large targets.  Moreover, 
the bidders pay less for large targets, because the competition for large targets is commonly 
low, and this mitigates the winner's curse problem (Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
 
The result also shows that a higher M/B ratio is associated with lower bid premiums, yet it is 
not significant.  Higher M/B ratios are normally associated with low growth opportunities 
Harford et al., (2009) and Eckbo (2009). This section observes the same result by using 
Industry-adjusted M/B ratio as alternative measure for the growth opportunities.  
  
The regression result shows a negative relationship between bid premium and target 
termination fees, and the result is not significant either.  Normally, scheme transactions are 
associated with high levels of termination fees, that the target firm needs to pay to the acquirer 
if the transaction is not complete eventually.  Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) state that the 
relationship between target termination fees and the bid premium is ambiguous.  
 
Next, when the bidders are public listed firms, the bid premium levels are significantly lower.   
This is surprising in the light of Bargeron et al., (2008), who finds that public bidders pay 
higher premiums for the target shareholders than private bidders.  One plausible explanation 
for higher bid premiums by public bidders could be that the managers of public firms have a 
strong incentive to successfully complete the transaction Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015), and 
therefore pay more.  Public bidders choose to structure the transaction by using scheme of 
arrangement, which gives them a more certainty to obtain the 100% of the target shares and 
this is consequently help them to avoid the additional cost of losing the target compare to the 
target firms, resulting in lower premium.  
 
About payment method, using 100 % of stock as a method of payment significantly reduces 
the bid premium in all the models.  For stock offers, target shareholders do not need to pay 
more taxes on capital gains, which is different from cash offers whereby the target shareholders 
ask for a higher price to cover the extra tax costs Huang & Walkling (1987). For mixed offers, 
where the payments are mixed between cash and stock, the results are ambiguous.   
 
Next, toehold is associated with lower bid premium.  When the bidder obtains a stake (toehold) 
in the target firm six- months before the announcement date, the target shareholders will receive 
lower bid premium.  This finding is consistent with that of Betton et al., (2008a). However, the 
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negative relation between toehold and bid premium is statistically significant only in the 
models for one-month premiums. 
 
The other main explanatory variables are related to the transaction environment, for example, 
whether the transaction occurred in the financial crisis period or in the time of the regulation 
shock. The results show that the effect of the financial crisis appears to have a significantly 
positive impact at 10% level on the one-month premium.  Moreover, there is a negative relation 
between the regulation shock and bid premiums across all the models, yet such result is not 
statistically significant.  
Another important explanatory variable that could affect the bid premium is whether the 
transaction is target initiated or not.  The result shows that the bid premiums are significantly 
lower across all the models if the transactions are initiated by target firms.  Furthermore, the 
bid premium decreases with the high level of leverage and tangible assets. This is consistent 
with Bargeron et al., (2008), who argues that a high level of leverage could weaken a target 
firm’s bargaining power during the takeover process, and, therefore, the target shareholders 
will obtain a low premium. However, this result is not statistically significant. 
 
Consistent with Boone & Mulherin (2008b),using prestigious banks do not cause bidder firms 
to overbid for target firms.  Using auctions significantly increases the target bid premium in 
most of the models, which is consistent with Bulow & Klemperer (1996a). The high level of 
competition between bidder firms who compete for the same target firm will raise up the offer 
price of the winner bidder.  This result confirms the argument of Roll (1986a) winner's curse 
problem exists in the takeover market and rejects Boone & Mulherin (2008b) who find auction 
as a proxy for winner's curse does not encourage the bidder to overpay for the target.  Finally, 
if the bidder aims to delist the target from the market, the target shareholders significantly 
obtain a lower premium.  
 
In relation to other control variables related to the targets' financial information, targets with 
poor stock performance significantly reduces the target shareholder’s premium. Such results 
are in line with Fidrmuc et al., (2012) who found that the bid premium is higher when there is 
poor past stock performance. The variables that measure the target profitability and the level 
of cash do not have a significant impact upon the bid premium.   
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Table 6 reports the similar regression results, where the analysis uses the SDC announcement 
date in calculating the bid premium.  Remember in Table 5, the analysis uses the initial public 
announcement date for calculation the bid premium instead. The scheme of arrangement 
decreases the target’s premium at one/two/and three months in all the models before the SDC 
announcement date, which is consistent with the univariate test. However, in model (1) in case 
of using a target stock price three-months before the SDC announcement date show a negative 
effect for scheme upon the bid premium at 10% level.   
 
Moreover, the larger the target size, the less the premium shareholders obtain. Again, there is 
no significant effect for the target size on the bid premium. The effect of M/B ratio appears as 
it has a significant negative relation on the bid premium in case of using a target stock price 
three -month before the SDC announcement at 10% level. The sign of the coefficient that shows 
whether the termination fees exist is shown as sometimes negative or positive. However, the 
statistical test of the variables is not significant. The bid premium is significantly negative if 
the acquirer is public listed firm.  Accepting 100 % of stock as the method of payment 
significantly lowers the bid premium as measured at one/two and three months before the SDC 
announcement date. Model (2) shows that accepting mixed offer between cash and stock is 
significantly lower the premium in case of using a target stock price one/ two and three months 
before the SDC announcement date to calculate the premium.   
 
Moreover, accepting the offer from the bidder who owned a stake in the target tends to be 
insignificantly lower the bid premium. Still the transaction that happened in the period of finical 
crisis positively affects the wealth of target shareholder wealth. The regulation shock has a 
mixed between positive and negative impact on the premium. However, the effect is 
statistically not significant. Initiated the deal by the target has a negative impact upon the bid 
premium and the result is statistically not significant. The more tangible assets the targets have, 
the less premium is significantly obtained. There is a negative relation between the levels of 
leverage and bid premium, however, the effect of leverage has no statistically significant 
impact upon the bid premium.  
 
In addition, there is no significant effect on bid premium either if the target or bidder use top-
tier investment banks to advise them in the deal process. Auction has a significantly positive 
impact on the shareholder’s premium which means that bidder overpay to the target in case if 
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there is another acquirer bid for the target. Finally, the poorer past stock performance of a target 
tends to have a significantly high bid premium.  
 
In conclusion, the linear regression estimates the effect of using schemes as a dummy variable 
upon the bid premium with taking into consideration the other determinants of the bid premium 
and the selection of takeover methods. The result shows that there are some variables that have 
significantly negative impact on the bid premium such as if the bidder is public listed firm, if 
the bidder uses a 100% stock to pay for the target shareholders, if the target is delisted from 
the stock market and the target with poor stock performance. From the other side, if the target 
initiated the deal, if the deal occurred in the time of financial crisis period and  if there are more 
than one bidder bid for the same target, target obtains a significantly high bid premium.  
However, self-selection in the treatment still exists in the estimate of linear regression where 
the assignment of the takeover methods is a self-selection decision made by the preference of 
bidder, target firms or the deal characteristics. To correct the self-selection problem, this 
analysis applies the method of propensity score matching to address the selection bias problem, 
and estimate the average treatment effect. The OLS result is discussed in the previous section 
in order to compare it later with the matched sample after controlling the bias selection problem. 
 
2.5.3. Choice of Takeover Method 
 
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to explore the determinants on the choice of a 
specific selling method in takeovers.  Table 7 models the choices of the selling mechanism in 
the U.K. market using the marginal effects from a logit model of the probability for a deal to 
structure as auction on the selective covariates. In model (1) we start with the main explanatory 
variables that are deemed in the literature to be the main determinants for bid premium or the 
selection of takeover methods.  These variables include target size, market-to-book value, 
target termination fees, acquirer status (public versus private), toehold, and, the percentage of 
cash that used by the bidder to pay for the offers, the period of financial crisis, and the time of 
regulation shock, tangible assets and the level of leverage.  In model (2), we further include a 
set of variables related to the transaction environment or the transaction characteristics, such 
as auction, target initiated the deal, whether the bidder and targets hire top investment bank. 
Finally, model (3) further includes the control variables such as whether the target is delisted 
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from the exchange market, and the variables related to the targets' financial characteristics such 
EBITDA/AT, ROA and ROE, cash holding and stock performance.    
 In Model (1), most of the observable explanatory variables strongly affect the choice of 
takeover method and have the expected signs. Only the ratios of M/B and leverage do not show 
significant impact on the choice between schemes and tender offers.  As predicted, target firms 
that are sold in schemes are more likely to be large firms, which confirm the conjecture that 
larger firms have larger numbers of tendered shares, which increases the uncertainty for a 
bidder in obtaining 100% share ownership in case of using tender offer. Using a friendly 
process like a scheme could increase the likelihood that the bidder obtains the full control of 
the target. 
Table 7 also shows some results on the impact of payment methods on the choice of selling 
method in takeovers.  For example, using cash decreases the probability of choosing schemes 
as the selling methods. 
It is also shown that private acquirers are more likely to choose schemes as the takeover 
methods.  Termination fees also matters. This result is consistent with the conjecture that a 
bidder knows that a scheme of arrangement as a takeover method gives them an amount of 
certainty about the completion of the acquisition. However, the corollary is that such a process 
takes a long time to ensure the target’s intent to complete the deal, and necessitates a long 
period to process the scheme. The bidder, therefore, asks for higher termination fees. 
Consistent with the conjecture that bidder do not usually seek to build a stake in the target, as 
that stake will not be counted towards the threshold of 75% voting power in terms of using 
scheme. The result shows that targets are less likely to be sold in scheme when the bidder owns 
a stake in the target firms.  
Target firms are more likely to be sold in scheme of arrangement in the period of financial 
crisis. It may reflect the facts that bidders becoming more familiar with the judicial process and 
the forum of the courts to affect takeovers, especially with the amendments that were added to 
the scheme practice.  For example, there is now no need to petition the court to commence a 
scheme (Payne, 2014a, p 84).  This might explain why schemes became a preferable takeover 
method in the UK during the financial crisis.  Although the U.K. government prohibits the 
cancelation scheme to prevent the acquirer from avoiding the stamp duty, scheme of 
arrangement is still a preferable method to implement the takeover transactions.   
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The trend of using schemes in the takeover market is confirmed by the results whereby target 
firms are more likely to be sold by scheme even after the regulation shock because it could be 
that bidder is more certain to obtain 100% share ownership, if this is necessary by using a 
scheme. Moreover, target firms that are rich in tangible assets are less likely to be sold in 
schemes. Model (2) shows that the target is more likely to be sold in scheme when the bidder 
and target use prestigious investment or when the target initiates the deal. Model (3) shows that 
the control variables that could indicate the financial health of the target do not have affect the 
choice between the takeover methods. 
In conclusion, this section shows that most of the covariates have the expected signs that have 
been predicted as main explanatory variables that could affect the bid premium or the choice 
between schemes and tender offer and they are significant at the 5% level or stronger. Such as, 
the size of the target, the percentage of cash, the bidder public status (public versus target), the 
exist of target termination fess, if the bidder owned a stake before the announcing of the 
transactions, the tangible assets, and if the target happened during the crisis time or after the 
regulation shock. Moreover, other variables related to the transactions environment such as the 
characteristic of the target and bidder advisors and if the target initiated a deal affect the choice 
between scheme and tender offer. The next part will estimate the casual impact of using 
schemes upon the target bid premium by using only the variables are significant. 
 
2.5.4. Matching  
 
2.5.4.1. Propensity Score Estimation 
 
The first step of implementing the propensity score of matching is to estimate the propensity 
scores.  Here the analysis will run a logit regression to estimate the propensity scores, while 
just keeping the statistically significant variables.  Table A2 in the Appendix A shows the 
results of estimating the likelihood of choosing scheme of arrangement by using the selective 
covariates that appears in the linear, higher order terms and interaction terms, as suggested by 
Imbeds & Rubin (2009).   
After estimating the propensity scores, it is essential to examine whether the overlap 
assumption is satisfied or not.  According to Guo & Fraser (2015), the overlap assumption is 
violated when there are mass propensity score distributions at zero or one.  Figure 1 shows the 
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distributions of the propensity scores, based on the logit model in Table A2 It is clear that, the 
quality of propensity score distribution satisfies the overlap assumption, as there are no values 
for the propensity scores that have zero or one in either tender offer (control group ) or scheme 
of arrangement (the treatment group).81 
Figure 1 Estimated propensity score 
 
2.5.4.2. Treatment Effects 
 
Tables 8 reports the results of the treatment effects, after implementing the matching strategies.  
Each row provides the results for both the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average 
treatment effect of the treated (ATT).   This section applies various greedy matching strategies 
here: nearest neighbour matching (in Panel A) and caliper matching (in Panel B). The columns 
are stratified based on the selection of the pre-offer price periods that are used to calculate the 
bid premium: one /two and three months before both the initial announcement date and SDC 
announcement date, respectively. Tables 8 provides results for both ATE and ATT based on 
the marginal effects in Table A2. The scheme of arrangement, in line with the general 
expectation, tends to generate significantly lower premium levels than tender offers.  
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Panel A estimates the treatment effects by matching the target firms choosing schemes (the 
treatment group) to one, two and three target firms that choose tender offers (the control group).  
The first row matches each target firm in the treatment group with the nearest neighbour in the 
control group, and there are 102 schemes targets matching with 99 tender offer targets. In the 
first column, ATE and ATT are estimated by using a bid premium measured by one month 
before the initial announcement date.  In the estimation of ATE, the coefficient on the scheme 
dummy is negative and statistically insignificant.  
In the case of estimate ATT, scheme targets still lose a premium in comparison to the tender 
offer by on average by - 6.437% through matching 201 treated targets with 99 untreated units, 
that the coefficient of ATT is statically insignificant. 
 In the second and third columns, ATE and ATT are estimated by using a bid premium 
measured by two and three months before the initial announcement date, where each target 
firm in the treatment group matches with a signal nearest neighbour in the control group. The 
ATE shows that the target firms that accept scheme of arrangement to implement the takeover 
will lose a premium in comparison to tender offer by on average -7.822% and -6.382% 
respectively. However, the result is not significant. The estimation of ATT shows that using 
the scheme of arrangement to implement the takeover reduces the premium by on average -
5.918% and -3.316% respectively; however, the result is not significant.  
The last three columns use to calculate the bid premium at one /two and three months before 
the SDC announcement date to estimate ATE and ATT. Both estimations show that using the 
scheme of arrangement leads the target shareholders to gain significantly less compared with 
the tender offer. However, the result remains insignificant  
The analysis now moves to estimate ATE and ATT based on the pre-offer periods that are 
before the initial date of announcement and SDC announcement date by matching each target 
that accepts scheme of arrangement to two nearest neighbours that accept the tender offer. 
These strategies of matching use 133 scheme of arrangement and 158 tender offer observations 
to estimate the treatment effect. In the first column, the estimation of ATE shows that the 
scheme of arrangement strongly reduces the target shareholder’s premium by on average -
11.228%. The estimation of ATT shows that the target shareholders who actually accept to 
implement the takeover by using scheme of arrangement lose a premium by on average -
7.192%. The results are robustness by using different periods to select the target share price in 
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order to calculate the bid premium. In the second and third columns, in case of estimate ATE, 
scheme of arrangement strongly reduces the premium of the target shareholders by on average 
-11.939% and -10.708% respectively. In case of estimate ATT, the second column shows that 
target shareholders who actually accept scheme of arrangement gain less than the target firms 
using tender offer by - 8.942% on average.  However, the result is statistically not significant. 
The third column shows that; the premium is significantly reduced for the target who actually 
accepted the scheme of arrangement by on average -6.546%. 
The fifth and sixth columns report that, in case of estimate ATE, scheme of arrangement 
significantly reduces the shareholder premium by on average -9.541% and -9.432%, 
respectively. In case of estimate ATT, the targets who actually accepted scheme of arrangement 
strongly lose a premium by on average 6.738% and 5.317% respectively in the fifth and sixth 
columns.  It is important to note that the percentage of losing wealth become large in the case 
of estimate ATE in comparison to ATT. This means that a target manger should require higher 
premiums to help the shareholders to cover the losing in wealth that the sachems due.    
Next, the analysis will use the implication of nearest neighbour matching strategies by defining 
three participants in the control groups to be match with a treatment unit.  This strategy uses 
147 schemes of arrangement units and 205 tender offer observations to estimate the treatment 
effect. In general, the estimate of ATE has a strong significantly negative impact upon the bid 
premiums regardless across most of the columns. The estimate of ATT shows that; scheme of 
arrangement significantly reduces the target firms’ premiums by on average - 5.779% and -
4.433% in the first and third columns respectively.  
Panel B provides information related to the application of matching schemes by using the 
nearest neighbour with specify a size of caliper. In general, this section chooses to implement 
caliper (𝜀 = 0.02 ) in order to estimate ATE and ATT. These strategies of matching with 
caliper uses 75 schemes and 77 tender offer observations to estimate the ATE and it uses 158 
schemes and 96 tender offer targets to estimate the ATT. In the first and second columns, the 
coefficients of ATE are significantly negative which means that using scheme to implement 
takeover reduces the premium by on average -11.416% and -13.195% respectively. In the third 
columns, scheme of arrangement significantly reduces the shareholder’s premium by on 
average -10.460% at 10% level. The last three columns show that in general scheme of 
arrangement reduces the target premium. However, the result is only significant in the fifth 
column at 10%. The coefficients of ATT show that scheme of arrangement has a negative 
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impact on the shareholder’s premium who actually accept to implement the takeover by 
schemes. However, the results are not statistically significant.  
 
2.5.4.3. Robustness Test 
 
Robustness test is divided into two steps: evaluate the matching strategy and sensitivity analysis 
to the hidden bias. First, after applying different matching strategies, it is important to evaluate 
how well the treatment and comparison group are balanced in the matched sample. Second, 
this section will test the sensitivity of the results to the presence of omitted variables that may 
affect schemes and bid premium because of the bias is removed from the observable variables 
but it is important to know how large the effect of the unobservable variables affects the result 
of PSM. 
This section first will show the results that related to the matching evaluation. The preferred 
results of this section is the estimation of ATE and ATT by using the strategy matching of one 
unit from the treatment group to two or three unites in the control group. Therefore, the 
evaluation matching will be presented with one of the preferred result, which is matching one-
target firms in the scheme group to two target firms in the tender group.82  Table 9 reports 
results of the comparison of covariate balance after estimating ATE by applying nearest 
neighbour 1-to-2 matching strategy without caliper. In the raw sample, the covariates seem to 
be balanced compare to the treatment unites. For most of the variables that have been used to 
estimate ATE, the standardised difference is close to zero and the variance ratio is close to one. 
Table 10 shows the comparison of covariate balance after estimating ATT by applying nearest 
neighbour 1-2 matching strategy without caliper. Most of the variables have a standardise 
difference that is close to zero and a variance ratio that is close to one, except some variables. 
For example, the mean of the firm target size and toehold in the raw unit look differ from the 
matched one. The standardised difference is far from zero and the variance ratio is not close to 
one. Because of this, it is important to check the balance for firm size and cash holding by using 
histogram as suggested by Guo & Fraser (2015).  Figure 3 show the comparison of estimated 
propensity scores generated by table A2 across target size. It can be seen that; the matched 
                                                          
82 The main reason to do that to avoid presenting too many tables for each matching strategy and the results are 
available upon request  
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sample is balanced in term of firm size. Thus, there is no need to increase the quality of 
matching. 
This second section concerns the sensitivity of the results to the presence of omitted variables 
that may affect schemes and bid premium. Using matching method removes the problem of 
selection bias between the schemes and tender offer. However, the bias does not remove from 
unobservable. This section will use the test that is suggested by Becker and Caliendo (2007) in 
section 2.4.2.3 that test how large the effect of the unobservable or “hidden bias” needs to be 
in order to reverse the results found by PSM. Tables 11 shows the result of the sensitivity 
analysis for 1-to-2 strategies that are used in Table 8. In case of match one target firm from the 
scheme group to two target firms in the tender offer group to study the effect of using scheme 
on bid premium at one/two and three months before the initial announcement date.  Under Γ=1, 
there is no hidden bias and the scheme of arrangement has a significant impact upon the bid 
premium.  
 
2.5.5. A Comparison of Estimated Models of the Impact of Schemes of 
Arrangement upon Bid Premiums 
 
All of the methods (t-test, OLS and PSM) conclude that the average treatment effect of using 
scheme generate significantly lower premiums than those structured through tender offers. 
However, this result is more stable in case of calculating the bid premiums by using stock prices 
in the period before the initial announcement date. 
The normal linear regression analysis as discussed before apparently may involve the self-
selection problem, as the selection of a specific takeover method would be self- decision of the 
bidder firms, which may in turn depend on its specific characteristics.  If the self-selection 
problem is not properly addressed, the regression will render biased estimates. Because of this, 
the analysis use PSM. It is worth to establish a comparison between the average treatment effect 
before and after controlling the selection-bias problem. Table 12 shows a comparison of 
findings across models estimating the impact of schemes of arrangement upon bid premiums. 
First, the t-test shows that schemes significantly reduce the bid premium at, on average, -7,941% 
(0.023),-8.132% (0.023) and -7.814% (0.000),  when the bid premium is measured by the 
target’s stock price at one/two/three months prior to the initial public announcement dates, 
Schemes of Arrangement vs. Tender Offers 
81 
 
based on the final price data, respectively. However, the result is statistically insignificant when 
using the period before the SDC announcement date to calculate the premiums.    
 
In OLS, the results show that the bid premium of scheme deals stands at roughly 8% lower 
than that of tender offer deals, and the results are statistically significant only at the 10% level, 
in cases when the bid premium is measured by the target’s stock price at one/two/three months 
prior to the initial public announcement dates. However, in cases using the period before the 
SDC announcement date to calculate the premiums, the result is statistically insignificant.     
 
The effect of schemes remained significant after controlling the selection-bias problem, 
whereby schemes, in general, significantly reduce bid premiums, using the period before the 
date of the initial SDC announcement date to calculate the premiums. The ATE and ATT were 
estimated using a regression-adjusted model, too. Schemes still lower the bid premium in 
takeover deals. However, the results were significant when using the period before the initial 
announcement date to calculate the premiums.    
 
2.6. Conclusion  
 
Scheme of arrangements has become a main choice in the U.K. market to implement the 
takeover transactions in recent years. This maybe because scheme of arrangement allows 
bidders to be certain if it is essential to obtain 100% of the target shares, whereby the law only 
requires a minimum of 75% of the target company’s voting rights to approve the transaction 
particularly with larger companies and the concomitant financial worth of such companies.  
 
However, there has been much debate among the UK takeover regulators and articles in the 
popular press about whether the takeover transactions should be allowed to be implemented by 
the way of scheme of arrangement because bidders can acquire a target company “cheaply” 
and “easily” in comparison to using the tender offer process. The debate is raised without 
evidence from the empirical research that could confirm or reject that scheme of arrangement 
is cheapest method in comparison to tender offer.   
 
The main aim of this chapter is to estimate the casual impact of using the scheme of 
arrangement to implement a takeover on target’s bid premium as main observable outcome of 
Schemes of Arrangement vs. Tender Offers 
82 
 
the bidding strategy. The self-selection bias is solved by employing the propensity score 
matching (PSM) methodology because the choice of scheme of arrangement is self-selected 
that maybe related to the target, acquirer or deal characteristics, which are different from the 
tender offer deals.  Therefore, a simple comparison or regression on the mean difference in bid 
premiums between the scheme of arrangement and tender offer deals would be biased. This 
chapter uses a sample of the UK takeover transaction between the period 1995-2015 for listed 
target firms and the sample is split into two sub-groups; deals that are implemented by the way 
of scheme of arrangement and deals that are implemented by the way of tender offer. The main 
result shows that scheme of arrangement significantly reduces the target shareholders gain 
relative to the tender offer.
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Table 1 Sample Construction 
The table shows the main steps that are used to construct the sample, and steps drop the number of deals, as listed below. Thomson One Banker provides all the acquisition 
data from Thomson One Banker (SDC) UK M&A Database over the periods 1995-2015. The original sample is restricted to meet step one criteria. Deals are subdivided in step 
two as schemes of arrangement and tender offers, based on the files acquisition technique, synopsis and the history file event in SDC database, which provide information about 
the specific takeover methods that are used to implement a deal, details about the parties involved in the transaction, and a summary of a bid history. Step three utilises 
information from the LexisNexis U.K. database to verify the actual takeover methods of deals in cases where this information is missing in SDC, and, second, to check whether 
a deal has been implemented by a scheme of arrangement or tender offer, as, in some cases, the SDC acquisition technique file indicates both when cataloguing single deals. 
The final sample consists of 201 scheme of arrangement deals and 558 tender offers after deleting deals that do not have DataStream codes or information related to the bid 
premium calculations in SDC or LexisNexis U.K. databases such as the share price paid by the acquirer for target shares (filed HOSTPR) and the calculated SDC premiums 
(filed PREM4WK). Moreover, the analysis deletes a deal that does not have DataStream information related to the main variables; sales, total assets, market to book value and 
leverage ratio in order to have sufficient data that measures the impact of accepting scheme of arrangement offer on target shareholder wealth. Finally, hostility offers are 
excluded. For more details about the steps that are used to utilise the final sample please see section 2.3.1.  








Steps  Total observations 
-The Target firm belongs to the U.K. with completed merger and acquisitions announced between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015 67,471 
Steps (1) the main criteria    
-Target is a public firm on the London Stock Exchange  6,050 
-The bidders are from the U.K.      4,047 
-Bidder is a public firm, private and subsidiary  3,967 
-Deal value > £1m      2,860 
-Before owned less than 50%      2,768 
-After owned at least 90 %      1,732 
-Self-tender, recapitalisation, exchange offer, repurchase, privatisation and creditor’s scheme of arrangement transactions are excluded  1,718 
- Payment method is known (i.e. cash, stock or mixed).   1,404 
Steps (2) two sub-samples are created using acquisitions techniques, synopsis and the history file event   
A) Scheme of arrangement offers are included   230 
B) Excluded Step (A) and only tender offers are included   1,174 
-There are no sufficient scheme takeovers that have been covered by the SDC before 1995. Therefore, the new sample period starts from 1995-2015 1,118 
Scheme of arrangement     228 
Tender offers     890 
Steps (3) using Lexis Nexis database  
The Total sample     922 
Scheme of arrangement      222 
Tender offers      700 
Deals lost because:      
 
No DataStream codes or no information related to the bid premium calculations -196 
No DataStream information related to the main variables sales, total assets, market to book, leverage -142 
Hostility offers are excluded       -17 
Delete the deals that have the same name for target and acquirer -4 
The final sample     759 
Scheme of arrangement      201 
Tender offers           558 
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Figure 2 The Distribution of selling mechanisms (Scheme of arrangement -
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Table 2 Summary Statistics Sorted by the Sales Process (Scheme of arrangement -Tender offer), U.K. Market, 1995-2015 
Scheme of arrangement versus tender offers. This table reports summary statistics on target firms and deal characteristics of the sample consisting of 759 U.K. takeover deals. 
The statistical information is reported for the whole sample and for deals that are implemented by scheme of arrangements and tender offers. Of these 201 deals are classified 
as scheme deals and 558 deals are tender offers. Schemes refer to a takeover method that requires the involvement of the court and the approval of a majority number of 
shareholders— 75% of the target company’s voting rights. Tender offers refer to cases in which an acquirer firm offers to purchase outstanding shares directly from target’s 
shareholders. Panel A presents the mean value for the target’s characteristics, as sourced by Thomson DataStream. Panel B reports the mean value for the proportion of deal 
characteristics, as sourced by Thomson One Banker (SDC). Table A1 in the Appendix A reports all the definitions and database sources of variables that have been presented 
in Panel A and B. The final column shows the differences in the means between the scheme of arrangement and tender offer sub-samples and its significantly levels are denoted 
by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis based on t-tests, ascertaining whether there are differences between schemes of arrangement and tender offers.  The 









Full Sample  
Scheme of 
arrangement  
Tender Offer  Difference in 
means  
Mean  N Mean N Mean N 
Panel A: Target 
characteristics  
Ln (Sales) 11.050 759 11.534 201 10.876 558 0.657*** 
Age (Year)  15.181 759 16.916 201 14.556 558 2.360**    
M/B 2.136 759 2.917 201 1.860 558 1.061 
Target M/B > industry median  0.569 759 1.376 201 0.278 558 1.098 
Sales growth  35.791 743 44.369 198 32.68 545 11.694 
Leverage  20.311 759 20.323 201 20.307 558 0.016 
Collateral  30.480 759 21.997 201 33.536 558 -11.538*** 
Run-up (-1, -42) 0.125 755 0.085 199 0.140 556  -0.055*** 
Run-up (-1, -63) 0.153 755 0.103 199 0.170 556 -0.067*** 
EBITDA/TA 0.088 740 0.067 196 0.095 544 -0.028 
Cash holding 12.197 738 13.151 192 11.862 546 1.288 
stock performance  16.465 751 2.492 199 21.503 552 -19.01 
Book assets (UK£, millions)  162,907 759 5,336 201 293 558  5,043** 
MV (UK£, millions)  350.97 753 881.793 200 158.986 553 722.807*** 
Panel B: Deal characteristics  
Transaction value (UK£, 
millions)  
399.885 759 999.271 201 183.977 558 815.294*** 
Days to completion 59.076 759 98.582 201 44.845 558 53.736*** 
Bidder Termination Fee  16.224 14 24.263 8 5.506 6 18.756 
Target Termination Fee  6.196 109 10.989 54 1.404 55 9.584*** 
Negotiation (%) 94.598 718 93.034 187 95.161 531 -2.126 
Auction (%) 4.743 36 5.970 12 4.301 24 1.669 
Target-Initiated (%) 4.479 34 6.965 14 3.584 20 3.380** 
Bidder-Initiated (%) 95.520 725 93.034 187 96.415 538 -3.380** 
Target debt ratio 49.902 658 46.191 175 51.246 483 -5.055** 
Percent of Cash (%) 93.383 647 91.863 165 93.904 482 -2.041 
Percent of equity (%) 81.900 189 83.749 59 81.062 130 2.686 
Pure cash deals (%) 75.098 570 70.702 142 76.702 428 -6.055 * 
Pure equity deals (%) 14.756 112 17.910 36 13.620 76 4.290 
Mixed offers (%) 10.144 77 11.442 23 9.677 54 1.765 
Crisis (%) 17.523 133 28.855 58 13.440 75 15.414*** 
Regulation Shock (%) 8.695 66 23.383 47 3.405 19 19.978*** 
Bidder hires top bank (%) 21.080 160 28.855 58 18.279 102 10.576*** 
Target hires top bank (%) 20.948 159 29.353 59 17.921 100 11.432*** 
Public bidder (%) 41.238 313 33.830 68 43.906 245 -10.075** 
Private bidder (%) 58.761 446 66.169 133 56.093 313 10.075** 
Owned directly before (%) 23.894 108 22.457 14 24.108 94 -1.651 
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Table 3 Bid Premium Measure for Different Acquisition Methods, U.K. Market, 1995- 2015 
Scheme of arrangement versus tender offers. This table reports summary statistics of bid premiums offered for the target shareholders of schemes and tender offers of the 
sample consisting of 759 U.K. takeover deals. The statistical information is reported for the whole sample and for deals that are implemented by scheme of arrangements and 
tender offers. Of these 201 deals are classified as scheme deals and 558 deals are tender offers. Schemes refer to a takeover method that requires the involvement of the court 
and the approval of a majority number of shareholders— 75% of the target company’s voting rights. Tender offers refer to cases in which an acquirer firm offers to purchase 
outstanding shares directly from target’s shareholders. Panel A reports the mean value for the actual bid premiums based on the final price data at one, two, and three months 
before the initial public announcement date. Panel B reports the mean value for the actual bid premiums based on the final price data at one, two, and three months before the 
SDC announcement date. The table uses the formula (
Pfin
Pi,t=either−A or−E
) − 1 to measure the final offer premium. The final column shows the differences in the means between the 
scheme of arrangement and tender offer sub-samples and its significantly levels are denoted by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis based on t-tests, ascertaining 
whether there are differences between schemes of arrangement and tender offers. The p-value is reported in brackets.  The statistical significances between schemes of 
arrangement and tender offers at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level are denoted ***, **, *. 
 
 
Premium definitions  
Full Sample  
Scheme of 
arrangement  
Tender Offer  Difference 
test  
Mean  N Mean N Mean N 
Panel A: Bid premium measures for the General Offer versus Scheme of arrangement by the initial public announcement date 
One month -Premium   
40.799%*** 759 34.961%*** 201 42.902%*** 558 -7.941% ** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.023) 
Two months -Premium 
41.342%*** 759 35.363%*** 201 43.495%*** 558 -8.132% ** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.023) 
Three months -Premium  
41.227%*** 759 35.481%*** 201 43.296%*** 558 -7.814%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.032) 
Panel B: Bid premium measures for the General Offer versus Scheme of arrangement by the SDC announcement date 
One month -Premium   
34.209%*** 759 33.717%*** 201 34.386%*** 558 -0.668%  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.835) 
Two months -Premium 
38.016%*** 759 34.705%*** 201 39.208%*** 558 -4.503%  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.183) 
Three months -Premium  
40.337%*** 759 36.231%*** 201 41.816%*** 558 -5.585% 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.108) 
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Table 4 Alternative Bid Premium Measure for Different Acquisition Methods, U.K. market, 1995- 2015 
Scheme of arrangement versus tender offers. This table reports summary statistics of different bid premium measurements of the sample consisting of 759 U.K. takeover deals. 
The statistical information is reported for the whole sample and for deals that are implemented by scheme of arrangements and tender offers. Of these 201 deals are classified 
as scheme deals and 558 deals are tender offers. Schemes refer to a takeover method that requires the involvement of the court and the approval of a majority number of 
shareholders— 75% of the target company’s voting rights. Tender offers refer to cases in which an acquirer firm offers to purchase outstanding shares directly from target’s 
shareholders. Panel A reports the mean value for the actual bid premiums based on the component data at one, two, and three months before the initial public announcement 
date. Panel B reports the mean value for the actual bid premiums based on the component data at one, two, and three months before the SDC announcement date. This table 
uses the formula (
(Total consideration offered i % acquiredi)X 100 ⁄
Target market value of equityi,t=either−A or−E
) to measure the final offer premium. Panel C reports the mean value of the four-week premium (field PREM4WK) that are 




measure the final offer premium. The abnormal return (AR) premium is reported in Panel C by using the formula ∑ CARi,t
Min [126,ordelisting]
t=−42 . The final column shows the differences 
in the means between the scheme of arrangement and tender offer sub-samples and its significantly levels are denoted by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis 
based on t-tests, ascertaining whether there are differences between schemes of arrangement and tender offers. The p-value is reported in brackets.  The statistical significances 

















Premium definitions  
Full Sample  Scheme of arrangement  Tender Offer  Difference 
test  Mean  N Mean N Mean N 
Panel A: Return measures based on component data for the General Offer versus Scheme of arrangement by the initial public announcement date  
One Month-Premium  
39.428%*** 758 35.000%*** 200 41.015%*** 558 -6.014%  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.180) 
Two months -Premium  
42.821%*** 758 35.788%*** 200 42.821%*** 558 -4.410%  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.529) 
Three months -Premium  
43.496%*** 758 36.233%*** 200 46.099%*** 558 -9.865% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.147) 
Panel B: Return measures based on component data for the General Offer versus Scheme of arrangement by the SDC announcement date 
One Month-Premium  
34.213%*** 758 36.089%*** 200 33.540%*** 558 2.548%  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.637) 
Two months -Premium  
38.586%*** 758 35.609%*** 200 40.019%*** 558 -4.410%  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.529) 
Three months -Premium  
43.207%*** 758 37.596%*** 200 45.217%*** 558 -7.620% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.281) 
Panel C: Return measures for the General Offer versus Scheme of arrangement by using filed PREM4WK in SDC and Event study  
Four-week offer premium (PREM4WK) 
40.281%*** 716 33.637%*** 193 42.733%*** 523 -9.096%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006) 
Abnormal Return (AR) Premium  
1.812%*** 758 2.297%*** 200 1.638%*** 558 0.658% 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.237) 
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Table 5 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions analysis with a Takeover 
Method, Target and deal variables.  
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, in which the dependent variable is the actual bid premium 
based on the final price data at one, two, and three months before the initial public announcement, respectively. 
The table uses the formula (
Pfin
Pi,t=either−A or−E
) − 1  to measure the final offer premium. This table regresses the 
dependent variables on a set of selective covariates in columns (1) and (2) because there is a correlation between 
the two variables public bidders and using 100 % of stock. Table A1 in the Appendix A reports all the definitions 
and database sources of variables. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The statistical significances 
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  One- month Two- months Three- months 
Variables  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Scheme  
-8.398* -5.266 -7.995* -4.891 -8.372* -5.355 
(4.512) (4.364) (4.397) (4.268) (4.416) (4.334) 
Ln(Sales) 
0.237 0.142 0.192 0.00544 0.321 -0.0441 
(0.866) (0.839) (0.906) (0.874) (1.031) (1.001) 
Market to book 
-0.0434 -0.0473 -0.00837 -0.00706 -0.0554 -0.0437 
(0.135) (0.123) (0.117) (0.102) (0.125) (0.128) 
Target Termination 
Fee 
-7.155 -7.921 -2.050 -3.236 -0.0546 -2.052 
(5.713) (5.776) (5.604) (5.687) (5.010) (4.784) 
Public bidders 
-21.03***  -18.11***  -12.22***  
(4.764)  (4.866)  (4.608)  
Stock  
 
-25.41***  -25.67***  -25.95*** 
(4.732)  (4.853)  (5.176) 
Mixed  
4.517 -10.48** 4.593 -9.300 4.595 -7.000 
(5.114) (4.936) (5.864) (5.701) (6.575) (6.219) 
Toehold 
-8.382** -8.461** -6.234 -6.402 -0.750 -1.092 
(4.162) (4.200) (4.716) (4.752) (5.444) (5.463) 
Crisis 
10.86* 11.38* 7.373 7.570 9.586* 9.148* 
(5.986) (6.068) (5.550) (5.626) (5.427) (5.375) 
Regulation Shock 
-3.601 -3.424 -5.054 -5.361 -1.851 -3.103 
(5.548) (5.566) (5.728) (5.636) (6.955) (6.938) 
Target-Initiated 
-23.67*** -23.44*** -26.42*** -26.51*** -24.47*** -25.17*** 
(9.115) (8.850) (9.033) (8.884) (9.322) (9.193) 
Tangible assets 
-6.742 -6.950 -6.642 -7.025 -6.764 -7.486 
(6.432) (6.425) (6.095) (6.073) (6.026) (5.988) 
Leverage 
-0.0600 -0.0412 -0.0137 0.00741 -0.0565 -0.0310 
(0.0865) (0.0846) (0.0922) (0.0902) (0.0953) (0.0929) 
Bidder hires top bank 
-1.558 0.0792 -0.293 1.140 -2.330 -1.311 
(3.866) (3.791) (3.736) (3.650) (3.694) (3.651) 
Target hires top bank 
0.178 -0.588 1.404 0.742 4.035 3.583 
(3.283) (3.242) (3.675) (3.649) (3.983) (3.950) 
Auction 
23.34*** 20.92*** 23.93*** 21.45** 25.24*** 22.63** 
(7.257) (7.494) (8.444) (8.610) (8.944) (8.948) 
Taken Private  
-16.52*** -11.16*** -15.03*** -11.44*** -13.47*** -13.37*** 
(4.674) (3.554) (4.763) (3.575) (4.143) (3.551) 
EBITDA/TA 
0.263 -2.614 5.548 2.541 8.613 5.378 
(6.941) (6.728) (7.292) (7.136) (8.031) (7.779) 
stock performance 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash holding 
-1.675 -0.454 3.278 3.977 0.937 0.605 
(12.71) (12.39) (13.03) (12.89) (12.24) (12.15) 
Constant 60.10*** 54.61*** 56.60*** 54.18*** 51.36*** 54.98*** 
 (11.06) (9.996) (11.83) (10.76) (12.48) (12.18) 
Observations 723 723 723 723 723 723 
R-squared 0.081 0.086 0.069 0.081 0.073 0.096 
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Table 6 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions analysis with a Takeover 
Method, Target and deal variables 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, in which the dependent variable is the actual bid premium 
based on the final price data at one, two, and three months before the SDC announcement date, respectively. The 
table uses the formula (
Pfin
Pi,t=either−A or−E
) − 1 to measure the final offer premium. This table regresses the dependent 
variables on a set of selective covariates in columns (1) and (2) because there is a correlation between the two 
variables public bidders and using 100 % of stock. Table A1 in the Appendix A reports all the definitions and 
database sources of variables. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The statistical significances between 
schemes of arrangement and tender offers at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level are denoted ***, **, *. 
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  One- month Two- months Three- months 
Variables  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Scheme  
-3.465 -0.950 -6.599 -3.782 -7.641* -4.881 
(4.376) (4.231) (4.206) (4.083) (4.281) (4.200) 
Ln(Sales) 
0.216 0.108 0.0452 -0.0964 -0.00194 -0.333 
(0.789) (0.771) (0.860) (0.826) (0.980) (0.953) 
Market to book 
-0.130 -0.131 -0.126 -0.126 -0.197* -0.187* 
(0.138) (0.125) (0.121) (0.107) (0.104) (0.0985) 
Target 
Termination Fee 
-4.183 -4.944 0.944 -0.00292 2.450 0.637 
(5.622) (5.664) (5.511) (5.558) (4.849) (4.604) 
Public bidders 
-15.95***  -17.27*** 
 
-11.26**  
(4.581)  (4.610) (4.436)  
Stock  
 
-20.57***  -23.15***  -23.72*** 
(4.592)  (4.466)  (4.893) 
Mixed  
-3.779 -15.49*** 0.0804 -12.83** -0.699 -11.33* 
(4.443) (4.215) (5.665) (5.513) (6.221) (5.901) 
Toehold 
-4.055 -4.150 -5.181 -5.306 -1.635 -1.945 
(3.854) (3.876) (4.199) (4.263) (5.129) (5.199) 
Crisis 
16.29*** 16.60*** 11.17** 11.44** 9.993* 9.603* 
(5.905) (5.970) (5.346) (5.425) (5.279) (5.205) 
Regulation Shock 
3.703 3.681 -0.955 -1.087 0.664 -0.467 
(5.225) (5.227) (5.316) (5.257) (7.012) (7.018) 
Target-Initiated 
-10.74 -10.66 -8.517 -8.499 -6.872 -7.507 
(6.870) (6.510) (6.869) (6.614) (7.462) (7.188) 
Tangible assets 
-10.82* -11.05* -11.15* -11.44** -11.82** -12.48** 
(5.905) (5.889) (5.679) (5.676) (5.604) (5.607) 
Leverage 
-0.0390 -0.0231 -0.0349 -0.0165 -0.0526 -0.0294 
(0.0747) (0.0731) (0.0840) (0.0823) (0.0917) (0.0899) 
Bidder hires top 
bank 
-0.688 0.562 -2.084 -0.726 -0.918 0.0197 
(3.561) (3.445) (3.606) (3.529) (3.589) (3.540) 
Target hires top 
bank 
-1.050 -1.632 0.878 0.248 3.071 2.653 
(2.938) (2.916) (3.473) (3.450) (3.880) (3.830) 
Auction 
15.36*** 13.38** 24.99*** 22.76*** 25.96*** 23.58*** 
(5.735) (5.759) (7.829) (7.977) (8.766) (8.790) 
Taken Private  
-18.52*** -14.81*** -17.55*** -13.76*** -15.73*** -15.59*** 
(4.409) (3.185) (4.487) (3.339) (3.951) (3.351) 
EBITDA/TA 
-3.604 -5.968 3.490 0.807 4.164 1.211 
(7.360) (7.142) (6.333) (6.142) (8.362) (8.111) 
stock performance 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash holding 
-11.20 -10.39 -7.094 -6.304 -5.050 -5.337 
(10.98) (10.75) (12.30) (11.95) (12.04) (11.83) 
Constant 51.59*** 48.21*** 57.07*** 53.95*** 56.01*** 59.23*** 
 (10.15) (9.184) (11.13) (9.995) (11.68) (11.53) 
Observations 723 723 723 723 723 723 
R-squared 0.084 0.090 0.075 0.084 0.062 0.083 
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Table 7 Choice of takeover method regressions. 
This table reports the calculation of the marginal effects from logit regressions of the probability for a deal in the 
U.K. takeover market to be structured as a scheme of arrangement on Ln(Sales), Percent of Cash, Private Acquirer, 
Market to book, Target Termination Fee, Toehold, Crisis, Regulation Shock, Tangible assets, Leverage, Bidder 
hires top bank, Target hires top bank, Target-Initiated, Auction, taken private, EBITDA/TA, stock performance, 
Cash holding. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target firm accepts scheme 
of arrangement to implement a takeover deal. Table A1 in the Appendix A reports all the definitions and database 
sources of variables. The p-value are reported in bracket. Each regression in the last rows reports the total number 
of observations and and pseudo-Rsquared.The statistical significances between schemes of arrangement and 
tender offers at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level are denoted ***, **, *. 
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Variable name (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(Sales) 
0.037*** 0.028*** 0.024** 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.017) 
Percent of Cash 
-0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Acquirer  
0.191*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market to book 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.839) (0.852) (0.872) 
Target Termination Fee 
0.192*** 0.182** 0.184*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Toehold  
-0.155*** -0.156*** -0.161*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Crisis 
0.158*** 0.153*** 0.149*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation Shock 
0.446*** 0.452*** 0.440*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible assets 
-0.196*** -0.215*** -0.178*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.006) 
Leverage 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.280) (0.335) (0.595) 
Bidder hires top bank 
 0.078** 0.086** 
 (0.036) (0.021) 
Target hires top bank 
 0.081** 0.082** 
 (0.035) (0.037) 
Target-Initiated 
 0.121* 0.146** 
 (0.077) (0.037) 
Auction 
 0.040 0.024 
 (0.597) (0.760) 
Taken private  
 0.045 0.044 























-3.269*** -2.844*** -2.779*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 759 759 723 
Pseudo R-squared 0.221 0.236 0.234 
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Table 8 Estimated Treatment Effects from Propensity Score Matching based on 
Logistic Model in Table A2 using different numbers of ‘neighbours’ and calipers 
This table reports the results of estimated parameters on the scheme of arrangement dummy from propensity score 
matching based on the logistic model in Table A2. The results of estimate the average treatment effect of using 
scheme upon bid premiums (ATE) and the average treated effect of scheme upon bid premiums for target firms 
that actually used scheme method (ATT) are reported using the actual bid premiums based on the final price data 
at one, two, and three months before the initial announcement date and the SDC announcement date, respectively. 
The table uses the formula (
Pfin
Pi,t=either−A or−E
) − 1 to measure the final offer premium. Panel A reports the ATE and 
ATT results by matching target firms that accept scheme of arrangement to implement a takeover deal (the 
treatment group) to the one, two and three target firms that accept tender offers (the untreated group). Panel B 
reports the ATE and ATT results by matching a target firm that accept scheme of arrangement to implement a 
takeover deal (the treatment group) to the one nearest neighbour firm that accept tender offer (the untreated group) 
with caliper size (𝜀 = 0.02 ). Each row reports the total number of observations in treated and untreated groups. 
Robust standard errors are given in brackets. The statistical significance of at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
level are denoted ***, **, *. 
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A: Neighbours             Before the initial announcement date        Before the SDC announcement date 
Number of 
Matches 
 One -Month Two- month Three -month One -month Two -month Three- month 
1 
Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) 
-7.781% -7.822% -6.382% -1.753% -6.040% -5.247% 
(5.780) (5.402) (5.726) (5.657) (5.396) (5.643) 
Treated Observation 102 102 102 102 102 102 
Untreated Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 
Average Treatment Effect 
for the Treated (ATT) 
-6.437% -5.918% -3.316% -1.394% -3.955% -1.599% 
(6.086) (6.294) (4.849) (5.984) (5.923) (4.669) 
Treated Observation 201 201 201 201 201 201 
Untreated Observations  99   99   99   99   99   99  
2 
Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) 
-11.228%*** -11.939%*** -10.708%*** -5.929% -9.541%*** -9.432%** 
(3.873) (3.576) (4.015) (3.676) (3.613) (3.859) 
Treated Observation 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Untreated Observations 158 158 158 158 158 158 
Average Treatment Effect 
for the Treated (ATT) 
7.192%** -8.942% -6.546%** -4.045% -6.738%*** -5.317%*** 
(3.532) (8.334) (3.267) (3.461) (2.282) (1.573) 
Treated Observation 201 201 201 201 201 201 
Untreated Observations 158 158 158 158 158 158 
3 
Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) 
-11.179%*** -11.384%*** -9.909%*** -6.093%* -9.242%*** -8.668%** 
(3.575) (3.226) (3.621) (3.212) (3.229) (3.415) 
Treated Observation  147  147  147  147  147  147 
Untreated Observations  205   205   205   205   205   205  
Average Treatment Effect 
for the Treated (ATT) 
-5.779%* -6.143% -4.433%** -3.355% -5.012% -3.531% 
(3.248) (7.143) (1.931) (3.096) (6.862) (5.840) 
Treated Observation 201 201 201 201 201 201 
Untreated Observations  205  205  205  205  205  205 
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Continued Table 8  
 
B: Caliper              Before the initial announcement date        Before the SDC announcement date 
        
 Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) 
-11.416%** -13.195%** -10.460%* -6.260% -9.922%* -8.378% 
 (5.497) (5.447) (5.553) (5.458) (5.481) (5.477) 
0.02 Treated Observation 75 75 75 75 75 75 
 Untreated Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 
 Average Treatment Effect 
for the Treated (ATT) 
-11.314% -8.651% -3.655% -5.554% -5.182% -0.722% 
 (10.605) (10.588) (7.390) (10.091) (10.024) (6.704) 
 Treated Observation 158 158 158 158 158 158 
  Untreated Observations  96   96   96   96   96   96  
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Table 9 Comparison of covariate imbalance after estimating ATE by applying nearest neighbour 1-to-2 matching strategy 
without caliper 
This table shows the results of the test that check the balances of the covariates after applying the strategy that matches a target firm that accept scheme of arrangement to 
implement a takeover method to two nearest neighbour target firms that accept tender offer (1-2) to estimate the average treatment effect of using scheme of arrangement upon 
bid premiums (ATE). This table uses tebalance as a technique in STATA to calculate the standardized difference and variance ratio for the sample before (raw) and after 
applying the matching strategy whereby the covariates are well-balanced if matched sample has zero standardized difference and the variance ratio close to one in comparison 
to row sample.  The standardized difference ratio and the variance ratio are reported for the sample before and after applying the matching strategy. The last row shows the 






















Standardised Differences  Variance Ratio 
Raw Matched Raw Matched 
ln(Sales) 0.333 0.177 2.271 0.801 
Tangible assets -0.413 -0.007 0.801 1.136 
Percent of Cash -0.148 -0.112 1.232 1.083 
Private Acquirer  0.207 -0.005 0.911 1.002 
Target Termination Fee 0.449 -0.023 2.218 0.949 
Toehold  -0.308 -0.062 0.464 0.890 
Crisis 0.383 -0.072 1.770 0.883 
Regulation Shock 0.612 0.074 5.464 1.229 
Bidder hires top bank 0.250 0.116 1.378 1.184 
Target hires top bank 0.271 0.163 1.414 1.248 
Target-Initiated 0.151 0.024 1.881 1.108  
Ln(Sales)*Tangible assets -0.341 0.018 0.969 1.247 
Ln(Sales)*Bidder hires top bank 0.300 0.133 1.738 1.286 
Target Termination Fee* Crisis 0.293 -0.021 2.447 0.927 
Private Acquirer *Crisis 0.296 -0.072 1.833 0.860 
Private Acquirer *Regulation Shock 0.388 0.100 3.853 1.424 
Private Acquirer *Bidder hires top bank 0.131 0.056 1.320 1.126 
Ln(Sales)2 0.403 0.163 2.424 1.047 
N 759 1,518   
Treatment observation 201 759   
Control observation 558 759     
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Table 10 Comparison of covariate imbalance after estimating ATT by applying nearest neighbour 1-2 matching strategy 
without caliper 
 
This table shows the results of the test that check the balances of the covariates after applying the strategy that matches a target firm that accept scheme of arrangement to 
implement a takeover method to two nearest neighbour target firms that accept tender offer (1-2) to estimate the average treated effect of scheme upon bid premiums for target 
firms that actually used scheme method (ATT). This table uses tebalance as a technique in STATA to calculate the standardized difference and variance ratio for the sample 
before (raw) and after applying the matching strategy whereby the covariates are well-balanced if matched sample has zero standardized difference and the variance ratio close 
to one in comparison to row sample.  The standardized difference ratio and the variance ratio are reported for the sample before and after applying the matching strategy. The 











Standardised Differences  Variance Ratio 
Raw Matched Raw Matched 
 ln(Sales) 0.333 0.532 2.271 0.651 
Tangible assets -0.413 0.068 0.801 1.436 
Percent of Cash -0.148 -0.335 1.232 1.611 
Private Acquirer  0.207 -0.214 0.911 1.222 
Target Termination Fee 0.449 0.080 2.218 1.096 
Toehold  -0.308 -0.348 0.464 0.431 
Crisis 0.383 -0.171 1.770 0.910 
Regulation Shock 0.612 0.029 5.464 1.039 
Bidder hires top bank 0.250 0.234 1.378 1.339 
Target hires top bank 0.271 0.195 1.414 1.254 
Target-Initiated 0.151 -0.191 1.881 0.938 
Ln(Sales)*Tangible assets -0.341 0.103 0.969 1.483 
Ln(Sales)*Bidder hires top bank 0.300 0.264 1.738 1.563 
Target Termination Fee* Crisis 0.293 0.052 2.447 1.126 
Private Acquirer *Crisis 0.296 -0.224 1.833 0.771 
Private Acquirer *Regulation Shock 0.388 0.074 3.853 1.183 
Private Acquirer *Bidder hires top bank 0.131 0.006 1.320 1.012 
Ln(Sales)2 0.403 0.523 2.424 1.000 
N 759 408   
Treatment observation 201 201   
Control observation 558 201     




Figure 3 The Distribution of Propensity Score of the size of target firm before and after Matching by Applying Nearest 
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Table 11 Result of sensitivity analysis to hidden bias 
 
This table shows the results of the sensitivity analysis for the impact of schemes of arrangement upon bid premiums in the case of applying the matching strategy that matches 
that matches a target firm that accept scheme of arrangement to implement a takeover method to two nearest neighbour target firms that accept tender offer (1-2) to estimate 
the average treatment effect of using scheme of arrangement upon bid premiums (ATE) and the average treated effect of scheme upon bid premiums for target firms that actually 
used scheme method (ATT). The bid premium is calculated based on the final price data at one, two, and three months before the initial public announcement and SDC 
announcement date, respectively. The table uses the formula (
Pfin
Pi,t=either−A or−E
) − 1 to measure the final offer premium. Γ starts at 1, with increments (Γ=1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, 2.25, 2.5, 2.75, 
3). This table provides statistical information that shows the minimum and maximum of the p-value by using STATA command (rbounds).  
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   Before the initial announcement date  Before SDC announcement date 
Matching 
Strategy 
    One-Month Two-Month Three -month One-Month Two-Month Three -month 






1 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.025 0.025 0.540 0.540 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
1.25 <0.0001 0.646 <0.0001 0.506 <0.0001 0.759 0.005 0.997 <0.0001 0.742 <0.0001 0.742 
1.5 <0.0001 0.994 <0.0001 0.985 <0.0001 0.998 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 0.997 <0.0001 0.997 
1.75 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 
2 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2.25 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2.5 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2.75 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 







1 0.181 0.181 0.411 0.411 0.377 0.377 0.022 0.022 0.537 0.537 0.650 0.65 
1.25 0.676 0.011 0.874 0.054 0.855 0.045 <0.0001 0.740 0.929 0.100 0.961 0.162 
1.25 0.942 0.0002 0.988 0.003 0.985 0.002 <0.0001 0.997 0.995 0.007 0.998 0.017 
1.75 0.994 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.999 0.999 0.0003 0.999 0.001 
2 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 
2.25 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 
2.5 0.999 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 
2.75 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 
3 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 
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Table 12 Comparison of Finding across Models Estimation the Impact of Scheme of Arrangement upon the Bid Premium 
This table shows a comparison of findings across models that estimate the impact of schemes of arrangement upon bid premium. The table reports the average treatment effect 
of using scheme upon bid premiums (ATE) and the average treated effect of scheme upon bid premiums for target firms that actually used scheme method (ATT) before the 
initial announcement date and the SDC announcement date across independent-sample t-test, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), propensity score matching (PSM) and Regression 
adjustment. The estimate average treatment effect of using scheme upon bid premium in case of applying OLS regression is reported by using regression (1) in Table 5 and 6. 
The estimate average treatment effect of using scheme upon bid premium in case of applying PSM is reported by using matching strategy that matches a target firm that accept 
scheme of arrangement to implement a takeover method to two nearest neighbour target firms that accept tender offer (1-2).  Bid premiums are calculated based on the actual 




) − 1 to measure the final offer premium. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The statistical significances between schemes of arrangement 






Estimated Average  
ATE ATT 
          Before the initial announcement date        Before the SDC announcement date 
          Before the initial announcement 
date 
       Before the SDC announcement date 
 One -Month Two- month Three -month 
One -
month 





Two -month Three- month 
Independent -sample t test 
(Difference test) 
-7.941% ** -8.132% ** -7.814%** -0.668%  -4.503%  -5.585% 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.835) (0.183) (0.108) 
OLS regression Model (1) 
-8.398* -7.995* -8.372* -3.465 -6.599 -7.641* 
(4.512) (4.397) (4.416) (4.376) (4.206) (4.281) 
propensity score matching (1-to-2)  
-11.228%*** -11.939%*** -10.708%*** -5.929% -9.541%*** -9.432%** 7.192%** -8.942% -6.546%** -4.045% -6.738%*** -5.317%*** 
(3.873) (3.576) (4.015) (3.676) (3.613) (3.859) (3.532) (8.334) (3.267) (3.461) (2.282) (1.573) 
Regression adjustment 
-10.325*** -8.621%**  -6.345% -.4.435% -6.404%  -5.085%  -9.102%* -10.202%**  -7.488%** -5.462%   -9.085%** -8.259%* 
(3.993) (4.190) (4.308) (3.704) (3.967) (4.148) (4.712) (4.694) (4.785) (4.529) (4.503) (4.727) 





Table A1 variables definitions and Sources 
The variables   Definitions Sources  
Panel A: Target characteristics 
 
Ln (Sales) The natural logarithm of target firm total sales twelve months 





The age of the firm, which is measured in year since DataStream 
holds information about target firms to the date of announcement. 
DataStream 
Market to book The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets 
one month before the date of announcement. 
DataStream 
Target M/B > industry mean is calculated by subtracting the yearly mean of target’s market to 
book from the mean of the target firms in the same two-digit SIC 
code. 
DataStream 
Sales growth The level of sales at the end of year t–12 minus sales at the end 
of year t–24, scaled by the sales at the end of year t–24, where t–
12 and t–24 are twenty and twenty-four months before the 
announcement date (t=0). 
DataStream 
Leverage The ratio of the book value of total debt to total assets as 
measured twelve months before the date of announcement. 
DataStream 
Collateral The ratio of property, plant, and equipment over the target’s total 
asset, all is measured twelve months before the date of 
announcement. 
DataStream 
Run-up (-1, -42), (-1,-63) Target’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the period 
immediately before the acquisition announcements particularly 
from days -1 to -41 and -63, respectively. 
DataStream 
EBITDA/TA The ratio of target’s operating income before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets, all is 
measured twelve months before the date of announcement. 
DataStream 
Cash holding The ratio of target’s cash plus tradable securities over total 
assets, all is measured twelve months before the date of 
announcement 
DataStream 
stock performance Target’s stock-price performance twelve months before the date 
of announcement. 
DataStream 
Book assets (UK£, millions) Target’s total assets in millions of pounds twelve months before 
the date of announcement 
DataStream 
MV (UK£, millions) The market value of equity (stock price multiplied by the number 
of shares outstanding in millions of pounds) twelve months 




Panel B: Deal characteristics 
 
Transaction value (UK£, 
millions) 
The pound value of a deal and it is defined in SDC (filed VAL) 
as the total value of consideration (UK£, millions) paid by 
bidders, excluding fees and expenses. 
Thomson One 
Banker 




Bidder Termination Fee The amount of money that must be paid by an acquirer to a target 
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Continued Table A1 
The variables  Definitions Sources 
 
Target Termination Fee The amount of money that must be paid by a target firm to an 
acquirer if the target does not allow the acquirer to successfully 
complete the purchase of the target’s assets 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Negotiation A dummy variable that takes the value of one if there are only 
one public bidder bid for the same target within a month from or 
before the date of announcement, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Auction  A dummy variable that takes the value of one if there are more 
than one public bidder bid for the same target within a month 
from or before the date of announcement, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Target (bidder)-Initiated A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target (bidder) 
firm initiated the deal, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Target debt ratio The ratio of target’s long-term debt plus current liabilities 
divided by total assets, all is measured twelve months before the 
date of announcement. 
DataStream 




Pure cash (equity)deals A dummy variable that takes the value of one if an acquirer firm 




Mixed offers A dummy variable that takes the value of one if an acquirer firm 
paid 100% of the consideration by a mixed of cash and equity, 
and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Crisis A dummy variable that takes the value of one when a transaction 
occurs between the period of January 1, 2007, and December 31, 
2009, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Regulation Shock A dummy variable that takes the value of one when a transaction 
occurs between the period of January 1, 2012, and December 31, 
2015, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Bidder (Target)hires top bank A dummy variable that takes the value of one if an investment 
bank that are used by acquirers (targets) as its advisors are 
classified as top-tier if they are used Rothschild &Co, UBS, JP 
Morgan, PricewaterhouseCoopers, HSBC Holdings PLC, the 
five banks that appear most often in the sample, all others take 0., 
which are the five banks. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Public bidder A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bidder firm is 
listed in London Exchange Market, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Private bidder A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bidder firm is 
unlisted in London Exchange Market, and zero otherwise.  
Thomson One 
Banker 
Owned directly before The percentage of target firm’s equity that held by a bidder six 
month before the date of announcement. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
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Table A2: Variables Means & Parameter Estimates used to estimate Propensity Scores 
This table reports the calculation of logit regressions of the probability for a deal in the U.K. takeover market to 
be structured as a scheme of arrangement on Ln(Sales), Percent of Cash, Private Acquirer, Market to book, Target 
Termination Fee, Toehold, Crisis, Regulation Shock, Tangible assets, Leverage, Bidder hires top bank, Target 
hires top bank, Target-Initiated, Auction, taken private, EBITDA/TA, stock performance, Cash holding. 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target firm accepts scheme of arrangement 
to implement a takeover deal. Table A1 in the Appendix A reports all the definitions and database sources of 
variables. The p-value are reported in bracket. Each regression in the last rows reports the total number of 
observations. The statistical significances between schemes of arrangement and tender offers at the 1% level, 5% 
level and 10% level are denoted ***, **, *.  














Percent of Cash 
-0.024*** 
(0.004) 
Private Acquirer  
2.949*** 
(0.482) 












Bidder hires top bank 
-1.446 
(1.519) 










Ln(Sales)*Bidder hires top bank 
0.283** 
(0.128) 
Target Termination Fee* Crisis 
-1.956*** 
(0.556) 
Private Acquirer *Crisis 
-1.559*** 
(0.582) 
Private Acquirer *Regulation Shock 
-4.199*** 
(1.131) 










Pseudo R-squared 0.329 







Chapter 3. Does Winner’s Curse Matter in 


























Does Winner’s Curse Matter in Takeovers: Auction vs. 
Negotiation?   
 
“[W]e don’t want to waste our time ...We don’t participate in auctions”  
                           
     Warren Buffett 83 
3.1. Introduction 
 
There are two major selling mechanisms in takeovers: negotiation and auction. As the above 
quote from the sage of Omaha shows, the choice matters.84 It is therefore necessary to explore 
and analyse the effects of choosing different selling mechanisms on the possible differentiated 
outcomes in takeovers. In their theoretical study, Bulow & Klemperer (1996a) show that an 
optimal auction with 𝑛 bidders is strictly dominated by an auction with (𝑛 + 1) bidders, even 
when no reserve prices is imposed.  This result shows that, compared with negotiating the 
existing buyers, it is typically better to invite one more bidder and run an auction, even without 
setting an optimal reserve price. In some respects, this would be expected. At its most basic 
and reductive level, it is clearly advantageous in terms of cost and manpower for a company to 
avoid involving itself in a negotiation which does not even guarantee any kind of positive 
outcome. Far better and more cost-effective to simply bait the line and let interested buyers 
circle around. A further positive outcome also partly explained by these results is that auctions 
increase competition, something which in negotiation would require multiple simultaneous 
negotiations which, in addition to basic costs would also generate immense logistical and 
strategic complexities for companies. A direct implication of this theoretical conclusion is that 
auctions, as a selling mechanism, are preferred by sellers, while negotiations are preferable to 
buyers.   
                                                          
83 This well-known statement by Warren Buffett, and it is cited in his business annual report for Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc in the section; Acquisition Criteria Bulow & Klemperer (2009c) 
84 Buffett is sometimes called the sage of Omaha. 




A number of empirical studies on M&As have investigated and aimed to establish the exact 
effects of selecting a specific selling mechanism – auction versus negotiation – on the possible 
outcomes of takeovers for both targets and acquirers. The most prominent of these are Boone 
& Mulherin (2007a:2008b),Aktas et al., (2010a),Fidrmuc et al., (2012). One somewhat 
puzzling observation relating to the real practise of takeovers is that most deals are structured 
using one-to-one negotiations, where there is only one buyer negotiating with the target firm. 
Boone & Mulherin (2007a) investigate private-phase competition of the takeover processes, 
before the public announcement of the deal. This research has shown that the private stage is 
not free from competition, even if there is only one buyer revealed at the announcement stage. 
This means that even publicly observed non-competitive negotiation deals are not free from 
competition.  Boone and Mulherin’s sample was constructed to take into account competition 
at the private stage, and shows that there is no significant difference in target returns between 
negotiation and auction. 
In their following study, Boone & Mulherin (2008b) tested whether selecting a different selling 
mechanism would induce different abnormal returns to the acquirers, or put another way, 
whether auctions gives rise to the ‘winner’s curse’ (overpay) in the U.S. takeover market.  The 
negative bidder returns have been used as an evidence to examine whether the winner’s curse 
exists in takeover competition, see: Kagel & Levin (1986), Moeller et al., (2004), and Boone 
& Mulherin (2008b). 
Boone and Mulherin concluded that using auction does not push bidders to overbid, and that 
there is no significant difference in the announcement returns of target and bidder firms 
between the two mechanisms of auction and negotiation. 
Since the publication of Boone & Mulherin (2007a), many recent empirical works have moved 
to measure the exact competition level between bidders in auction and negotiation, and how 
the competition levels would affect different returns for acquirers or target firms.  
Betton et al., (2009b) and Aktas et al., (2010a) investigate why bid premium on average is no 
significantly different in auction and negotiation deals. They argue that negotiation is actually 
under the threat of a potentially possible auction, therefore presence of latent competition 
drives up the negotiation premium.  More specifically, Aktas et al., (2010a) examine whether 
the cost of auction (such as searching for bidders and advertising expenses) could affect directly 
the choice of target firms between auction and negotiation mechanisms. They find that if latent 




competition induced bidder firms in negotiation deals to increase the bid premium, anticipated 
auction costs served to reduce the premium.  Fidrmuc et al., (2012) study whether the choices 
between selling mechanism (auction versus negotiation) and buyer type (private equity versus 
strategic buyer) could affect the bid premium.85 But they found that the difference in bid 
premiums is statically insignificant. 
Gorbenko & Malenko (2014) show that strategic bidders on average value the assets of target 
firms higher than financial bidders in auction deals. The main reason is that target firms with 
specific characteristics attract different type of bidders. For example: they find that financial 
buyers pay significantly more for mature and poorly performing target firms.  Schlingemann 
& Wu (2015) document positive and significant returns for both target and bidders in auction 
compared to negotiated deals, particular for relatively small targets. Aktas, Xu, & Yurtoglu, 
(forthcoming) investigate whether the choice of a bidder firm to announce the deal before 
signing the definitive agreement at the private selling process could tend a bidder to overpay. 
They find that, although the earlier deal announcement is associated with a higher public 
competition, winner’s curse does not exist in bidder announcement returns. 
As Boone & Mulherin (2007a) discuss, prior to the public announcement of a bid, there is 
usually a period of highly competitive private negotiations between a target firm and bidders. 
However, Boone & Mulherin (2007a) model raises some concerns. First of all, this model 
overlooks the levels of competition during public takeover procedures, when rival bidders are 
attracted to participate in a public takeover battle which can, then, affect the initial offer price 
and any further gains made through the auction process. Bazerman & Samuelson (1983) and 
Kagel & Levin (1986) argue that bidders are more aggressive when there are a large number 
of competitors jostling to acquire a target firm,  which can lead to the winner overpaying for 
the targets’ assets.   
Boone & Mulherin (2007a) private process model is constructed using the number of 
confidential bidders as a proxy for competition. The weaknesses of this approach can perhaps 
be explained, at least in part, by its essentially quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. This 
disregards the fact that auction should mimic the actual environment of bidding competitions, 
where each bidder can extract useful information about the object’s value for themselves from 
                                                          
85 Private equity firms (or financial bidders) refer to bidders who are from outside target firm’s industry, while 
strategic bidders refer to firms that are from inside the industry of target firms, and they could be competitors, 
customers or suppliers for a target firm. 




the bids of other bidders. Based on the standard definition, the auction process can be seen as 
a Bayesian game in which players act on beliefs that are reached after observing the distribution 
of other types of bidders (Gibbons, 1992, p.149-150). Bearing this definition in mind, each 
bidder’s beliefs can be seen to be shaped by the type of other peer bidders. As such, the types 
of bidders, which represent a substantial source of competition, have an enormous impact on 
the selling process. Therefore, bidder firms will be more aggressive when there is more than 
one public bidder bidding for the same target.  
 
Bulow & Klemperer (2002b) and Boone & Mulherin (2008b) argue that levels of competition 
are related to bidder characteristics, where the presence of a strong bidder would create or at 
least heighten the prospect of the winner’s curse for other possible bidders.  As a result, bidder 
asymmetry suggests that there are gains to be made for bidder firms when a takeover 
competition is limited and, to an extent, when market failures or inefficiencies are removed 
from the takeover process. Therefore, it is fundamental to identify the differences between 
bidder characteristics, in auction and negotiation transactions in order to explore whether these 
distinctions can critically influence, or even dictate, the bidding behaviours of acquiring firms, 
or even drive bidders to pay more for their targets.  
Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to examine whether auction bidding has a causal 
impact upon bidder returns during takeovers, and, therefore, this chapter also aims to test 
whether an increase in competition between bidders during the public phase of takeover 
competition could induce the winner’s curse problem. 
A further issue in studies conducted by Boone & Mulherin (2007a) and Aktas et al., (2010a) is 
that both use unrepresentative samples, examining only large firm acquisitions with deal 
sizes over $100 million. However, a significant number of M&As are conducted between small 
firms, and the outcomes for a small firm could be quite different to those of large firms. 
According to Moeller et al., (2004), small firms generally outperform large firms in acquisition 
markets. This seems to be because large firms are more prone to the hubris effect, as outlined 
in Roll’s hypothesis (1986a).  Moreover, Boone & Mulherin (2008b) have found that the size 
of the bidder firm is inversely related to the level of competition when there is more than one 
bidder for the same target. More precisely, the mere presence of a large firm presents an 
opportunity to deter small bidders and, consequently, it is therefore more beneficial for the 
target to avoid conducting a full-scale auction when the size of the bidders is markedly different. 




Therefore, this chapter will examine whether firm sizes affect an acquirer’s announcement 
return for the two selling mechanisms of auction and negotiation, used as a main proxy for 
bidder asymmetry. Influenced by Moeller et al., (2004) arguments, this study thus divides 
bidder firms into two subgroups: small and large firms. The bidder firm is deemed larger 
(smaller) if its equity market value is greater (equal or less) than the market value of the 25th 
percentile of NYSE firms during the year of the announcement date. 
Using a comprehensive M&A data taken from the U.S. markets for listed-bidder firms over the 
period 1984-2014, as sourced by Thomson One Banker-the SDC Merger and Acquisition 
Database. Of them, 286 were structured as an auction deal if there is one more public bidder 
bidding for the same target firm, and 14,360 deals as negotiation if there is only one public 
bidder bidding for the same target firm. Therefore, we construct a sample of 14,646 deals, of 
which only about 2% bidder firms use auctions, and about 98% adopt negotiations. The main 
objective of this chapter is twofold. First, this chapter investigates how the choices to bid in 
different selling mechanisms (auctions vs. negotiations) are related to various bidder and deal 
characteristics. 
 
As predicated, bidder firms that are large, have high levels of leverage and tangible assets 
typically are more likely to bid in auction. Moreover, bidders are more likely to bid in auction 
if a target firm initiated a takeover deal or it is in bankruptcy, if bidders own a toehold in a 
target firm. Bidder firms also bid in auction if they or target firms use an investment bank with 
a high reputation. Auctions are associated with a tender offer, hostile technique, and most 
surprisingly with all-stock offers.  However, bidder firms are less likely to bid in auction for a 
private firm, and less likely to complete a bid.   
Second, to estimate the treatment effect of selecting a specific selling mechanism on bidder 
returns, it necessarily to address the obvious self-selection problem, as the choice of selling 
mechanism is self-decision made by target or bidder firms.  To identify the treatment effect of 
selecting an auction, the method of propensity score matching is applied in this chapter. This 
chapter examines the short-run performance of bidder firms using a narrow window (-1, +1) 
centred on the announcement date and different models and indexes.  Meanwhile, it also studies 
the long-term performance over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows, as suggested by 
Boone and Mulherin (2007a: 2008b).  The study applies the Market Adjusted Returns model, 
using a CRSP value-weighted index in order to estimate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). 
 




This chapter calculates the propensity score by using logit regression on a set of key covariates 
that include bidder size, a dummy if a target firm initiated a deal or it is in a bankruptcy, if 
bidder firm own a toehold in a target firm, if a bidder or target firm hire an investment bank 
with a high reputation, if a deal is a tender offer, a hostile deal, if a target is a private, all-stock 
offers, and successful deals    
 
The main results, after implementing the matching strategy, confirm that, compared with 
negotiation, using auction induces a negative impact on acquirer’s share prices in the short run. 
However, the results of estimate the treatment effect over the longer windows are not clear.  
The analysis applies various greedy matching strategies: nearest neighbour matching and 
caliper matching. Over the (-1, +1) window, the negative impact of using auctions upon the 
cumulative abnormal return is high in cases of structured the matched sample by using the 
nearest neighbour with different sizes of caliper, in general either for ATE and ATT. It could 
be argued that treatment effect result is influenced by the length of the selected window, and 
this finding valid only for the short-value analysis.    
 
 This seems to confirm the theoretical prediction that auction, as a selling mechanism, is less 
beneficial to bidder firms, than negotiation due to increasing competition. This may also an 
advance for the existence of the winner’s curse in takeover markets: bidders tend to overbid in 
takeover auctions. This results consistent with Bazerman & Samuelson (1983) and Kagel & 
Levin (1986) who argue that bidder firms are more aggressive and overbid in case there are 
other bidders bidding for the same target.  
 
The remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows: a literature review, which is 
related to the previous explanation of this thesis’s motivation and research questions, will be 
undertaken in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 will discuss the sample and the main explanatory 
variables that will be used in the model to calculate the propensity score matching. Section 3.4 
will define the methodological analysis. Section 3.5 will present the empirical results. Finally, 
the conclusion will discuss the main results in Section 3.6. 
 
 




3.2. Literature Review  
 
 
Auction theory is considered a useful method to determine the uncertain value of auctioned 
items. This theory is predicated on a notably transparent market and one where rivals have full 
knowledge of competitors. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding these virtues, auctions are 
notoriously speculative markets which sometimes defy rationality. Although it is impossible to 
ascertain the precise factors of bidders in auction, outcomes are measurable. Some competitors 
win auctions with bids that are higher than the true value of target’s assets. These winners are 
uncertain about the value of the assets that are being sold and have made the estimation with 
the largest positive error, and consequently overpay which incur a loss or at least forego some 
profits for the bidders. This event is termed, somewhat melodramatically, the “winner’s curse” 
(Dasgupta & Hansen, 2007). Examinations of the winner’s curse hypothesis have become an 
increasing focus of both the theoretical and empirical works since the first paper that described 
the phenomenon (Wilson, 1969). The possibility of the existence of winner’s curse is 
considered a real example in the real world, which confirms that bidders are irrational and 
subject to making systematic errors. That this runs contrary to rationality as one of the main 
assumptions of the economic theory. In a fully rational equilibrium, bidders are less aggressive, 
and the offer price is more likely to reflect the underlying value when the number of bidders 
increases.  Therefore, there is a sense in which psychological momentum drives the error 
estimation (Thaler, 1988) and (Hong & Shum, 2002). 
The winner’s curse is more likely to exist in a common-value auction where acting rationally 
can be even more difficult. In a common-value auction, all bidders have equal knowledge of 
the value of an item, and gain further information as other offers are tendered. A common-
value auction bid can produce the winner’s curse as a result of over-estimating value during 
the bidding process. In a private-value auction (such as an auction for antiques) the value of an 
object is equal to the value estimated by individual bidders, without insight from other 
competitors: the bidder sets his or her value according to his or her own information about the 
object (Rasmusen, 2007, p.414). For example, the absence of perfect information in a common-
value auction, such as the distribution of future cash flow, can lead to errors in estimating a 
company’s value, and can potentially result in a winner’s curse (Varaiya &Ferris, 1987). As a 
result, bidders for the target company could over-value shares if they are only consulting 




publicly available information, and thus firms can encourage bidders to spend money in order 
to acquire additional information.   
One industry that fits the situation of common-value auction is the auction for oil and gas leases, 
where the bidders are uncertain about the amount of oil in tract of land, and have different 
estimation about the value of the tract. (Capen, Clapp, & Campbell, 1971) show that winners 
in the U.S. government auctions for oil leases suffered from unexpectedly lower rates than the 
market rate of return during 1960s, even in land where oil was discovered, because they had 
overpaid for low value items.  
The phenomenon of the winner’s curse raises the debate in behaviour finance, on whether the 
bidders’ bidding strategies in corporate takeover are related to psychological behaviour of 
humans rather than to rational behaviour previously regarded as the corporate mind-set, as well 
as the efficiency of the corporate control market. Particularly, there has been a growth trend to 
test for the presence of winner’s curse as one of the possible explanation for the negative returns 
to bidder firms in M&A empirical research. In general, around 61 % of US acquirers’ 
shareholders endure significant losses in M&As (Bruner, 2005b,p.15).  The total value 
generated in M&A activity in the U.S. market increased sharply from US$ 87.75 billion in 
1984 to US$2.2 trillion in 2016.86  Yet, despite the rapidly increased volume of M&A activity, 
outcomes were normally mixed, ranging from success such as Disney and Pixar in 2006, to 
failures such as Daimler Benz and Chrysler in 1998, and AOL and Time Warner in 
2001(DePamphilis, 2012a). Most pertinently, approximately 70–80% of U.S. market mergers 
failed to create a significant value above their annual costs (Clayton, 2010).  
 
There are various explanations for the possibility for winner’s curse to occur in takeovers. 
Roll’s hubris-based hypothesis (1986a) is considered the first work that focuses on the 
‘emotional’ motivations for merger and tender offers.  He argues that the hubris motivation of 
the boards leads them simply to overbid for the target, and then suffer the resulting winner’s 
curse that is usually associated with hubris. 
There are other explanations based on rational decisions of the boards of the acquiring 
companies. For example, in some cases, although an acquisition would destroy the wealth of 
shareholders, the board might still prefer to invest in order to gain power and prestige, as 
indicated by Jensen’s agency-based hypothesis (1986).   Jensen (1986) argues that if the board 
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of the bidder firm has an excessive level of cash, then an agency conflict issue could emerge 
between the shareholders and the board.  And the board, instead of paying out cash to their 
shareholders, chooses to invest it on wasteful vanity projects, of which the destruction of the 
shareholder value by overbidding could be a symptom. 
One important factor that may exacerbate the winner’s curse problem is the number of 
competitors in the auction. Kagel & Levin (1986) show that the number of bidders in auction 
is a root cause for the winner’s curse.  Bidders will be more aggressive when there are a large 
number of bidders bid for the target, and this makes negative the winner’s consequent payoff. 
Bazerman & Samuelson (1983) find that the likelihood of the winner’s curse increased as the 
number of bidders increased particularly if bidders are uncertain about the value of target assets.   
In any event and irrespective of psychological analysis, it seems that raising the competition 
between bidders could generally increase the profits for sellers. Bulow, Huang, & Klemperer 
(1999) show that when the seller engaged in a friendly transaction has the opportunity to invite 
one more serious bidder (𝑛 + 1) to an English auction bidding with 𝑛  players, this will 
generate an extra revenue- in comparison to negotiating with the winning bidder. This means 
that target firms should normally prefer auction to negotiation. In the financial world, an 
auction can be defined as an economic mechanism that is used to transfer the entire assets of a 
firm (both in and out of bankruptcy) between multiple buyers and the seller. In contrast, a 
negotiation is generally regarded as dealing with a single bidder (Dasgupta & Hansen, 2007). 
However, most of the takeover transactions in the markets are through negotiations.  In Bulow 
and Klemperer’s model, sequential negotiation is more efficient than auction. In the negotiation 
process, bidders are encouraged to bid with a high valuation, particularly when the previous 
bidders had a low valuation. However, bidders will make a “jump bid” simply in order to deter 
other competitors, therefore bidders can benefit from negotiation at the seller’s expense. 
Conversely, auction is inefficient, predicated as it is on bidders making their estimation about 
the value of a target being sold without information regarding the other competitors’ value.   
Collusion can, however, be a useful strategy for bidders to gather more information and reduce 
the cost of acquiring the asset. For example, in common value auctions collusion can help some 
bidders acquire more information about deals, which leads to asymmetric bidding taking place 
during the auction. Bajari & Ye (2001)showed that in procurement auctions, there are crucial 
sources which help to create an asymmetric information exchange between bidders such as; 




when there are different types of bidder firms with different managerial efficiency or when the 
location of bidder firms are close to the targeted contracts.  For example, around 75% of the 
bidders who win the contracts of highway construction are those closest to the highway location.  
Asymmetries may also occur where certain bidders operate in rings or cartels to pool more 
information about procurement auctions.  
Waehrer (1999) argues that the level of revenue of bidders who are outside of the cartel does 
not tend to be impacted by bidding rings that are created to reduce competition and acquire 
information. However, he concluded that this is not the same for all types of auction. The 
auctioneer, Waehrer (1999) points out, should consider how to eradicate collusion and to attract 
more potential bidders. This should be self-evidently true and the notion that members of the 
same trade getting together to reduce costs was noted piquantly by Adam Smith. Nevertheless, 
it is important that the auctioneer does not simply follow previously successful auction designs 
as auctions are not suitable for a ‘one size fits all’ mentality (Klemperer, 2002). Thus, the 
outcomes of past auctions are not necessarily suitable models for the next auction deal. 
Some studies have examined whether bidders who own a stake in the target company (referred 
to as a toehold hereafter) could affect the efficiency and revenue across both the negotiation 
and auction mechanisms. For example, (Loyola, 2012) find that, in the absence of a reserve 
price, negotiations in the context of a takeover with asymmetric toeholds outperformed both 
first-price and second-price auctions. Even when sellers fixed a reserve price, negotiations only 
performed to a high enough degree for toehold asymmetry. This result addresses the issue of 
the breakdown in revenue of conventional auction formats, and as a result, the behaviour of 
bidders with toeholds becomes more aggressive.  
One of the key arguments in support of applying auction strategies to mergers is that it is a 
good method for controlling the toehold problems. Some researchers suggest that there are 
distinct advantages for companies who use toeholds to attract other companies into the merger 
auction. Toehold auctions can motivate other firms to use the takeover auction as a strategy to 
value their share price in the target firms and sell it to other bidders afterwards for a higher 
price. Carroll and Griffith (2010) offer an example in which hostile bidders who had a toehold 
in an auction withdrew after encouraging other companies to bid. The company with the 
toehold was able to obtain abnormal returns of around 4.98%, whereas they would only have 
achieved a 0.06% return without the toehold. Therefore, toehold bidders can attract other 
bidders to enter an auction and, thereby, can increase the number of competitors.  




Moreover, a toehold offers advantages for bidders in case they decide to engage in auction and 
deter other competitors. With a toehold, bidders will not pay the full price, and the value of the 
initial stake will be extracted from the total value to be paid. Furthermore, even with a small 
toehold of around 5–10%, bidders can still win the company with only a minimum of actual 
bidding price (Georganas & Nagel, 2011). However, some target companies refuse to negotiate 
with toehold companies, and there is evidence to show that toehold tender offers have been 
decreasing in U.S. mergers—occurring relatively rarely since the 1980s: among 10,000 initial 
bids, only 13% were placed by toehold companies as shown by Betton et al., (2009b). The 
decline in toehold bidders is due to the disadvantages associated with toeholds that can affect 
the outcome of the takeover. For example, in 1999, four weeks before the public announcement 
of the attempted takeover of Warner-Lambert by Pfizer, the latter obtained a 1% stake of the 
former, which saved Pfizer $246 million of the final acquisition value (Bris, 2002). From the 
bidder side, toeholds can lead companies to bid aggressively, increasing the probability of the 
winner’s curse, especially if there are a number of bidders with different stakes in the target 
company (Bulow et al., 1999). 
It seems that there are benefits to be a shareholder in the target firm, including being able to 
encourage other bidder to bid aggressively or obtain a target at a lower price in case bidder 
with a toehold engage in auction. However, a toehold can change a bidder’s behaviour during 
auctions, which can also lead to overpaying for shares being sold.  
In conclusion, target firms elicit the amount of money that the acquirer is willing to pay, by 
using different selling mechanisms, e.g. one-to-one negotiation or competitive auction.  A deal 
can only happen if the acquirer’s willingness to pay is higher than the seller’s willingness to 
accept.  And the main cause of the acquirer’s shareholders’ wealth being destroyed is when the 
acquirer pays significantly more than the actual economic value of the target firm (Varaiya and 
Ferris, 1987). The coining of the term ‘curse’ in this context is more instructive than perhaps 
was intended. With its connotations of mysterious external forces or influences, the word curse 
gives the impression of malign forces operating on us but beyond our control and to whose 
whims we must bow. However, the research noted above suggests that any curse brought down 
upon winners in auction is a result of basic human emotions, a particularly stylised and unique 
transaction method and a willingness to put internal beliefs ahead of expert evidence. Returns 
for companies bidding in M&A as noted above are hardly suggestive of a market where 
discretion and discernment are valued traits. This section has however focussed on bidders 




inter se. It is important to assess the interaction between sellers and bidders in the context of 
selling mechanisms. This is crucial particularly, given that over-bidding tends to occur more 
frequently in an auction than a negotiation context, due to the increased competition among 
bidders 
 
The next part will explain in detail the main theories and empirical tests that have been used in 
the literature to measure the level of competition between bidders, to examine how the selling 
mechanisms (auction versus negotiation) affect the M&A outcomes, in terms of share prices in 
both the short and relatively long runs.    
 
3.2.1 Selling Mechanisms and Competition Proxy: An Overview 
 
‘All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what 
you don't know by what you do; that's what I called "guessing what was at the other side of the 
hill."’87 
 
Before discussing the concept of the selling mechanisms and its implications, it is necessary to 
understand the importance and role of the acquisition process for corporate control activities. 
The acquisition process is a concurrent and interrelated set of phases that enable the transfer of 
assets ownership from a seller to buyers (DePamphilis, 2012a, p.138). This definition is 
accurate but does not fully convey the complex nature of acquisition processes. This is a matter 
of both strategy and tactics, where the process is not a simple facilitation of exchange but rather 
a matter of fundamental strategic importance, which will thereafter dictate the tactics employed 
by the parties. As Sir Arthur Wellesley (a master of choosing not just his battles but also his 
battlefields), well understood choices made throughout and particularly at the beginning of any 
campaign are as significant as the number of battalions that can be brought to the battlefield. 
Process in acquisitions can better be understood in this light as integral to outcome as much, if 
not more so, than the capital or leverage which can be deployed or post-acquisition plans which 
can be implemented.  
 
                                                          
87 Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, cited in The Croker Papers: The Correspondence and Diaries of 
the Late Right Honourable John Wilson Croker, LL.Dm F.R.S, Secretary of the Admiralty from 1809 to 1830 
(1884), edited by Louis J. Jennings, Vol.III, p. 276. 




This process starts by preparing business and acquisition plans, to then searching for, screening 
and contacting appropriate candidates, to negotiating the purchase decision, and, finally, either 
integrating and closing the deal, or walking away using alternative techniques, such as a hostile 
tender offer (DePamphilis, 2012a, p.138). Firms usually attempt to use a well-designed 
acquisition process in order to ensure success, and to avoid mistakes, at all phases of the 
acquisition process (Rankine & Howson, 2006, p.3). However, throughout any acquisition 
process, there is a concern about which selling mechanism target firms should adopt. 
 
Both parties, the seller and the bidders, may hire financial advisors and law firms to help with 
reaching a consensus on particular issues related to financial and legal affairs. The participation 
of advisors helps acquirers to define a competitive initial offer price, financing source and 
assess the target’ assets valuation based on their knowledge of what lies the other side of the 
hill in a process which can never be assumed to be based on wholly transparent or complete 
information. Advisors play an important role in helping target firms to figure out which selling 
mechanism to adopt, prospective bidders to contact and perform due diligence and valuation 
analysis (Pearl & Rosenbaum, 2013, p.316-321). Target firms and their advisors should act as 
auctioneer and choose the selling method according to certain criteria, such as maintaining a 
high level of confidentiality, creating a high level of competition between bidders, preventing 
information leakage, minimising impact on employees, political concerns (in certain countries 
and industries), and whether they occupy a weak negotiation position. For example, in order to 
achieve a high price by creating a high level of competition, a target might organise an auction 
with multiple bidders, rather than negotiating the transaction with just one bidder.  However, 
if a target company prefers to control the level of information leakage, it will select the private 
negotiation process rather than a public auction (Ernst and Häcker 2012, p. 25).  
 
The selling process in general is composed of two main stages: the pre-negotiation stage and 
the negotiation stage.  Figure 4 illustrates the selling process that will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next part. The pre-negotiation stage could be a reactive or a proactive sales process 
(DePamphilis, 2010b, p. 584-585).  Reactive sales begin when a prospective acquirer initiates 
contact with a potential target to express his/her interest in acquiring either full or part of the 
target’s assets. If the potential target accepts the offer, the two parties then start one-to-one 
negotiations and the process ends. However, if the target rejects the offer, a second stage of 
either public or private process will be pushed forward (see Figure 4: A&B).  In a public sales 




or auction88, the target or their advisors announce the selling opportunity to the market in order 
to attract bidders, whereas a private or controlled sale89 involves confidential negotiation with 
either one or more bidders. Even if there is more than one bidder, the target still negotiates with 
each bidder privately. The second way of instigating the pre-negotiation stage occurs when a 
target intends to sell their assets (a proactive sales process) by either a public sales or auction 
or a private or controlled sale (see Figure 4: C).   
 
Figure 4 The Selling process 
 
In the negotiation stage, strategic interactions are conducted differently between sellers and 
bidders throughout either a private phase or a public phase. At the private phase, agents are 
utilised for decision-making activities by interacting and exploring the possibility of closing 
the deal successfully. Such negotiations are of necessity often quite sophisticated because this 
negotiation process is more than mere pourparlers but can, and ideally should, include all the 
main interdependent activities related to the purchase decision, such as refining the target 
valuation, the method of payment, due diligence and developing projections and a robust 
financial plan (DePamphilis, 2010b, p. 138-179).   
At the public-phase, where a target initiates the bid by public announcement, bidders are able 
to observe the initial price offer and the number of rival bidders, the players will start to interact, 
depending on the move or moves of one's opponent, and will finally end the deal with 
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integration with the winner, and closing the deal. These conscious interactions can impact the 
behaviour of players and the tactics that will be used such as collusion and bluffing (Bruner, 
2004a,p. 793). Moreover, Bulow & Klemperer (2002b) and Boone & Mulherin (2008b) argue 
that the level of competition is related to the bidders’ characteristics, where the presence of a 
strong bidder would create or at least heighten the prospect of the winner’s curse for other 
possible bidders, scuttling gains that might be expected to be generated through auction.  For 
example, bidders could deter other competitors if they are prone to agency problems of free 
cash flow (Jensen, 1986), or to a collective hubris (Roll, 1986a) which leads them simply to 
overbid for the target’ assets. As such, the type, nature and relative strength of bidders, which 
represents a substantial source of competition, has a profound effect on the selling process.  
Regardless of whether takeover bids are negotiated in a public-phase or in a private-phase, the 
negotiation stage consists of consecutive steps directed by different rules and deadlines in 
auction and negotiation. For example, auction is governed by clear rules and deadlines. 
Theoretically, (McAfee & McMillan, 1987) show four types of auction are available to the 
parties: English auctions; Dutch auction; first-price sealed-bid auctions and second-price 
sealed-bid auctions.  
 
English auction is open publicly to all bidders and it starts at the setting of the reservation price 
of the seller. Thereafter, potential bidders raise the bid price until no other bids are made. The 
bidder with a highest price win the auction. This is a conceptually straightforward auction 
process and arguably highly transparent at least in respect of knowing (if not necessarily 
understanding) the imperatives and limits of the other bidders. Dutch auction begins with an 
arbitrarily high price which is then lowered until the shareholders accept the offer. This 
indicates that the firm seeks to get the lowest possible price, while obtaining the desired number 
of shares. These types of auction are both highly tactical and also require bidders to have a 
clear and unusually precise idea of what they are ultimately willing to pay to succeed (to a 
maximum bid in English auctions and a minimum in Dutch). Bidders in the sealed-bid auction 
submit the bid price with each bidder having one chance to bid, however, in the first-price 
sealed-bid auctions, the winner pays the highest price, while in the second-price sealed-bid 
auctions, the winner pays the second-highest price. In actual practice, sealed bid auctions and 
Dutch auction are more commonly used in M&As. However, this research will not investigate 
the impact of Dutch auction upon bidder returns because such mechanisms are used for 




repurchasing activates which is not the main focus of this study. The next part will explain the 
mechanism of sealed-bid auctions in a public and private-phase competition.  
Public sales or auction are designed to heighten a competitive environment between bidders, 
where target firms or their investment banks open the target’ assets publicly for sale, in order 
to solicit bids from as many potential public bidders as possible. Before bidders are given 
access to the target firms’ information not publicly available, they are asked to sign a 
confidentiality agreement (non-disclosure agreement). The auction is then held by a target firm 
until all interested buyers have submitted their bids with the winner being the one who offers 
the best value (Pearl & Rosenbaum, 2013,p. p.315) and (DePamphilis, 2011c, p. 14) 
In private or controlled sale, there are many negotiation rounds before announcing the auction 
winner as described by Bruner (2004a, p.798) and Hansen (2001a). The target firm’s advisors 
may prepare a list of bidders’ contact information, or as it is called selling memorandum, which 
includes either strategic players (e.g. peer competitors) or financial players (e.g. leveraged 
buyout, LBO). Following this stage, the targets or their advisors begin to contact members on 
the list. 
Bidders who are interested in buying the target firm sign a confidentiality agreement and 
receive a non-public information book.  Occasionally, bidders might also sign standstill 
agreements that prohibit them from making unsolicited offers for target shares. Signing the 
confidentiality agreement marks the end of the initial contact round. During this phase it seems 
only the sellers observe the type of bidders. In the preceding indication of interest phase, the 
sellers or their advisors request the bidders to submit non-binding indications of their interest, 
which may disclose both their method of payment and their price offer. 
At the end of this stage, the reserve price is offered and the non-binding proposals will be 
observed for the seller and their advisors, and the seller will start to invite bidders, based on 
the indicative offers made, to conduct additional due diligence, and, thereafter, the second 
round begins. In this round, the target’s management gives a presentation and bidders are given 
access to a data room for more detailed information. At the end of this round, the seller 
thoroughly reconsiders the selected bidders’ offers from various positions, for example, the 
payment method (i.e. cash versus equity) will be considered. In the third round, the seller 
accepts the highest bid.  Finally, the winner of the auction is announced, and the seller begins 
to negotiate with the winner during the final negotiations stage.  
 




For the other side, the negotiation mechanism consists of consecutive steps directed by limiting 
rules and deadlines. First, the acquirer initiates a takeover offer to the target board. If the target 
accepts the offer, both parties will proceed with negotiation settlements, otherwise; if the offer 
is rejected, the acquirer might adopt an aggressive approach. If the target board recommends 
the offer, the acquirers will be invited to sign a confidentiality agreement. By reviewing the 
private information, bidders will update their preliminary target valuations and, afterwards, the 
two parties will start negotiating the deal structure. The deal structure includes factors that 
determine the risk share of both parts, such as the form of payment, tax considerations and 
post-closing arrangements that allow the final organisational form to be defined, i.e. whether it 
is corporate or divisional. The final step is to develop the accounting and finance plans for the 
combined firms. If the two parties process the negotiation successfully they will integrate; 
otherwise, the acquirer will “walk away” (DePamphilis, 2011c, p. 15-18) 
In conclusion, there is always a trade-off between the cost of disclose information and 
increasing the competition between bidders as shown in the theoretical work of (Hansen, 
2001a). However, if the cost of information is high and could affect the value of the selling 
firms, the optimal choice for target firms (rationally) to negotiation the bid with only a signal 
bidder. 
 
Researchers differ in term of modelling the sales process, with studies focussing on either the 
number of bidders in a private or public phase competition. However, there are two basic 
approaches currently being adopted to model the sales process. The first is Boone and 
Mulherin’s 11-Step Model, and the second is Betton, Eckbo, and Thornburg’s Two-Stage 
Approach. 
 
Boone and Mulherin’s 11-Step Model is based on a theoretical framework suggested by 
(Hansen, 2001a). This model divides the takeover process into eleven steps, as shown in Figure 
5 The first seven steps are labelled as a private process, while the remaining steps are made 
after the public announcements. The private takeover process covers the period beginning from 
the initiation of the deals, whether by the acquirer or target, and includes the various stages of 
choosing the appropriate selling procedure, signing the confidentiality agreement, to the 
submission of nonbinding offers, to the disclosure of the method of payment and the price offer. 
After the deal is announced, the bid might attract other bidders, then if target firms accept one 
of the offers, they announce the winner and wait for shareholders and regulatory agencies to 




approve the deal. If the transaction is approved, the deal is completed. The 11-Step Model 
defines the private process deal when there is more than one bidder at an auction, while if the 
target negotiates the process with a single bidder, the deal is defined as negotiation (Aktas, De 
Bodt, Baker, & Kiymaz, 2011) 
Boone and Mulherin’s 11-Step Model collect details of the sales process for each takeover 
from the EDGAR system of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)90, particularly 
from the background section of 14A and S-4 filings (for mergers) and 14D filings (for tender 
offers). 
The 11-Step Model however overlooks levels of competition during public takeover procedures. 
These steps are significant as they include the public announcement of the winning bidders, 
when other rival bidders are attracted to participate in a public takeover battle which could 
affect the initial offer price and the gain from conducting an auction.  
 
The second possible model is Betton, Eckbo and Thornburg’s Two-Stage Approach, which has 
been used to investigate the disappearance of takeover bids with a toehold in the US market.  
According to this framework, the first stage shows the bargaining mechanism that the bidders 
use to make their initial offer to the potential target firm. If the potential target accepts the offer, 
the two parties progress to one-to-one negotiations, and the game ends. However, if the target 
rejects the offer, they will organise a second stage: either private or public auction. This means 
that merger negotiations are carried out under the threat of an open auction. This approach 
classifies the level of competition between bidders based on the public-phase competition. 
Under the Williams Act 1968 (which amended the Securities Exchange Act 1934) the target 
board has a fiduciary responsibility to consider any rival offers within a certain period until the 
arrangement is finally approved by the shareholders. This fact is used to classify a deal as 
auction or negotiation whereby a deal is classified as negotiation if there is only one public 
bidder for the same target over the preceding or following six months, and the auction 
subsample will detail whether there were additional public bidders during that period (Betton 
et al., 2009b) 
 
                                                          
90 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an independent body in the U.S. federal government to supervise 
and control securities industry. EDGAR system is a free database in the SEC that provides files that include 
information about all the registered firms in the U.S stock markets. Find more in https://www.sec.gov/  
 





Figure 5 Timing of Takeover Process 
 
Source: Aktas , De Bodt (2011, Figure 15.1) 
 
Although private process has a significant role in informing the seller about a target firm value, 
however; it can be argued that strategic interaction activities are best seen in the public- phase 
competition. Modelling the competition level in M&As based on the public phase creates a 
context of Bayesian game in which players act on beliefs that are reached after observing the 
distribution of other types of bidders (Gibbons, 1992, p.149-150). More specifically, the level 
of competition is related to the bidders’ characteristics, where the presence of a strong bidder 
would create or at least heighten the prospect of the winner’s curse for other possible bidders, 
and reduce gains that might be expected to be generated through auction (Bulow & Klemperer, 
2002b) and (Boone & Mulherin, 2008b).  However, most of the empirical research that 
followed Boone & Mulherin’s approuch highlighted the number of bidders in private process 
where bidders do not observe each other, and then apply a static regression. Yet, this method 
disregards the significance of the outcomes of the interactions between bidders. This is can be 
seen as one of the weaknesses of how these ideas have been investigated in empirical research, 
as it stands.  
The next part will discuss the main empirical works that investigate the impact of the level of 
competition between bidders upon bidder returns practically after the publication of the earlier 
work of (Boone & Mulherin, 2007a) 
 




3.2.2. Empirical work 
 
There are many empirical papers which study why all firms are not sold in auctions given the 
apparent advantage of competition in auctions.  These empirical works are motivated by the 
theoretical framework of Bulow & Klemperer (1996a) who argue that increasing the number 
of bidders in a standard auction will lead to increase the competition between bidders and then 
raising the profit for the seller rather than engaging in one-to-one negotiation procedure.  
However, Hansen (2001a) argues that there is always a trade-off between the cost of 
information and competition in deciding between competitive auction and negotiation. Sellers 
have an incentive to expose the ranges values of their companies in a competitive auction 
procedure because they are attempting to maximise shareholder revenue, while the full 
disclosure of sensitive information to potential bidders that include competitors, customers or 
suppliers could destroy the value of the selling firms. As a result of this, if the cost of 
information is high and could affect the value of the selling firms, the optimal choice for target 
firms (rationally) is to negotiate the bid with only a signal bidder. 
Boone & Mulherin (2007a) investigate what could drive the choice between auction and 
negotiation: the information cost hypothesis or the agency cost hypothesis, in order to answer 
why a competitive auction is not a dominating selling process in the US takeover activities.   
They argue that if information costs are found to drive the choice of selling mechanisms, there 
is no difference between shareholders’ wealth in auction and negotiation, because an auction 
is costly, and it has always been unable to dominate negotiation. While if the shareholders’ 
wealth in auction is greater than in the negotiation, this means that agency costs are found to 
drive the choice between the two mechanisms because a target manager prefers to negotiate a 
deal with a certain bidder in order to gain power and prestige at the expense of the shareholders.  
Therefore, the wealth of target shareholders will be destroyed in the case of a target manager 
decides not to conduct a competitive auction. 
Boone & Mulherin (2007a) apply the event study approach to examine the impact of the selling 
process upon target returns based on the theoretical analysis of (Hansen, 2001a). They use a 
sample of 400 US-based target firms that were acquired by US-based bidder firms with a deal 
value of at least $100 million over the 1989 to 1999 period. Based on Boone and Mulherin’s 
11-step model, the sample comprises 202 auctions and 198 negotiation deals. The event study 
approach calculates the target cumulative abnormal returns and reports that target firms gain 




positive returns in auction and negotiation subsamples. However, there is no significant 
difference in target returns between auction and negotiation. The selection bias problem 
between the choice of the sales procedure and target returns is controlled by performing a 
standard two-stage IV regression.91 The research concludes that agency costs do not explain 
the choice between auction or negotiation choices, while the trade-off between competition and 
information costs actually drive the argument for choosing between auction and negotiation.  
This conclusion is consistent with the model of Hansen (2001a). Moreover, this research has 
shown that the private stage is not free from competition, even if there is only one buyer 
revealed at the announcement stage. This means that even publicly observed non-competitive 
negotiation deals are not free from competition. 
In the following study, Boone & Mulherin (2008b) examine whether the event of a winner’s 
curse exists in auction takeover based on the framework of Thaler (1988) and Roll (1986a) who 
argue that if bidders create negative returns around the date of announcement, this event is 
considered as  evidence of the winner’s curse.  The main motivation for this paper is to 
essentially answer one of the fundamental questions in the field of corporate finance, which is 
why bidders significantly lose in M&As.  The authors compare the winner’s curse hypothesis 
and the competitive market hypothesis in order to test whether bidders overbid for target firms 
by using two proxies: intangible assets and the number of bidders that bid for the same target 
firms. The intangible assets ratio is a proxy of uncertainty, whereby if bidders are uncertain 
about the value of the target’s assets that are being sold, they will overpay, as suggested by 
Bazerman & Samuelson (1983). The winner’s curse therefore exists if there is a significant and 
negative relation between bidder returns and uncertainty proxy.  Moreover, the number of 
bidders is used as a proxy to ascertain whether there is a significant, negative relationship 
between bidder returns and the level of competition between takeover bidders at auction and 
negotiation as suggested by Kagel & Levin (1986). Bidders will be more aggressive when there 
is a large number of bidders bidding for the target and this consequently destroys bidder returns.  
Boone & Mulherin (2008b) look at 308 US-based bidder firms with a deal value of at least 
$100 million between the periods 1989 to 1999. Based on Boone and Mulherin’s 11-step model, 
the sample comprises of 145 auctions and 163 negotiation deals. Boone & Mulherin find that 
                                                          
91Boone & Mulherin (2007) use a ratio of relative size of target firms to bidder firms as an instrumental variable 
in their model in order to correct the self-section problem 
  




there is a negative relation between the dummy variable auction as a measurement for the level 
of competition in takeover activities and bidder cumulative abnormal returns, but that such 
relation is not statistically significant. Moreover, there is a positive and significant relation 
between intangible assets and bidder returns. Again, this paper controls for the selection bias 
problem between the choice of bidding in auction or negotiation and bidder returns by 
performing a standard two-stage IV regression. There is still no statistically significant relation 
between auction and bidder returns.  These results lead the authors to conclude that the event 
of winner’s curse is not presented in takeovers, while the negative bidder returns in the US 
market occur mainly due to the high level of competition in the private competition phase. 
One of the main factors that could affect bidding strategies is toehold, although bidders with a 
toehold may yield a strategic advantage over other competitors regardless of whether they win 
the bid or not.  However, there is evidence in the empirical literature showing that toehold 
bidding has decreased in the US market since the 1980s. To investigate the toehold puzzle, 
Betton, Eckbo, and Thornburg’s examine an original Two-Stage Approach in which merger 
negotiation is carried out under the threat of an open auction.  Betton et al., (2009b) use a 
sample that exceeds 10,000 US-target firms over the period 1973 to 2002. Of these, 7,750 bids 
are classified as merger bids and 3,056 as tender offers. They find that bidding with a toehold 
exists in the US takeover market, only if bidders own on average 20% of target’ assets. A likely 
explanation for such phenomena is that bidding with a toehold could impede negotiation 
takeover.  With optimal bidding, rational target managers should reject bids with a toehold 
because bidders obtain a target at a lower premium compared with non-toehold bidders. On the 
other hand, the optimal bidding strategy with a toehold for bidders, is to bid with a zero toehold 
to avoid the cost of rejection or to bid with a toehold size that exceeds the threshold because 
the toehold benefit offsets the cost of rejection. This strategy of avoiding bidding with a toehold 
is an evidence for that bidder firms are rational, and this is the main reason why bidding with 
a toehold has decreased in the U.S. takeovers. 
The study of Aktas et al., (2010a) follows the two-stage takeover process to explain why firms 
do not organise competitive auctions to sell their assets. However, the research follows Boone 
& Mulherin (2007a) model to define auction and negotiation deals. They argue that even 
friendly bidding, which proceeds under the format of a one-on-one negotiation, is not insulated 
from competitive pressure, whereby if latent competition induces bidders in negotiation deals 
(the first-stage) to increase the bid premium, anticipated auction costs reduce the premium (the 
second-stage). (Aktas et al., 2010a) examine their argument by using 1,774 US samples of 




public target firms during the period from 1994 to 2007. Of these, 927 bids are classified as 
auction bids and 847 as negotiation bids. The authors use different proxies to measure latent 
competition and the cost of conducting an auction.  First, they use the liquidity index, private 
buyout fund activity and recession times of economies as proxies for latent competition. They 
predict that bidders face latent competition even in a deal with only one bidder with a high 
liquidity index and private buyout fund activity and less in times of recession.  The target debt 
ratio and whether target firms initiated the deal are used as proxies for the cost of the auction. 
Target firms are under pressure to sell if the debt ratio is high and if they initiated the deal, 
which could affect their bargaining power to extract a high bid price from bidders. Aktas et al., 
(2010a) document that even in a deal with only one bidder, competition still exists from latent, 
potential competition, which increases the bid premium. However, an auction in the second 
stage could be organised by the target if negotiations fail and the auction cost reduces the 
premium.  
Fidrmuc et al., (2012) study whether the choice of selling mechanisms could help reflect bidder 
types: whether the firm is sold to a private equity firm or a strategic bidder.92 The authors 
classify selling process as a controlled auction and private negotiation based on the private-
competition phase, and formal auction as being based on the public-competition phase whereby 
target firms organise the selling process with highly pre-set rules.  The sample consists of 410 
takeover bids of listed US targets. Of these, 205 target firms were sold to private equity bidders 
and 205 target firms were sold to strategic bidders. After controlling for self-selection problem 
between the selling mechanisms, buyer types and bid premium by conducting a simultaneous 
model, there is no significant effect for bidder types and the choice of selling mechanism on 
the takeover premium. Moreover, the research finds that a private equity firm prefers to hold 
an auction rather than a negotiation for the deals that are initiated by the target firm. Gorbenko 
& Malenko (2014) agree that private equity and strategic bidders are attracted to different target 
firms with specific characteristics, because of that there is a significant difference in target 
values between the two different types of bidders. They document that strategic bidders on 
average value the assets of target firms higher than financial bidders in auction deals. For 
                                                          
92 Different type of bidders has different motivations to acquire a potential target. Strategic bidders usually aim to 
integrate target assets to their existing operations in order to gain from the possible synergies between the two 
firms, while private equity buyers need to hire specialists in order to run target firms for them. Private equity 
buyers will avoid overpaying for target firms because they do not have full information about the value of firm’s 
assets (Fidrmuc et al., 2012). 
 




example: They show that financial buyers pay significantly more for mature and poorly 
performing target firms. To examine their argument, they use a sample of 349 US auctions of 
only cash and completed takeovers, whereby 211 target firms sold to strategic bidders and 138 
target firms sold to financial bidders. The auction deals define if there is more than one bidder 
signing a confidentiality agreement.  
Schlingemann & Wu (2015) re-investigate the effect of selling mechanisms upon bidder and 
target returns, particularly when the size of target firms is relatively small. This work is based 
on the theoretical framework of Hansen (2001a), which argues that the trade-off between the 
cost of information and competition is the main determinant of the choice between auction and 
negotiation. Schlingemann & Wu (2015) predict that that the costs of disclosure proprietary 
information are inversely related to the size of target firms and during the post-acquisition 
integration, larger bidders are able to absorb and cover these costs. Therefore, small target firms 
prefer to conduct auctions in order to increase the level of competition between bidders and 
maximise shareholders’ wealth because the costs of disclosure are small. Large target firms 
prefer to engage in a one-to-on negotiation process because the cost of disclosure is high.  If 
the above prediction is true, this could suggest that the decision of target firms to choose 
between auction and negotiation is consistent with rational behaviour.    
 
Schlingemann & Wu (2015) use a US sample of 575 completed takeover transactions with a 
deal value of at least more than $10 million, over the period 1998 to 2012. If the number of 
bidders contacted is more than one, the sale process is defined as an auction and if there is only 
one bidder contacted, the sale process is defined as a negotiation. The sample contains 313 
auctions and 262 negotiation deals.  In the analysis of univariate and OLS regression, there is 
no significant relation between auctions and target returns either in cases of using Boone and 
Mulherin (2007a) model or the number of bidders contacted to define the takeover bids to 
auction and negotiation.  After controlling for the self-selection problem between target returns 
and selling mechanisms by using a series of two-stage IV regression and the variables, target 
sales growth and deal volume are used as instruments for auction. The research finds that there 
is a positive and significant relation between auction and target cumulative abnormal returns, 
particularly when the size of target firms is small. Moreover, the event of a winner’s curse does 
not exist as there is no significant relation between auction and bidder cumulative abnormal 
returns. Overall, the relative size of target firms plays an important role in the choice between 
competitive auctions and negotiations.  




Akts,Xu & Yurtoglu (forthcoming) examine whether the event of overpayment exists in cases 
of bidders announcing the deal earlier, before signing the definitive agreement during the 
private selling process. They argue that if bidder firms announced their intentions to acquire a 
target firm, this could attract other competitors to bid, which could increase the level of 
competition between potential bidders.  They use a U.S. sample of 269 takeover deals that were 
announced in the period of 1990 to 2013. They define auction and negotiation deals based on 
the level of competition in a private process. They show that, although the earlier deal 
announcement is associated with a higher public competition, a winner’s curse does not exist 
in bidder announcement returns. 
Most of the previous research controls the selection-bias problem between the choices for a 
sales procedure and target or bidder returns by performing a two-stage regression. Under the 
Heckit model, the solution for the self-selection problem is to use the 𝑧 vector that meets two 
conditions; the 𝑧 vector is not correlated with ε ((Cov (z, ε) =0), and at the same time is 
predictive of the selling process which means that 𝑧 is correlated with 𝑋1. 
Therefore, if the vector met these conditions, then it is a good candidate for an instrumental 
variable (IV)(Guo & Fraser, 2015, p.63 and p.98-101). This estimator consists of two stages: 
in the first we regress the endogenous variable 𝑋1 on the instrument (and any other exogenous 
variables), and use the fitted regression to obtain the predicted 𝑋1; in the second we then regress 
the dependent variable (the target returns, for example) on the exogenous variables and the 
predicted 𝑋1. This procedure is essentially a way to filter out the endogenous part of 𝑋1, 
leaving only the variance that is due to exogenous factors; which should not be correlated with 
the error term.  
In general, the set of exogenous variables includes deal characteristics that could affect returns, 
or characteristics of target firms that predict the choice of auction and negotiation in the 
takeover. 
According to Bound, Jaeger, & Baker (1993), instrumental variables estimation results in an 
estimator that is biased but consistent. Its variance depends crucially on the degree of 
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous covariate. If this correlation is weak 
then the resultant estimator may not be consistent, and will likely have a high variance. 
Therefore, it is crucial to check for significant correlation between the instrument and the 
exogenous covariate in the first stage regression. 




Although instrument variable estimation is a good method, there is still a big challenge in 
finding such an instrumental variable z, which meets the two conditions. Because of this, using 
propensity score matching is an alternative method to address the self-selection problem 
(Wooldridge, 2010, p. 937)  
3.2.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
There have been several empirical studies on M&As have investigated and aimed to tested 
whether selecting a different selling mechanism would induce different abnormal returns to 
acquirers, or put another way, whether auctions gives rise to the winner’s curse (overpay) in 
the U.S. takeover market. Kagel & Levin (1986) show that the number of bidders in auction is 
a root cause for the winner’s curse.  Bidders will be more aggressive when there are a large 
number of bidders bid for the same target firm, and this makes negative the winner’s 
consequent payoff. Bazerman & Samuelson (1983) find that the likelihood of the winner’s 
curse increased as the number of bidders increased particularly if bidders are uncertain about 
the value of target assets.  Theoretically , Bulow, Huang, & Klemperer (1999) show that when 
a seller engaged in a friendly transaction has the opportunity to invite one more serious bidder 
to an English auction bidding with number of players, this will generate an extra revenue- in 
comparison to negotiating a deal with the winning bidder. Therefore, bidders will be more 
aggressive when there is a large number of bidders bidding for the same target firm and this 
consequently increase the target shareholders wealth.  
However, most of takeover deals in the real world are structured using one-to-one negotiations, 
where there is only one buyer negotiating with a target firm. Such puzzling observation 
motivates many research to investigate why all firms are not sold in auctions given the apparent 
advantage of competition in auctions.  The most prominent works such as  Boone & Mulherin 
(2007a:2008b) and (Aktas et al., 2010a) measure the exact competition level between bidders 
in auction and negotiation, and how the competition levels would affect different returns for 
acquirers or target firms. As Boone & Mulherin (2007a) discuss, prior to the public 
announcement of a bid, there is usually a period of highly competitive private negotiations 
between a target firm and bidders. This research has shown that the private stage is not free 
from competition, even if there is only one buyer revealed at the announcement stage. This 
means that even publicly observed non-competitive negotiation deals are not free from 
competition.  Although competition is high in the private negotiation, Boone & Mulherin 




(2007a:2008b) and (Aktas et al., 2010a) conclude that using auction does not push bidders to 
overbid, and that there is no significant difference in the announcement returns of target and 
bidder firms between the two mechanisms of auction and negotiation. Therefore, the event of 
the winner curse does not exist in the U.S. takeover activities. 
However, Boone & Mulherin (2007a)’s model raises some concerns. First of all, this model 
overlooks the levels of competition during public takeover procedures, when rival bidders are 
attracted to participate in a public takeover battle which can, then, affect the initial offer price 
and any further gains made through the auction process. Particularly, Bazerman & Samuelson 
(1983) and Kagel & Levin (1986) argue that bidders are more aggressive when there are a large 
number of competitors jostling to acquire a target firm,  which can lead to the winner 
overpaying for the targets’ assets.   
Boone & Mulherin (2007a) private process model is constructed using the number of 
confidential bidders as a proxy for competition. The weaknesses of this approach can perhaps 
be explained, at least in part, by its essentially quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. This 
disregards the fact that auction should mimic the actual environment of bidding competitions, 
where each bidder can extract useful information about the object’s value for themselves from 
the bids of other bidders. Based on the standard definition, the auction process can be seen as 
a Bayesian game in which players act on beliefs that are reached after observing the distribution 
of other types of bidders (Gibbons, 1992). Bearing this definition in mind, each bidder’s beliefs 
can be seen to be shaped by the type of other peer bidders. As such, the types of bidders, which 
represent a substantial source of competition, have an enormous impact on the selling process. 
Therefore, bidder firms will be more aggressive when there is more than one public bidder 
bidding for the same target.  
 
Relatively speaking, Bulow & Klemperer (2002b) and Boone & Mulherin (2008b) argue that 
levels of competition are related to bidder characteristics, where the presence of a strong bidder 
would create or at least heighten the prospect of the winner’s curse for other possible bidders.  
As a result, bidder asymmetry suggests that there are gains to be made for bidder firms when a 
takeover competition is limited and, to an extent, when market failures or inefficiencies are 
removed from the takeover process. Therefore, it is fundamental to identify the differences 
between bidder characteristics, in auction and negotiation transactions in order to explore 
whether these distinctions can critically influence, or even dictate, the bidding behaviours of 




acquiring firms at a public stage, or even drive bidders to pay more for their targets.  It can be 
argued that the winner’s curse is more likely to exist in a public stage when there is more than 
one public bidder bid for the same target where acting rationally and less aggressive can be 
even difficult, and this argument lads this thesis to test the second proposition as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: the event of winner’s curse exists in the U.S. takeover market between bidders 
during the public-phase competition, where there is more than one public bidder bid for the 
same targets assets.  
A further issue in studies that investigate the impact of the competition between bidders on 
their shareholders wealth such as Boone & Mulherin (2007a:2008b) and Aktas et al., (2010a) 
is that both use unrepresentative samples, examining only large firm acquisitions with deal 
sizes over $100 million. However, a significant number of M&As are conducted between small 
firms, and the outcomes for a small firm could be quite different to those of large firms. 
According to Moeller et al., (2004), small firms generally outperform large firms in acquisition 
markets. This seems to be because large firms are more prone to the hubris effect, as outlined 
in Roll’s hypothesis (1986a). Moreover, Boone & Mulherin (2008b) have found that the size 
of the bidder firm is inversely related to the level of competition when there is more than one 
bidder for the same target. Schlingemann & Wu (2015) document positive and significant 
returns for both target and bidders in auction compared to negotiated deals, particular for 
relatively small targets.  
The size of bidder firms, therefore, seems to hint that firm size might be inversely associated 
with average abnormal returns and the level of competitions.  The larger the bidder size, the 
more negative returns for bidder shareholders there are because of large firms are more 
susceptible to the tendencies of management empire building or hubris. Moreover, the larger 
size of bidder firms motivates them to engage in competitive selling procedures, where the 
larger bidder could deter other competitors and overpay for target assets.  
Therefore, this chapter will examine the second hypothesis of whether firm sizes as a main 
proxy for bidder asymmetry could affect an acquirer’s announcement return for the two selling 
mechanisms of auction and negotiation. Particularly, large firms are more likely to be 
aggressive when there is more than one public bidder bid for the same targets assets because 
of the tendencies of management empire-building or hubris. 




Hypothesis 2: there are a positive relation between winner’s curse and the size of bidder firms 
whereby the larger the bidder size, the more negative returns for bidder shareholders there are 
because the larger size of bidder firms motive them to engage in a competitive selling 
procedure and overbid for a target firm because of management empire building or hubris.   
 
3.3. Data and variables 
 
3.3.1. Sample construction  
 
The data is drawn from Thomson ONE Banker and Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). 
Thomson ONE Banker provides core information on M&As through the Securities Data 
Company’s (SDC), the U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The SDC provides the sample 
of U.S. acquiring firms that were announced from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/2014, and the relevant 
information on deal characteristics such as acquirer and target name, date of announcement, 
deal status, deal value, acquisition technique, synopsis and history file and the form of 
transactions. Secondly, the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) provides the yearly 
accounting data and daily stock prices relevant to the period covered by the event study. The 
WRDS uses files from COMPUSTAT and the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
to obtain accounting and stock price information, respectively. The most pertinent 
characteristics of the U.S. acquiring-firm (i.e. market capitalisation, total assets, total debt to 
total assets, cash holding, return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q) are necessary to provide the 
narrow context of the particular M&A transactions are taken from COMPUSTAT database. 
The CRSP is used to provide the daily stock prices during the event window, while also 
providing the broader context to investigate the effect of the selling mechanisms (auction 
versus negotiation) on the acquirer’s return. Since the data that underpins this element of this 
study has been taken from two different data sources (the SDC and the WRDS), a common 
identifier is necessary to facilitate the full and accurate merging of the data in order to provide 
consistent results. To this end, the Acquirer’s CUSIP is used to match the datasets; the CUSIP 
master file on SDC provides the 8-character CUSIP to match with the firms’ NCUSIP on 
COMPUSTAT. 
To estimate the causal effect of using auctions on the acquirer’s wealth level, a number of 
strategies have been adapted to define the sales process as either auction or negotiation by using 




a sample from US takeover market. Table 13 shows the three-steps as applied to the sample in 
order to define transactions as either auctions or negotiations. Step one, indicates that there 
were 289,163 deals involving U.S. transactions for domestic acquirers between 1 January 1984 
and 31 December 2014. The sample of U.S. acquiring firms has been taken from the SDC using 
the following general criteria: 
• The acquiring firms chosen are public listed companies, as indicated later by the share 
codes (10, 11) on the CRSP and COMPUSTAT.93  
• Targets are US firms, in order to guarantee that the both buyers and sellers are subject 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations.94    
• The target could be a private, subsidiary or public firm. 
• The acquiring firm forms part of a completed or unsuccessful M&A deal where the 
transaction is completed when the acquirers gain control of more than 50% of the target 
company. Transactions that are flagged by the SDC as “withdrawn” will be defined as 
unsuccessful. In order to avoid obtaining biased results, the withdrawn deals are 
included, as suggested by Boone & Mulherin (2007a:2008b);Fidrmuc et al., (2012), and 
Akts,Xu & Yurtoglu (forthcoming). In addition, the percentage of the shares held by 
the acquirer six months prior to the date of announcement should be less than 50%.  
• Transactions that are flagged as privatisations will be excluded because such deals are 
subject to special regulations in terms of organising competition between bidders. 
• Repurchases or buybacks, self-tender offers, exchange offers, and recapitalisation deals 
are excluded.  
• Only deals that have a minimum value of $1 million are included, in order to study the 
size effect as suggested by (Moeller et al., 2004) 
 
                                                          
93 This thesis chooses not to exclude uitility and finacial industries as suggested by the the most  most prominent 
research that investigate the impact of bidding in a specific selling mechanism on bidder or target shareholders 
wealth  such as  Boone & Mulherin (2007:2008), Fidrmuc et al., (2012), Aktas, De Bodt & Baker (2010:2011): 
and Akts, Xu & Yurtoglu (forthcoming). Of course, it is true that utility and fanatical industries have different 
capital structure and book to market ratio which could affect the final results. However, studying the impact of 
auction on the shareholders wealth aims to investigate how the selecting of different bidding strategies could 
determine the shareholder wealth, and this is does not relate to the capital structure and book to market ratio which 
is more related to the accounting studies. In other words, there is no core reasons in the previous emprical works 
to exclude exclude utility and financial industries. 
94 Under the Williams Act (which amended the Securities Exchange Act 1968) the target board has a fiduciary 
responsibility to consider any rival offers within a certain period until the arrangement is finally approved by the 
shareholders. This fact will be used later to classify a deal to auction or negotiation.  




The above criterion that is implemented on the sample generates 37,680 transactions that will 
be used to classify auctions and negotiations. Step two uses the information about the main 
characteristics of the transactions from acquisition technique (field RANK_MENUACQTECH 
in the SDC database), which reports on a subset of deals, whether they are conducted through 
Auction or Privately Negotiated Purchase. Such information motivates this study to extract 
auction and negotiation subsamples because of the SDC definitions of such selling mechanisms 
are consistent with the adopted definitions of the auction and negotiation in this study. The 
SDC defines auction as a sealed-bid auction made on a specific day between multiple bidders, 
while the private negotiation purchase is defined as a negotiation process between a seller and 
buyer in order to obtain a percentage of shares in the target. After implementing step two, a 
sample of 134 deals remains (77 auction and 57 negotiation), which satisfies these requirements 
and helps with the data integrity—from which conclusions and analysis may be drawn. All the 
auction sub-samples here are structured as a formal auction, whereby target firms organise the 
selling process with highly pre-set rules.  
Back to the main sample: after excluding the step two subsamples, the third step follows the 
criteria proposed by Moeller et al., (2004) and Betton et al., (2009b) whereby a deal is classified 
as negotiation if there is only one public bidder for the same target, and as auction if there are 
two or more public bidders. More specifically, Betton et al., (200b9) limit the period for the 
second bid (in order to classify the bid as an auction) at six months, whereby, under the 
Williams Act the target board has a fiduciary responsibility to consider any rival offers until 
the arrangement is finally approved by the shareholders. 
In this light, the negotiation subsample will include deals made with only one public potential 
bidder for the same target over the preceding or following six months, and the auction 
subsample will detail whether there were additional public bidders during that period. To do 
this, the sample in step three will be divided into steps; step three-A, and step three-B. Step 
three-A defines a new negotiation subset that are labelled by SDC, as including deals that are 
not related to another existing deal (in field RD) and that, at the same time, have only one 
public bidder as shown (in field BIDCOUNT).  
Step three-B will include all the related deals (based on field RD) to define extra auction and 
negotiation deals. Transactions in this sub-step are classified as auctions if there are one or 
more public bidders competing for the same target over the preceding or over the following six 
months, and as negotiations if there is only one public bidder over the preceding or over the 




following six months. One more condition will be applied to the step three-B: offers from all 
public competitors should be in the form of ‘‘M’’ (merger) or ‘‘AM’’ (acquisition of majority 
interest). The forms “M” and “AM” present transactions where the acquirer held less than 50% 
and is seeking to acquire 50% or more of the target company's stock, which is consistent with 
the main criteria. By doing this, this analysis is able to compare apple-to-apple, as different 
types of forms that are reported by SDC sought different percentages from their target’s assets, 
and this could affect the compressions. 95  The subset of 34,187 deals are classified as 
negotiations based on step 3a, while step 3b adds about 308 transactions as auctions and about 
95 as negotiations.  
It is necessary for bidders’ names to be disclosed in order that these qualify as auctions on step 
three-B because if the competitor’s name and characteristics are confidential, this will not 
consistent with the definition of auction as Bayesian game. Therefore, this section chooses not 
to include 11 transactions whereby that the names of competitors appear as undisclosed.  
The initial total sample sizes are around 726 for auction and around 34,830 for negotiation. 
After acquiring the sufficient information about the daily stock prices and the accounting 
information from CRSP and COMPUSTAT, the size of the sub-samples was lowered to around 
286 deals for auction and around 14,360 for negotiation. There is more shrink process on the 
size sample is caused by several reasons. First, the transactions that do not have return 
information around the announcement date to allow for short and long-term analysis are deleted. 
Relatively speaking, all the deals that have multiple announcement dates within five days are 
deleted.   
Moreover, the transactions that do not have sufficient information related to the acquirer 
characteristic such as market capitalisation, total assets, leverage, cash holding, return on assets 
(ROA) and Tobin’s q as measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the date of announcement 
are excluded.  Finally, this research eliminates the sample where the deal value relative to the 
market value of the acquirer is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the date of 
announcement is less than 1% in order to study the size effect as suggested by Moeller et al., 
(2004) and Masulis, Wang, & Xie (2007). At the end of this process, the auction sub-sample 
includes 286 transactions, while the negotiation sub-sample includes 14,360 transactions. 
                                                          
95 For example;”AC” form includes acquisition of certain assets occur in which the acquirer holds less than 50% 
and is seeking to acquire shares in the target that are less than 50%.  




Figure 7 shows the annual auction and negotiation frequency announced between 1984 and 
2014.  The level of takeover distribution across auction and negotiation varies over this period, 
with more acquisitions by negotiation than by auction. This could suggest that, generally, the 
negotiation mechanism is a dominant strategy in takeover activities. The auction frequency in 
M&As activities increases in 1984-1988 and then starts declining. Boone & Mulherin (2007a) 
report that the fewest auction transaction deals took place at the end of the 1980s. However, 
the statistics confirm that the auction frequency peaks in the 1980s and again in 1992 to 1997. 
This indicates that auction was an important activity in the M&As market in the 1980s and the 
1990s. It is interesting to note that a large number of auction activities in the 1980s are recorded. 
However, this is not surprising given that Rhodes‐Kropf & Viswanathan (2004)point out that 
the 1990s are considered to be a period rich in merger and acquisition activities practically the 
hostile takeover and corporate raiders.   
Regarding negotiation deals, there was an enormous growth in deals processed by negotiation 
at the beginning of the 1990s. This could be related to the. Com bubble, which resulted in a 
large wave of mergers and acquisitions. The negotiation frequency, meanwhile, increases in 
1992-1998 and then falls steadily towards 2002. 
 
3.3.2. Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
 3.3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 
Bidder returns are considered as one of the main observable outputs of bidding strategies that 
could be used to evaluate the effect of using different methods of selling process. More 
specifically, the negative bidder returns have been used as an evidence to examine whether the 
winner’s curse exists in the U.S. takeover activates, see for example; Kagel & Levin, (1986), 
Moeller et al., (2004),and Boone & Mulherin (2008b). This chapter therefore aims to measure 
the difference in the average cumulative abnormal return of acquirer shareholders with and 
without bidding in auction as potential outcomes of each individual firm, in the short and longer 
event period. Section 3.4.1 set out in details how this chapter calculates the average abnormal 
returns and the relative theoretical literature. 
 
 




3.3.2.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
This section explains the various factors that the empirical research has revealed to be the 
potential determinants of either acquirer’s abnormal returns or the selling procedure. This 
analysis will support the rationale for the decision procedure in terms of selecting the important 
covariates based on substantive ground that will be used to calculate the propensity score in 
order to control for confounding influences.  Table 14 provides a useful insight, demonstrating 
in visual form the main characteristics of the deals and acquirer firms as a statistical analysis. 
This section reports the information for the whole sample, as well as for firms that used auction 
and negotiation. The final column presents the mean value based on t-test that tests the 
difference between the auction and negotiation subsamples.  
 
Panel A presents variables that illustrate the main differences between bidder characteristics 
across auction and negotiation transactions. There are number of theories and empirical 
findings that posit that variables such as firm size, cash holdings, and Tobin’s q, leverage and 
market-to-book ratio can be used as proxies for bidder asymmetries. 
 
Among these characteristics, firm size has been used by most empirical studies as a key 
covariant to explain the variation in shareholder wealth. This received wisdom seems rather 
complacent, as there is no clear explanation in these studies. One article from Moeller et al., 
(2004) cited nearly 1,700 times96, finds a significant negative correlation between bidder size 
and the average shareholder returns. Regardless of how the acquirers have financed the deal 
(whether by cash or stock), or the nature of ownership of the target firm (public or private), 
small firms generate 2.24% of abnormal returns around the announcement date in comparison 
to larger firms. Moeller et al., (2004) argue that such a relatively significant difference is 
founded on the imponderables of human nature and large firms are more susceptible to the 
tendencies of management empire-building or hubris based on Roll’s hypothesis (1986a)-this 
might well be the case in smaller firms but the ‘empire’ would remain considerably smaller of 
course. 
Boone & Mulherin (2008b) argue that the winner’s curse does not exist in takeover activities 
when the competition between bidders increases in the private selling process, or when there 
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is no certainty about the value of the target. However, although there is no evidence for the 
winner curse, Boone and Mulherin find that firm size as a proxy for bidder asymmetries is not 
only inversely related to the shareholders’ wealth, but could be also inversely related to the 
level of competition when there is more than one bidder bid for the same target. More precisely, 
the mere presence of large firms presents an opportunity to deter any other small bidders and, 
consequently, it is therefore better for the target not to conduct a full-scale auction when the 
size of the bidders is markedly different Bulow & Klemperer (2002b). In this light, it will be 
interesting to include bidder’s size as a proxy for bidder asymmetries among the covariates, 
whereby the firm size is inversely related to the bidder shareholders’ wealth as a result of 
hubristic behaviour, or inversely related to the level of competition whereby the larger bidder 
could deter the others. 
Panel A' investigates in detail the effect of bidder’s size across auction and negotiation 
subsamples. Panel A'-1 shows that auction deals dominate where large firms are present. Here 
large firms are classified according to the natural log of market value of equity (stock price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding in billions of dollars) at the end of the fiscal 
year immediately prior to the announcement date.97 This is not surprising because as Moeller 
et al., (2004) note, large firms are more frequently in competition for the same target in 
situations where there is another public bidder. Consequently, a larger bidder has a greater 
motivation to engage in an auction, and, at the same time, a larger bidder is more prone to 
hubris and, as a result, is more likely to overpay for target firm’s assets, and to possibly decrease 
the return for their shareholders.   
Any negative in the shareholders return arising from the auction process could be evidence for 
the winner’s curse. However, such a result is contrary to the Boone and Mulherin’s findings 
(2007, 2008) and Aktas et al., (2010a) who find that small firms tend to use auctions and large 
firms use negotiations. These differences in the firm sizes between this analysis and others 
could, however, be related to the nature of the auction selling process in this study compared 
with the results of Boone and Mulherin (2007a:2008b) and (Aktas et al., 2010a) where, in the 
later studies focus on the private selling process. In the private process, a target firm or its 
advisors design in advance a list of contact bidders and are, therefore, aware of the distribution 
                                                          
97  Such a result is confirmed by using the natural log of the market value of equity 42- days before the 
announcement date to measure the bidder size. However, this research measures the firm size by selecting the 
market value at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the year relative to the announcement date as auction 
procedure sales take longer than negotiation.   




of the acquirer’s size. Therefore, if the targets note that the size of the bidders is markedly 
different, they could prefer not to conduct auction because large bidder could reduce the level 
of competition, which could affect the target premium. It seems a way of controlling bidder 
asymmetries. From the other side, it could be that if a target firm is small and aim to obtain 
benefits from a merger deal, the small target firm would prefer to contact small bidders who 
have greater scope for growth (Jovanovic, 1982), and this might explain why target and bidder 
firms are small in auction sub-samples in the previous studies.  
While the auction bidders in this study are classified as large firms in the level of public selling 
process. The reason could be that controlling the bidder symmetric is limited in cases where 
the large bidder could deter a small firm and, because of this, in this study large firms are 
structured as auction firms. This could lead to a negative relation between the level of 
competition and firm size in the public selling process because lager bidders who control the 
process while in private selling process target mangers and their advisors who control the 
process.98 
As discussed in the context of the extant research Moeller et al., (2004) there is a difference 
between the wealth that is generated by small firms, relative to large firms, where small bidders 
significantly outperform the larger. When it comes to increasing the level of competition, it is 
interesting to investigate whether there is a difference between the returns created for 
shareholders by small and large bidders. Practically, auction bidders are structured as large 
firms which could lead to a suspicion of the winner’s curse event. 
For a deeper and more complete understanding of the size effect and, consequently, its 
relationship to the winner’s curse, or overconfident behaviours, bidder firms are divided into 
two groups: small and large firms, following (Moeller et al., 2004) classification. Panel A'-2 
and A'-3 show respectively that a bidder firm is larger (smaller) if its equity market value is 
greater (equal or less) than the market value of the 25th percentile of NYSE firms during the 
year of the announcement date. This research will classify bidder firms as small and large based 
on their size relative to all of the firms listed on the NYSE. It is expected that this broader 
contextual analysis should lead to results that are more precise and will allow for a more 
                                                          
98 Another difference between this study and the others is that the researchers that have largely focused on the 
private selling process, have chosen to investigate deals with values above $100 million.  Perhaps in order to 
consider the relative size effect and, this had, therefore, led them to classify small firms of large firm samples as 
a main characteristic of auction deals. 
 




comprehensive and telling analysis than would be provided by a classification based only on 
the firms presented in the sample. Auction deals are splits between 25.524% of deals conducted 
by small firms and 74.475% conducted by large firms and the mean market value in millions 
is $181.915 (USD) and $5063.041(USD) respectively. The percentage of small firms that use 
negotiation stands at 44.763 %, while around 55.236% involves large firms, with the mean 
market value in millions at $168.994(USD) and $3393.899(USD), respectively. 
The majority of firms using auctions in this study are large, which lead to suggest that auction 
firms are more likely to be prone to the hubris effect. This, in turn, might be expected to 
increase with a large bidder size based on Moeller Schlingemann, and Stulz’s argument and 
therefore the negative effect on auction shareholders’ returns would not be a surprise. Such 
explanations could be appropriate for bidder firms who engage in one-to-one negotiations 
where more than half of the negotiation sub-sample are classified as being large firms. However, 
bidder firms who choose to bid in auctions are significantly larger than bidders who prefer to 
negotiate one-to-one with sellers. This section obtains similar results by using the total assets 
of the bidding firms and the level of sales as alternative measures for firm size.99 In this model, 
auction bidders must have substantially larger total assets and sales levels in comparison to 
negotiation bidders.  
The size of bidder firms, therefore, seems to hint that firm size might be inversely associated 
with average abnormal returns and the level of competitions.  The larger the bidder size, the 
more negative returns for bidder shareholders there are because of large firms are more 
susceptible to the tendencies of management empire building or hubris. Moreover, the larger 
size of bidder firms motivates them to engage in competitive selling procedures, where the 
larger bidder could deter other competitors, and this could reduce the level of competition and 
scuttle the possible gain for target firms from conduction an auction. These predictions are 
based fundamentally on Bulow & Klemperer (2002b), Moeller et al., (2004) and Boone & 
Mulherin, (2008b). These studies led to the inclusion of bidder size as one of the main 
covariates necessary to control the confounding influences.  
There has been much empirical research into Jensen’s agency-based hypothesis (or the free 
cash flow hypothesis) and its relation to bidder behaviour and shareholder wealth. For example, 
Lang, Stulz, & Walkling (1991a) find that there is a negative and significant relationship 
                                                          
99 Total assets is (item6) in COMPUSTAT, and sales is (item 12), all measured at the end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the announcement date. 




between the ratio of cash flow to assets and bidder returns in tender offers as a result of 
managerial discretion over cash flow, and this relationship becomes more pronounced for low 
Tobin’s q. One can infer from these results that cash-rich acquirers might be more likely to pay 
more for poor acquisitions. The same outcome was observed by  Schlingemann (2004) who 
examine the relationship between the source of financing decision (the actual cash available 
for the acquisition opportunity) and bidder returns, after controlling the method of payment. 
He documents another evidence for the free cash flow hypothesis whereby an acquirer with 
rich cash flow could destroy shareholder wealth practically with low level of Tobin’s q. 
 
Harford (1999a) argues that cash-rich firms are more likely to be active acquirers in the merger 
market; however, they could destroy their shareholder wealth. He examines the relationship 
between cash-rich bidders and levels of competition, and suggests that cash-rich bidders could 
deter other bidders. To do this, Harford measures the bid premiums received by target firms of 
cash-rich and cash-poor bidder subsamples in order to investigate whether the presence of cash-
rich bidders consequently lowered levels of competition and, therefore, lowered the target 
premiums. The author found that there is no difference between the averages of the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR). Moeller et al., (2004) document that the free cash flow hypothesis fails 
to explain the variations in the average abnormal returns between small and large firms by 
using the ratio of cash to total assets as indicator for free cash flow.  
 
Cash reserves will give bidder firms more financial flexibility to engage in takeover activates. 
However, cash reserves could compound the agency problem particularly with empire-building 
mangers who promote their personal interest on the expense of shareholders. Therefore, 
Jensen’s agency-based hypothesis (1986) allows the inclusion of cash reserve variable in the 
model as a further proxy for bidder asymmetries. 
 
This section uses the ratio of the acquirer’s cash and short-term investments (item 1) in 
COMPUSTAT all divided by the book value of total assets (item 6) as a measure for cash 
reserves at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the date of announcement. There is a 
significant difference in the level of cash reserves between acquirers using auction and 
negotiation; acquirers who choose to engage in one-to-one processes are significantly a cash 
richer. This would point to that bidder firms are asymmetric in terms of cash reserves which 
could be a hint for an agency conflict whereby bidder firms in negotiation process maybe 




overbid for those transactions and could also lead to the bidder’s shareholders obtaining a 
negative return because mangers are more likely to make poor acquisitions instead of pay-outs 
the cash for the shareholders.  
    
However, Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) argue that access to the cash is more important in terms 
of deciding between different bidding strategies (merger versus tender offer) in the U.S. market 
than possession of cash. They investigate whether the acquirer’s financial impediments (i.e. 
cash and leverage levels) can affect the choices between tender and merger. They find that 
bidders are more likely to pay by cash (using the percentage of actual cash) in case they bid in 
tender offer while there is not significant effect for the acquirer’s cash reserves variable. 
Moreover, they use a dummy variable to differentiate between firms that have significantly 
high debt levels. The high debt dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the leverage ratio (total 
debt to total assets) exceeds 0.5, and 0 if it is below this figure in order to assess whether a high 
level of debt can affect the choice between merger and tender offers. The main results are that 
acquirers that have less cash and high level of leverage ratio are the more acquirers attempt to 
bid in the form of merger. 
 
It could be argued that bidder firms with high level of leverage might be expected to have less 
hubris, perhaps with high level of competition when they are more than one bidder bid for a 
target firm and this would prevent the possibility of winner’s curse. Particularly, bidders with 
high level of leverage are less likely to engage in acquisitions (Uysal, 2011). Moreover, such 
firms with high level of leverage generate a high level of abnormal return as documented by 
Maloney, McCormick, & Mitchell (1993). Discussion on this issue in empirical literature 
motivate this analysis to include the level of firm leverage among the covariates that could 
control the conflicts that would be likely to exist between shareholders and the board, 
particularly with a high level of cash. 
 
Leverage is rightly considered to be an important mechanism for corporate governance in 
particular but not exclusively to control the conflict between the board and the shareholders in 
terms of free cash flow expenses. High levels of debt serve to depress levels of future cash flow 
in the mid- to long-term, while the day-to-day servicing of debt inhibits, or at least limits, the 
scope for executive discretion. Any significant degree of leverage acts positively, and serves 
to provide incentives (both carrot and stick) for the board to improve a firm’s performance, 




since directors will often have to cede significant control to creditors, and often lose their jobs 
if their firms, weakened by highly leveraged positions, fall into financial distress (Robert & 
Sufi (2009); Gilson (1989, 1990)). It is, perhaps, a law of unintended consequence that, in this 
respect, high levels of extant debt in a firm will restrict hubristic or cavalier management, which 
will reduce the firm’s probability of making poor acquisitions. It might appear scant 
consolation to shareholders of highly leveraged companies, but, in this context, indebtedness 
at least possesses the virtue of restricting opportunities for the board to make a bad situation 
qualitatively worse, thereby positively impact on shareholder wealth. In order to examine the 
effects of different levels of leverage on the bidding offer price, this analysis will include 
leverage variables as explanatory variables for wealth variations.  
 
Relatively speaking, leverage is positively related to the level of tangible assets because bidders 
can have a great debt capacity by using their assets as collateral for loans (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). It should be noted that this study will factor the firms’ tangible assets as one of the 
control variables as useful identifiers of total or manageable debt capacity. 
 
The leverage ratio is measured as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
(item 9+ item 34) all scaled by the book value of the total assets (item 6) at the end of the fiscal 
year prior to the date of announcement. For negotiations, the level of leverage tends to be low 
in comparison to auction processes. The same result is obtained in case of using the debt 
dummy variable as suggested by Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) to differentiate between the 
bidders who have high levels of debt.  Auction firms have significantly higher levels of debt 
than those going through negotiations at 13.286% versus 10.181%, respectively at 10% level. 
Negotiation bidder firms have high level of cash and low levels of leverage, which could 
suspect that mangers are more likely to make poor acquisitions. Therefore, the possibility of 
the winner’s curse could be high in negotiation subsample. 
 
However, auction firms have more tangible assets. This means that acquirers could have a high 
securitised borrowing capacity, and a high ability to pay back their debt, although they have 
high levels of leverage. High level of leverage could help bidder firms who engage in auction 
to generate a gain for the bidder’s shareholders as shown by Maloney et al., (1993) and this 
could be an evidence of that the winner’s curse does not exist in auction as in Boone & 
Mulherin (2008b).  In general, the above results are contrary to Offenberg & Pirinsky 




(2015)who document that acquirers that have less cash and high levels of leverage ratio are the 
more acquirers attempt to bid in the form of merger 
 
Again, it will be interesting to control for confounding influences by including the acquirer’s 
cash, the level of leverage and tangible assets among covariates as explanatory variables for 
the variation in the acquirer’s abnormal return, and for explanations for the selection between 
the selling processes (auction versus negotiation). 
 
The inclusion of Tobin’s q among the covariates will control for the possibilities of obtaining 
a negative abnormal return as a proxy for poor acquisitions. More specifically, some 
researchers who examine the free cash flow hypothesis find that overbidding behaviour might 
be greater if the bidders have low growth opportunities as measured by low Tobin’s q and high 
level of free cash (Lang et al., 1991a) and ( Schlingemann, 2004). 
 
However, a debate has been raised as to whether Tobin’s q can accurately capture how well 
bidders manage their firms and, consequently, whether poorly managed firms could have a 
negative abnormal return. For example, Lang, Stulz & Walkling (1989b) and Servaes (1991) 
test Jovanovic & Rousseau’s Q theory (2002), which has been considered to be the 
paradigmatic neoclassical explanation for merger activities. These studies have found that the 
probability of a successful synergy between target and bidder firms (where the latter gains 
financially) increases with acquirers with high Tobin’s q and decreases with targets that have 
low Tobin’s q. However, some empirical work has documented that the q dispersion fails as an 
explanation for variations in bidder abnormal returns particularly across small and large firm. 
For instance, in (Moeller et al., 2004), where the bidders with a high Tobin’s q have a negative 
abnormal return or, as in  Dong, Hisrshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), where market-to-
book value is used as closer measurement to Tobin’s q.  In light of the conflicting evidence as 
to whether the q dispersion (Q hypothesis) can explain the variations in bidder shareholders’ 
wealth, it was felt legitimate to include Tobin’s q as a further proxy for the bidder asymmetries.  
 
Here Tobin’s q is measured as the market value of assets over the book value of assets (item 
6—item 60+item25-item 199)/item 6). It is significant that auction bidders have a low Tobin’s 
q, at 10% level, which is consistent with statistical information of market-to book value ratio 
as close surrogates to Tobin’s q. The low level of Tobin’s q is inversely correlated with acquirer 




shareholder wealth, based on the Q hypothesis and documented by, Lang, Stulz & Walkling 
(1989b) and Servaes (1991). This could be used as evidence for that auction firms could be 
more likely to conduct poor acquisitions.  Such results run contrary to Lang et al., (1991a) and 
Schlingemann (2004) who show that cash-rich acquirers are more to have lower Tobin’s q 
levels. Negotiation bidders are rich in terms of cash reserve levels, but they have a high Tobin’s 
q ratio.  
    
The overvaluation hypothesis could explain the negative relationship between bidders with 
high market valuations and their returns. Researchers such as Shleifer & Vishny (2003a), Dong, 
Hisrshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh (2006), and Ang & Cheng (2006) suggest that market-to-
book (MV) ratio, as reliable measured for overvaluation hypothesis, can be used to explain, or 
at least to better comprehend, the takeover waves and financial behaviours for each payment 
method. These studies have concluded that market misevaluations can drive merger activities, 
whereas an acquirer with an overvalued issue has an incentive to sell their equity to less 
overpriced companies. The preference for paying with stock therefore reflects that the assets 
of the acquirers are overvalued. Harford (2005b) considers whether the overvaluation 
hypothesis can really drive acquisition activities in this way and he concludes that the main 
drive for M/B ratios and the activities of mergers is, rather, market liquidity. Dong et al., (2006) 
find that, typically, the acquirer announcement returns are worse when firms have a higher M/B 
ratio. The analysis of these results might highlight the proposition that acquirers have 
communicated with the market that the variables given were not warranted by the fundamental 
and underlying financials of the target firm; simply put, that the firm was de facto incorrectly 
overvalued (Moeller et al., 2004). An alternative, more cynical analysis would posit that this 
might be because the M&A activity was being conducted on thin ice, acquiring less valuable 
(or valued) assets with highly overvalued equity. Such acquisitions are a way of buying growth 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore, the average abnormal return reacts negatively to acquirer equities 
that have high valuations based on the M/B ratio.   
It could be argued that, the high M/B ratio would affect the acquisition decision, but the high 
MV ratio might exacerbate hubris and bidder could overbid for the target. This ratio therefore 
is also investigated and used among the covariates as a proxy for firm valuation. The M/B ratio 
is firm book value of equity scaled by market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the date of announcement. Auction firms have a lower M/B ratio, from 
which we can reasonably extrapolate the finding that auction firms could generate a higher 




returns than the negotiation bidders. The negotiation acquirer tends to have a larger M/B ratio 
in comparison to auctions, which indicates that the former may be overvalued, and have an 
incentive to market more optimistic acquisitions, or might at least be more open to such 
activities.  
Finally, this section provides some information related to the bidder firm’s performance level 
which is considered a partial control for hubris. Hayward & Hambrick (1997)show that 
hubristic behaviour can be exacerbated if bidder firms have a strong performance by using 
acquirer’s return on assets (ROA), whereby the greater a bidder firm’s performance in the prior 
year, before the date of announcement, the more overconfident they will be. The authors find 
that there is a positive relation between the size of bid premium the target shareholders receive 
and performance of bidder firms. Moeller et al., (2004) use the ratio operating cash flows (OCF) 
scaled by total assets as an indicator of a bidder firm’s performance to show whether bidder 
firms can create value by returning free cash flow to shareholders. They find that there is no 
evidence to show that a bidder firm’s level of performance affects shareholder wealth. In light 
of the conflicting evidence, ROA will be used as a proxy for the bidder firm’s performance; 
ROA is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization over total 
assets at the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the announcement date. Auction 
bidders show significantly better performance than negotiation bidders, which might be 
expected that managers of auction firms might have greater hubris.100  
 
This section further considers information that relates to deal characteristics, such as 
transaction values, completion rates, and days to be completed in the case of a transaction 
successfully completed, method of payments, target status, and the percentage of the shares 
acquired by negotiation and auction acquirers before and after completing the transactions.  
Panel B shows that the dollar value of auction deals, for example, is much larger than those 
for negotiation. This is not surprising because firms using auctions tend to be larger. The dollar 
value of a deal is defined in SDC (filed VAL) as the total value of consideration (US$, millions) 
paid by bidders, excluding fees and expenses. The total value paid by small and large auction 
                                                          
100 Similar results are also reported in the case of using the ratio of operating cash flows (OCF) scaled by total 
assets as suggested by Moeller et al., (2004). The operating cash flow is defined as sales less the cost of goods 
sold less sales and general administration, and working capital change.  




acquirers is significantly larger than the amount paid by negotiation bidders either classified as 
small or large firms.  
The impact of the relative size of the target to bidder is considered to be an important variable 
that could help to explain the variation in the acquirer’s shareholder returns, or the selection of 
the selling mechanism, particular if bidders acquire a relatively large target. The impact of 
relative size could be positive or negative. The negative impact on acquirer returns could be as 
a result of that with larger relative size, target firms have greater bargaining power in terms of 
negotiating the offer price and this will lead an acquirer paying more and consequently will be 
worse where there is a competitor Dutta & Saadi (2011). From the other side, although the 
positive impact on bidder returns as a result of merger activities is rare,(DePamphilis, 2012a, 
p. 40-41) states that the positive impact could be related to the synergy gain that is brought 
about from the combination of the value a target and acquirer.  
 
For example, a larger relative size between the equity capitalisations of a public target firm to 
bidder, will lead to increase bidder returns as observed by Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins(1983), 
Jarrell & Poulsen (1989) and Moeller et al., (2004). Boone & Mulherin (2008b) document that 
relative size has a positive effect on bidder returns, although there is no significant difference 
in the relative size between auction and negotiation bidders. 
 
Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller (2002) show that the relationship between relative size and bidder 
returns is negative when a target firm is a publicly traded, and these relationships could be 
driven by using stocks as the method of payment. Further, this study reports that relative size 
has a positive effect on the bidder’s shareholders’ wealth when a target firm is private and 
subsidiary.   
 
The relative size (transaction value (VAL)/market value of equity) in this study indicates that 
auction deals have a larger relative size compared to negotiation transactions, which is not 
surprising because firms using auctions is larger. However, the difference between the two 
subsamples is insignificant. 
 
As suggested in many studies Boone & Mulherin (2007a:2008b) and Fidrmuc et al., (2012), in 
order to avoid obtaining biased results, this analysis incorporates both successful and 
unsuccessful transactions. The rates of completion for transactions using auctions and 




negotiations stand at 51.748% and 95.612%, respectively. This statistical information shows 
that the possibility of completing the negotiation process is significantly higher than for auction 
deals. This is not surprising, because with auction there is one of the competitors will win the 
deal.  Further to this, the average time a transaction needs in order to be completed in term of 
successful deals is 143 days, which is significantly longer than those using negotiation (69 
days), and this effect could also be related to the size effect of auction firms.  This is hardly 
surprising given that auction bidders will, typically, be a large firm with, characteristically, 
corresponding of inertia and administrative unwieldiness.  
 
This, concomitantly, means that larger firms need more time to process deals, notwithstanding 
that larger firms take time to negotiate regulatory issues Moeller et al., (2004). Auction has 
been regarded as a long selling process, and usually made longer when bidders are larger. 
However, it could equally be the case that large firms prefer auction as suggested by Boone & 
Mulherin (2008b), because they can deter smaller competitors, as auction bidders gain from 
limiting competition. Almost half of auction deals ultimately fail, whereas only 4.87% 
negotiation deals fail. It could be concluded that auction is not a popular mechanism in 
corporate finance simply in order to avoid the high possibility of a failed transaction. Bidders 
might observe the likelihood of these types of process to fail and, so, natural lose confidence 
in this kind of purchasing format. 
 
Most of the previous empirical works have understand auction as a long process that requires 
time and endeavour to organise, and carries related increases in process-related costs. As result 
of this research such as Aktas et al., (2010a) and Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) measure 
unobservable competition before the announcement date particularly why a target firms accepts 
such costs when it is under pressure to sell, by using a dummy variable that is equal to the value 
of 1 if the target initiated the deal, and 0 otherwise.101 Therefore, if a target firm initiates a bid 
it signals their willingness to sell, which weakens their bargaining powers during the 
                                                          
101 This chapter will not discuss target motivations to initiate their own assets for sales. For example, target firms 
could initiate a deal if they suffer financial and competitive conditions whereby a target firms seeks a merger with 
a rich acquirer in order to avoid expected bankruptcy costs (Masulis & Simsir, 2015), or  because of managerial 
motivations (Fidrmuc & Xia, 2017). The main aim of this section is to investigate whether target-initiated deals 









negotiation process which would then, logically, affect the level of premium that the target will 
receive. This is could be true, and research, particularly Masulis & Simsir (2015), document 
that there is a significant difference in bid premiums between those deal-initiated by target 
firms compared to those deal-initiated by bidders. Anilowski Cain, Macias, & Sanchez (2009) 
use the variable target-initiated deal as a proxy for higher adverse selection risk and found that 
if a target initiated a deal, this would drive bidders to pay a lower premium. Therefore, the 
authors argue that acquirers pay lower premiums for target-initiated deals in compensation for 
adverse selection. However, the effect of adverse selection is mitigated on a premium if target 
mangers have high incentives such as ownership stakes and equity grants where there is a 
positive and significant correlation between bid premium and target-initiated deal (Fidrmuc & 
Xia, 2017). 
 
To investigate whether target-initiated deals could prevent a winner’s curse event, a dummy 
variable of target-initiated deals will be used as a proxy for a target adverse selection. The 
history events (failed HEVENT) descriptions and deal synopsis (field SYNOP) in SDC 
provides such information whereby the dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a target was 
searching for buyers, and 0 otherwise. Of the whole sample, only 1.276 % acquisitions are 
initiated by targets. In general, the number of deals that are initiated by target firms in auction 
and negotiation is larger in Aktas et al., (2010a) and Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015). By 
comparison, 11.538% of auction targets clearly signal their willingness to sell, which might 
well, indeed be likely to, weaken their bargaining power during negotiations while negotiation 
deals are target-initiated at on only 1.070%. This information could also help auction bidders 
to avoid the winner’s curse, because the bargaining power of a bidder firm the target initiated 
a deal is higher. 
Among the explanatory variables, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a target frim is 
actually bankrupt is also included, since the bidder’s outcome expects to be different when a 
target firm is in bankruptcy.  A bankruptcy transaction diminishes target firms’ bargaining 
power and this induces bidders to pay a price for a target’ assets at a “fire-sale” discount. A 
fire-sale exists in corporate finance when target firm’s assets are sold at a price below (usually 
far below) the value in the best use (the fundamental value of target firm’s assets) (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2011b). Empirically evidence, Hotchkiss & Mooradian (1998) show that in the same 
industry, bidders on average purchase bankruptcy targets at a 45% discount in comparison to 
prices paid for target firms outside bankruptcy. Moreover, Pulvino (1999) find that fire-sales 




in the bankruptcy of aircraft industries, bidders purchased used planes from distressed airlines 
at a 10 % to 20 % discount in comparison to prices paid for healthy airlines. It is important to 
mention that, most of the used airlines transactions according to , Pulvino (1999) are processed 
through private negotiation, although there are some developed works which used auction in 
such transactions particularly in the mid-1990s. However, auction is not a successful process 
in used aircraft market.102   
 
Applying auction theory in the context of bankruptcy is considered one of the most fruitful 
areas in corporate finance, because the theory  resolves some issues related to the efficiency 
and welfare of the reallocation of target firm’s assets to those who value them most(Dasgupta 
& Hansen, 2007). However, there is much debate in the theoretical and empirical literature as 
to whether auction in bankruptcy induces a fire-sale discount. Theoretically, Hansen & Thomas 
(1998) argue that there is an inverse relation between target firm’s assets value and the auction 
price where if bidders are uncertain about the value of bankruptcy target firm’s assets, the low 
auction price will be paid. Shleifer & Vishny (1992c) argue that fire-sales exist in auction 
bankruptcy particularly when industries suffer from financial distress which restrict bidders 
and even other competitors with high industry valuation to bid in auction because they are 
financially constrained, which in turn promotes offer discounts.  On the empirical side, Eckbo 
& Thorburn (2008b) show that fire-sales exist in the Swedish auction bankruptcy, particularly 
if the bidders bid in auction that leads to piecemeal liquidation (bids for individual assets) but 
not in case of bidding for going-concern sale (bid for the entire firm).  
 
Equally and further to this, bankruptcy auction attracts bidders from both inside and outside a 
target firm’s industry and the latter while perhaps sniffing a bargain will be typically less 
informed about the true value of target firm’s assets. A natural and obvious concomitant of this 
is that such bidders are far more likely to suffer from the winner’s curse event that would less 
typically affect better- if not necessarily well-informed industry insiders (Povel & Singh, 2007). 
However, Hotchkiss & Mooradian (1998)  argue that a “lemon problem” also faces insider 
bidders because only firms with poor future prospect put their assets in auction, therefore if  
                                                          
102 There was no organised market to sell and buy used airplanes until the mid of 1990, because of that sellers 
could not find buyers with a high-value for their assets. They only way to discuss a deal was through the 
negotiation process. However, the author does not provide any information related to why the auction process 
failed in such market 




firms with better future prospects choose to sell their assets in a market, the poor firms 
prospects will be pooled with the good ones.  
 
Moreover, Eckbo & Thorburn (2009a) tested whether overbidding in Swedish auction 
bankruptcy exists where a target firm’s bank provides the necessary funding for the bidding in 
order to improve bidder liquidity. They measured the final auction premium and found that 
such coalition-bidding strategy between a bidder and target firm’s bank drives a bidder to bid 
a price that exceeds the bidder’s private value (overbidding). The overbidding of the coalition 
winners could exclude efficient rival bidders who will cease bidding once the true or even 
sensible price has been exceeded. 
In relation to the reaction of bidders stock price to bankruptcy, Hotchkiss & Mooradian (1998)  
show that bidders significantly have a positive return around the date of announcement. 
However, the non-bankruptcy bidders do not create gain for shareholders. Bidders with empire-
building boards seem to prefer to bid for a non-bankruptcy firm through a complex negotiation 
process regardless of shareholder wealth. 
According to this analysis, target firms in bankruptcy are around 11.888% of auction subsample, 
while only being 1% of negotiation deals. It seems that bidding for bankruptcy target is more 
likely to be within a high competition environment. In the light of Hotchkiss & Mooradian 
(1998) auction bidder could create a value for shareholders, in comparison to negotiation 
bidders. Equally, bidding for a bankrupt target could protect auction bidders from the event of 
the winner’s curse in case if the target firms accept an auction price at a fire-sale discount as 
suggested by (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992c) and  (Hansen & Thomas, 1998).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
One of the main control variables in this study is using all-stock as method of payment. 
Although the highest price bid affects the ultimate agreement, the method of payment has an 
essential impact on sellers (and their advisor’s) decisions to accept bidders’ offers (Offenberg 
& Pirinsky, 2015). However, bidder firms significantly have negative announcement returns in 
instances where stock has been used as a method of payment ((Travlos ,1987;Heron & Lie 
,2002 ; Boone & Mulherin ,2008b). The negative impact on bidder returns exists because 
bidders by using stock convey a negative signal that their shares are overvalued which is 
consistent with signalling hypothesis Travlos (1987), while the reaction of bidder firm’s stock 
price is higher with all-cash offers Betton et al., (2009b). The negative impacts of using stocks 




become even worse when a bidder firm takeover attempt fails after between one and three years 
following the announcement date Savor & Lu (2009). 
 
Moreover, Dasgupta & Hansen (2007) argue that using the method of all-stock rather than all-
cash offers generates a lower payoff for bidder firms using auctions. Under the information- 
asymmetry hypothesis, Hansen (1987b) argues that using stock as method of payment signals 
that bidders are uncertain about a target value, whereby a bidder firm's overpayment cost is 
reduced because bidders share it with a target firm. The choice of payment method therefore 
reveals more information about bidders: overvalued acquirers will use stock, while high quality 
acquirers will use cash. In terms of protecting bidder firm’s confidential information, bidder 
firms in terms of using stocks usually prefer to use negotiation than auction (Boone & Mulherin, 
2008b). Relatively speaking, deals that use all-stock as the method of payment require longer 
times to complete compared to the all-cash deals, because of the former offers need more 
valuation analysis (Offenberg & Pirinsky, 2015). Therefore, if there is more than one bidder 
bid for a target firm, it is perhaps the case that bidders prefer to use all-cash offers simply in 
order to accelerate the takeover process.  
The percentage of cash that is paid to target firms when sold by auction is significantly higher 
than that paid by negotiation bidders (84.725% versus 77.643% respectively). However, there 
is no significant difference between the percentage of stock paid to target firms, whether it is 
sold by auction or negotiation. Auction and negotiation acquirers are more likely to use an all-
cash offer (100% cash) and less likely to pay with all stock (100% of stock). However, auction 
is significantly more likely to use all-cash in comparison to the negotiation subgroup.  It could 
be related to the nature of auction activities that need cash to accelerate the completion of the 
transaction, particularly in situations where there is another public bidder analysis (Offenberg 
& Pirinsky, 2015). However, bidders as suggested by Hansen (1987b) bear, by using cash offer, 
the entire cost of overpayment. Moreover, although the assets of negotiation firms are 
overvalued, negotiation bidders use cash more than stock for transactions.  
The statistical information shows that the number of public targets acquired by auction and 
negotiation stands at around 76.223% and 18.043%, respectively. It has been shown that only 
8.391% and 15.384% of auction deals are related to private and subsidiary targets. In terms of 
negotiation, 53.899% and 28.057% (respectively) of these targets are classified as private or 
subsidiaries. 




It is interesting to note that most of the target firms in the sample that are acquired by auction 
bidder firms are public, and most private targets are acquired by negotiation bidders. This 
information cannot be ignored. The target firm’s public status will be included as one of the 
control variables.  Fuller et al., (2002) document that bidder returns are higher in cases where 
they acquire private firms or subsidiaries in comparison to acquiring public firms. As a result, 
acquirers using negotiation will create higher abnormal returns when compared to auction.  
Therefore, if acquiring private firms is more profitable than acquiring public firms, this could 
go some way to explaining the auction effect. 
There are further elements used as control variables in the empirical literature that could have 
a significant impact on the return of the acquirers, or the selection of the selling mechanism. 
These are related either to deal type (i.e. such as whether a transaction is a tender offer, hostile, 
and whether the acquirer already has a toehold in a target firm) or could be related to the 
takeover regulation (i.e. whether a target firm is located in a state that has stringent anti-
takeover regulations).  
 
First, this section will include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a transaction takes 
the form of a tender offer, as indicated by SDC (filed TEND). (Offenberg & Pirinsky, 2015) 
argue that an acquirer firm will typically prefer to use a tender offer in the U.S. market because 
it is substantially quicker than mergers.103 Particularly, if there is more than one bidder bid for 
the same target firm and if there are fewer external impediments on the implementation of a 
tender offer.104 However, there is always a trade-off between the cost of using a tender offer 
and the fast execution of the bid.  If bidder firms ask target shareholders directly to tender their 
shares that could signal that a target firm has a high value for them and therefore target 
shareholders could raise its reservation price. Empirically, Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) 
document that bidders pay more premium for target firm’s assets in tender offer than in merger.  
However, Moeller et al., (2004) find that tender offers create value for bidder’s shareholders. 
In relation to the reaction of bidder firm’s stock price, Eckbo (2009) states that most of the 
empirical literature in corporate finance shows a positive albeit insignificant gain for the bidder 
firm’s shareholders when an acquirer firm bids in the form of a tender offer. 
 
                                                          
103 In merger; an acquirer firm and target firm’s board agree on a price, and target firm’s shareholders then vote 
on whether or not to approve the proposal (Offenberg & Pirinsky, 2015). 
104 The external impediments such as existence or prospect of anti-trust reviews from the regulators. 




The percentage of auction and negotiation transactions that are bid in the form of a tender offer 
is 21.328% and 2.221%, respectively. In the light of Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015),  this means 
that tender offer bidders are more likely to bid more in order to acquire quickly target firms 
essentially in an environment with high levels of competition. Because auction, as already 
noted, takes significantly longer to be completed. This section to predict that auction bidders 
will have a return that is likely to be less than negotiation which means that the event of 
winner’s does not exist in auction. From the other side, bidder firms could generate significant 
and positive returns as in Moeller et al., (2004). 
 
A dummy variable indicating hostility takes the value of 1 if the SDC flags the transaction as 
hostile is also included among explanatory variables. Schwert (2000b) shows that there is a 
negative relationship between a bid in the form of hostility and acquirer shareholders’ wealth.  
Betton et al., (2009b) report that hostile deals raised takeover premiums, but such deals did not 
have any impact on bidder returns. It is not surprising to note that negotiation transactions are 
less likely to be hostile. In the light of Schwert (2000b), the statistical information predicts that 
the winner’s curse could exist in auction. 
 
Furthermore, this section will also include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a target 
frim is in the one of the following U.S. states that have robust anti-takeover regulations: Idaho, 
Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, as 
suggested by Boone & Mulherin (2008b). The main reason of using this variable is that in such 
states target firms have a high level of negotiating power, and therefore such target firms are 
less likely to conduct auctions. This is consistent with the statistical information of this section 
which provides that auction mechanisms are less likely to be organised in states with robust 
takeover laws in comparison to negotiations. However, the statistical difference between 
auction and negotiation is not statistically significant.  
 
Finally, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if acquirers owned percentage of shares in 
target firms six months before initiating a takeover bid (a toehold) also included among other 
covariates. Bulow et al., (1999) argue that auction is not an attractive strategy for bidders who 
already have a toehold in target firms because toeholds lead bidders to bid aggressively and 
increase the probability of the winner’s curse, especially if there are a number of bidders with 
different stakes in the target company. On the empirical side, Betton et al., (2009b) show that 




if a bidder firm with a toehold bid for a target firm, they outperformance bidder firms without 
toeholds particularly when no bidders win (if target firms reject all the offers). Toeholds 
motivate significantly acquirer firms to choose negotiation in this study over auction. The 
average of toeholds in a negotiation subsample is about 20.735%, which is close to the 
percentage of toehold that is reported by Betton et al., (2009b) in negotiation deals. The result 
indicts that negotiation bidders are rational, they bid with a size of toehold that exceeds the 
threshold (only if bidders own on average 20% of target’ assets), in order to avoid the cost of 
rejection. 
 
The low percentage of bidders with toeholds bid in auction could be explained in the light of 
Bulow et al., (1999) the decision to bid in negotiation with respect to toehold is consistent with 
rational bidder behaviour. This section predicts that negotiation bidders will outperform 
auction bidders with respect to toehold as shown by Betton et al., (2009b). 
 
Panel C details the use of advisors and their characteristics to reflect the impact of investment 
banks with a high reputation upon bidder returns. There has been much debate in the field as 
to whether hiring top-tier investment banks can give a rise to winner’s curse (overpay) event. 
Yet, there is no clear evidence to show whether employing top-tier investment banks could 
affect bidder or target wealth, as most of the previous evidence is related to particular deal 
characteristics. For example, Rau (2000) reports that bidders have positive returns in tender 
offer with a high reputation investment bank, while in merger, employing such banks lower 
bidder returns. Moreover, the author documents that in tender offer, there is a positive 
relationship between bidders that are supported by more prestigious bank advisors and target 
bid premium. In these scenarios the top-tier investment banks seem are more concern about 
deal completion than the stock price of client firms, as a result of this they advise their bidder 
to pay more for their target in order to motivate their shareholders to accept the offer. This 
result could suggest that winner’s curse exists with prestigious banks in case of bidding in the 
form of tender offer. However, there is no difference between bid premiums either with hiring 
top-tier investment banks or not in merger.  
 
Kale et al., (2003) confirm that there is a positive relation between bidder returns and 
investment banks with a high reputation in tender offer deals. Moreover, they study the impact 
of target firms use top-tier investment banks to examine accordingly whether the target’s top-




tier advisors could affect the bargaining power between bidder and target firms and help a 
target firm to extract the highest offer from bidders. They find that the wealth level of target 
firms (bidder firms) decreases (increases) as the reputation of the advisers that are hired by 
bidder firms increase, relatively to the advisers that are hired by target firms. Golubov, 
Petmezas, & Travlos (2012) document that using prestigious banks have a positive impact upon 
bidder returns in case of acquiring public firms, but this result is inconsistent in case of 
acquiring private and subsidiary firms. 
In conclusion, hiring top-tier investment banks could mitigate the event of winner’s curse in 
particular deals such as tender offer or if the target is publicly traded.  The impact of using 
investment banks with a high reputation cannot be ignored and, therefore, to accommodate this, 
Boone & Mulherin (2008b) use such variables to investigate whether the winner’s curse exists 
in takeovers when target and bidder firms are backed by blue chip banks. They have found, 
however, that a firm’s use of prestigious banks does not promote overbidding.  
Such debate on the relationship between the use of prestigious banks and the winner’s curse 
has motivated this study to include covariates that help to investigate the impact of hiring top-
tier banks bid premiums. This section follows Boone & Mulherin (2008b) method of modelling 
the usage of investment banks. Top-tier banks are classified here using a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the bank is Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Goldman 
Sachs & co, Jp Morgan, Citi. 
In the whole sample, bidders use on average 31.578% investment banks, around 61.188% of 
auction firms choose to hire advisors, in comparison to only 30.988% of negotiation acquirers. 
However, on average 23.426% investment banks with a high reputation are employed by 
auction bidder firms, while only 7.200% investment banks with a high reputation are employed 
by negotiation bidder firms. The statistical information shows that there is a statistical 
difference in case of employing investment banks with a high reputation between auction and 
negotiation. This result suggests using top-tier investment bank in auction deals could prevent 
bidder from overbidding for the target assets as in Boone &Mulherin (2008b).  
 Moreover, the majority of target auction firms hire advisors with a high reputation, while only 
less than half of target negotiation firms use advisors with a high reputation. There is a 
difference in case of using top-tier advisors between auction and negotiation. This result 
predicts that scheme target firms that hire advisors with greater reputations increase their 
bargaining power, which increase their bid premiums— as suggested by (Kale et al., 2003). 




In summary, there are statistical differences in bidder and deal characteristics between auction 
and negotiation firms. Auction bidders are larger, have less reserve cash, Tobin’s q, and MV 
ratio, and they are highly profitable firms. Auction firms have high levels of leverage and 
intangible assets. Moreover, the rate of bidders who successfully completes takeover deals is 
low in comparison to negotiation deals, auction deals in general need longer time to be 
completed the deals. Target firms in auction are more likely to initiate a deal than in the 
negotiation process, pay in cash, acquirer publicly traded firms, bid in a tender offer form and 
more likely to use a hostile technique, bid for a target in a bankruptcy. Auction bidders are less 
likely to bid with a toehold, bidder and target firms are more likely to use investment banks 
practically with a high reputation more than negotiation bidders. 
 
3.4 Methodology  
 
In order to measure the casual effect of choosing to bid in auction upon the acquirer abnormal 
return, however it is essential to control for the self-selection problem between the choice of 
the selling process and bidder returns. This potential self- selection issue arises because the 
choice of selling mechanisms may be correlated to factors that can also affect the abnormal 
returns.  Therefore, a simple comparison or regression on the mean difference in bidder returns 
(between the two sub-groups of auction and negotiation deals) would be biased.  To address 
the self-selection problem, propensity score matching will be applied in this chapter to estimate 
the treatment effect.  
This section will provide a review of the theoretical background of the matching method, which 
is first introduced by Rubin (1974, 1977).105  Let us introduce some notations first, following 
the guideline of of (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) and (Wooldridge, 2010). First, let us introduce 
some notations. We denote 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑖 as the potential cumulative abnormal returns for bidder firm 
𝑖 that would be attained via the selling mechanism of 𝑗, where 𝑗 = 𝐴, 𝑁, representing auction 
and negotiation, respectively.  And 𝐷𝑖 is a treatment dummy which takes the value of 1, if the 
bidder firm 𝑖 is bid in auction, and 0 if it bids in negotiation.  Therefore, CAR1i represents the 
level of potential returns if the firm 𝑖 chooses to bid in auction, and CAR0i  represents the level 
                                                          
105 105 The Rubin Causal Model that is developed based on the work of Rubin (1974,1977) and Holland (1986) and is 
considered fundamental to modern research on casual effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, p14) 




of potential returns if it chooses to bid in negotiation. The main interest of this chapter is to 
estimate the average treatment effect of bidding in auction. 
The exact treatment effect for a target firm 𝑖 is 1 0CARi i iCAR   , and the average treatment 
effect, denoted by 
ATE , and can be written as: 
 
01(C )R ) (AATE i iE CAE R   
 
Where, 𝐸 is the expectation operator.  The difficulty in estimating 
ATE  is that it is not possible 
to observe the both outcomes of CAR1i  and CAR0i   for a single bidder firm 𝑖; there is only one 
state of the world.  If we, in a naïve way, estimate the difference in mean outcomes between 
the auction and negotiation sub-groups, what we actually get is; 
 1 0| 1) ((CAR CAR | 0)i ii iDE E D    
By manipulation, we obtain, 
 
1 0 0 0| 1) (CAR | 1(CAR (CAR) | 1) (CAR | 0)i ii ii ii iD E D D EE DE       , 
where the first part: 1 0| 1) ((CAR CAR | 1)i ii iDE E D     is the causal effect of treatment on 
the group that are treated, denoted by 
ATT .  The second part of this expression is what is known 
as the “selection bias’’ (SB), which represents the difference in the cumulative abnormal 
returns for a potential negotiation that exists between the groups.  The SB term implies that a 
simple estimation of the mean difference across the two groups with different treatment is not 
equal to either the ATE  or the ATT , and therefore is biased.  Ignoring the self-selection 
problem would consequently lead to bias (and inconsistent) estimates.  
There are a broad range of strategies used to correct the selection bias problem, for example, 
the Heckman two-stage estimator and instrumental variables (IV) estimation.  More recently, 
propensity score matching has been widely used to estimate the casual treatment effect, in 
different forms: propensity score sub-classification, matching estimators, propensity score 
weighting, kernel-based matching estimators and finally dosage analysis of multiple treatment 
(Guo & Fraser, 2015) Guo and Fraser (2015, p.342).  




The seminal work of (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983a) proposes the method of propensity score 
matching (PSM).  The basic idea of their framework is that, the choice of treatment is 
determined by a certain set of observable covariates, 𝑿𝑖 , and in consequence, when we 
condition on the set of covariates, 𝑿𝑖 , we can regard the treatment are being essentially 
randomly-assigned.  This assumption is termed the “conditional independence assumption 
(CIA)”, and is represented mathematically as, 
 
01CAR , ii CAR  ╨   ( | )i iD X
 
To see how the conditional independence assumption removes the treatment effect, consider 
the selection bias this section derived before, except now conditioned on 𝑿𝑖, 
 
0 0(CAR | 1, ) (CAR | 0, )i i i i i iSB E D X E D X                                   
0 0(CAR | ) (CAR | )i i i iE X E X   
                                                          0 , 
where this analysis has used the conditional independence assumption (CIA) to go from the 
first line to the second, since the potential outcome in the presence of covariates is independent 
of the treatment.   
In practice, this would require that we stratify the sample according to the covariates, and match 
individual firms across the two treatment groups according to this.  This results in an estimator 
of the form, 
CAR CA( | 1, ) ( | 0, ),R
ATE i i ii ii
PSM E D X E D X      
where 
ATE
PSM is the estimated causal treatment effect using the approach of matching.  
However, the difficulty in implementing an equivalent estimator in practice is due to the 
covariate matching. As the dimensionality of the covariate vector increases, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to find reasonable matches across the two groups, meaning that we are 
unable to estimate a treatment effect for some unpaired individuals in our sample.  This lack of 
overlap in covariates between the two treatment groups motivates the use of propensity scores 
as an alternative matching criterion.  This analysis supposes that, for each firm in our sample, 




there is a probability of choosing the treatment of 𝐷𝑖 = 1, and this probability ( 1| )iiP D X  is 
a function of the aforementioned covariates in Table 14. The conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) states that the potential outcomes of a treatment are independent of the 
treatment decision given an appropriate vector of covariates.  The propensity score theorem 
extends this assumption, such that the potential outcomes of a treatment are independent of the 
treatment decision conditional on the probability of ( 1| )iiP D X which is known as the 
propensity score (Wooldridge, 2010). This can be written mathematically as, 
 
01CAR ,CARi i  ╨   ( | ( 1| ))i i iD P D X
 
 
which is essentially equivalent to saying that conditional on the propensity score, the treatment 
is randomly assigned.  Compared with multivariate matching, the matching of propensity score 
is univariate.  This property is favourable because it becomes much easier to find matches in 
both treatment groups along a univariate score.  The collapse from a multivariate matching 
space to a univariate one therefore makes propensity score matching an attractive alternative 
to covariate matching.106 
An important requirement of using propensity score matching to estimate causal effects is the 
“overlap’’ assumption.  The overlap assumption states that there must exist individuals in both 
treatment groups that have similar propensity scores (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983a). For 
example, if there is a firm from the treatment group (auctions), but no one from the control 
group (negotiation) that has similar propensity score, the estimated treatment effect will not 
                                                          
106 In relation to estimate the treatment effect of implementing the propensity score matching, there is a concern 
can be made against any piece of work that uses matching (or other method such as multivariate regression). The 
main concern is that the estimated treatment effect will be biased in the case of using matching method because 
of there are unobservable variables that determine selling mechanism or bidder returns, and this would 
consequently lead to violate the conditional independence assumption upon which matching depends on. In this 
research, however, it is unlikely to be such unobservable variables whereby there are many variables that have 
been investigated as main determines either for the selection of takeover methods or bidder returns based on the 
literature review which are observed, not unobserved. Moreover, to know how large the effect of the unobservable 
variables affects the result of propensity score matching, section 2.4.2.3 will test the sensitivity of the results to 
the presence of omitted (hidden) variables that may affect the choice of takeover methods and bidder returns.  
 




apply over the entire sample of observations.  The overlap assumption implies that, for all 
possible value of 𝑋𝑖, it follows 0 ( 1| ) 1iXP D< = < . 
 
3.4.1 Event study  
 
Empirical studies of M&A and bidding behaviours have documented evidence on abnormal 
stock returns to bidders and targets by using the event studies approach.  This approach allows 
for an investigation of the effects of economic or regulatory events on stock market prices in 
both the short and long term. The event-time approach can be particularly useful to measure 
the impact of abnormal performances, at the time of an event, and provide a general “one 
captures most, if not all” measure, in order to quantify the effects of this type of event on a 
firm’s value (Kothari & Warner, 2007). Seiler (2004, p.202) defines the abnormal return (AR), 
as a result of corporate events and it could be as anything over and above either the normal 
return or what could be reasonably predicted by the market.  
Event study methodology consists of several steps in order to measure the abnormal or 
unexpected impact of an M&As event around a specific time-frame. This analysis will follow 
Brown & Warner (1985) and Seiler’s (2004) guidelines in order to calculate the stock’s 
abnormal return over the stated time frame. 
 
The first step, in general, is to estimate the event window length, as either a “short horizon” or 
a “long horizon”.  The latter is generally used in order to study the performance of shares over 
a monthly data index of one year or more (Kothari & Warner, 2007). In contrast, Armitage 
(1995) defines the range of short estimation periods as between 100 to 300 days, and, for long 
estimation periods, 24 months to 60 months. However, although recent developments in event 
study methodology over the past 30 years have improved the level of accuracy available to 
long-horizon event studies—as seen in research conducted in the late 1990s, the short-horizon 
method is more reliable and straightforward (Brown & Warner, 1985;Kothari & Warner, 2007). 
Further, using a short-term event window such as (-1, +1), is capable of capturing accurate 
estimates of market reactions immediately after take over announcements (Fama, 1991). 
 
Armitage (1995) states that there is always a trade-off between choosing the short or long-term 
estimation periods to measure the market’s reaction to corporate events. In contrast, utilising a 




longer window might be more precise, but will generally offer “out of date data”, is highly 
susceptible to the joint test problem, and can have lower power, as stated by Kothari & Warner 
(2007) with Lyon, Barber,& Tsai(1999) commenting that this method is even “treacherous” . 
Moreover, (Moeller et al., 2004) suggest that study the effect of M&As activities are unlikely 
to have significant long-term returns.  
Due to the problems associated with choosing a long-horizon data period, this study will 
measure the abnormal returns based on the daily data index rather than monthly data in the 
short and long event period. With this in mind, this research will follow Boone & Mulherin, 
(2007a:2008b) by selecting a narrow window (-1, +1) to compare acquirer returns between 
auctions and negotiations.  The (-20, +20) (-63, +126) windows have, in previous research, 
been used to calculate the long-run.  
 
There are a number of methods that are capable of measuring abnormal returns (unexpected) 
by modelling normal expected returns, such as the Market Adjusted Abnormal Return approach, 
(MM) the capital assets pricing model, (CAPM) or Arbitrage pricing theory (APT). Most event 
studies choose the Market Adjusted Returns model to calculate ARs due to the restrictions that 
accompany the CAPM approach (Roll, 1977b). Moreover, Market Model, Fama-French model 
and Carhart (1997) four-factor model are use as alternative measures to model the expected 
returns in order to calculate acquirer-CAR.107 
3.4.1.1. Market Adjusted Returns model 
 
This study will calculate the abnormal returns over both the narrow and longer estimation 
periods using the Market Adjusted Returns Model as a benchmark with the CRSP value-
weighted index returns. This research will compare market reactions that generated by M&As 
through the abnormal returns (ARs) of acquirers that do and do not use auctions over the short-
run and long-run. 
 
 Let t=0 represents the announcement date and, for each sample, security i. The cumulative 
abnormal return of each firm is shown as the sum of the daily ARs over the sample as follows: 
                                                          
107  This section will explain the Market Adjusted Abnormal Return approach as the main measure for the 
cumulative abnormal returns in this chapter, in order to save a space, the explanation of other methods is available 
upon request   
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As mentioned before, the abnormal return (ARi) is calculated as anything over and above either 
the normal return or what could be reasonably predicted by the market (Seiler, 2004,p.202) as 
follows:  
 
                                                                      ARi = Ri − Rm                                                       
Where,  
 
Ri is the daily normal return of the security i 
Rm is the daily normal return calculating by using CRSP value-weighted index, this research 
will use as alternative index to calculate the unexpected return: CRSP equally value-weighted 
index and S&P Composite index 
The daily price data index is used to calculate the daily normal return of the security i, as 
follows: 
 
                                                                      Ri = ln  (
Pt
Pt−1
)                                                      
Where, 
 
Pt is the security price on day t and Pt−1 is the security price on day t-1  
While the normal market return is calculated by using the daily CRSP value-weighted index on 
day t and day t-1 respectively over the sample period as follows:  





The univariate analysis will use the descriptive statistics based on T-test of the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) in order to study the main differences between auction and 
negotiation subsamples, and the below formula is used to capture the T-test:   
 




                                                              t =  
ARt
σ (ARt) √n⁄
                                                        
Where, 
 
ARt here is the mean of the sample, and  σ (ARt) is standers deviations for the sample. 
 
Before applying propensity score matching, this analysis will extend the univariate analysis for 
short-run and long-run to a cross-sectional analysis that will assist in the explanation of any 
variation in bidders’ returns. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) will be considered as 
the dependent variable across the short and long windows. The following multivariate 
framework will show the narrow event windows (−1, +1). Further, it will, in addition, examine 
the long-term performance of merger deals by adding the longer event (-20, +20) and (-63, 
+125) 




𝛼 = the constant variable (The intercept) 
𝑋𝑖 =  a vector of explanatory variables 
ε denotes the residual term of the regression model  
i denotes the acquiring firms’ index 
 
3.4.2. Implementing Propensity Score Matching  
 
This section aims to explain the main steps used to calculate the propensity score, following 
the practical guidance Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008), Imbeds and Rubin (2009), and (Guo & 
Fraser, 2015). There are generally three main steps in implementing propensity score matching: 
estimating the propensity score, matching strategies, and calculating the treatment effect.  
Below is a summary of the main three steps of propensity score matching. 
 
3.4.2.1. Estimating Propensity Score 
 




Estimating the propensity score involves a two-step decision: the choice of models, and the 
choice of covariates. As the choices of treatment method are binary choices, we will use either 
logit or probit models, both of which usually yield similar results in the case of binary treatment 
Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008). In this paper, specifically, we adopt logit model to estimate 
propensity scores.108  See ; Section 2.4.2.1 for the main theoretical and empirical works that 
discuss the main methods that are used to estimate the propensity score.  
As shown above, Table 14 provides a relatively comprehensive list of the variables that may 
be related to takeover outcomes and the selection of selling mechanisms. The key covariates 
include bidder size, a dummy if a target firm initiated a deal or it is in a bankruptcy, if bidder 
firm own a toehold in a target firm, if a bidder or target firm hire an investment bank with a 
high reputation, if a deal is tender offer, hostile, if a target is private, all-stock offers, and 
successful deals. This section will apply logit model to estimate the propensity score in line 
with Imbeds & Rubin (2009).  Table B3 shows the results of estimation the propensity scores 
using the logit model. 
 
3.4.2.2. Matching Strategies  
 
This step matches the treatment and untreated groups according to the estimated propensity 
scores.  These matched samples have the same probability of being treated, and it is hoped that 
the differences in the outcome variable just reflect the causal effect of the treatment.  There are 
different algorithm matching methods that have been discussed in the literature review, and 
can be divided into three groups: greedy matching, optimal matching and final balance 
procedures (Guo & Fraser, 2015). See; Section 2.4.2.2 for the main theoretical and empirical 
works that discuss the main matching strategies in this chapter, which are used to estimate the 
treatment effect of using auction. 
 
3.4.2.3. Post-Matching Analysis 
 
Post-matching analysis is divided into two steps to evaluate the matching strategy and 
sensitivity analysis to the hidden bias. First, after applying different matching strategies, it is 
                                                          
108 The results remain the same in case of using a probit model to estimate the propensity score. 




important to evaluate how well the treatment and comparison group are balanced in the 
matched sample. Second, this section will test the sensitivity of the results to the presence of 
omitted variables that may affect auction and bidder returns because of the bias is removed 
from the observable variables but it is important to know how large the effect of the 
unobservable variables affects the result of PSM. See; Section 2.4.2.3 for the main theoretical 
and empirical works that discuss the main matching strategies in this chapter, which are used 
to estimate the treatment effect of using auction. 
 
3.5. Empirical Results 
 
 
The majority of empirical literature mentioned in this work argues that auctions do not induce 
bidders to pay more for target firms and that there is no significant difference between auction 
and negotiation returns either for target or for bidder firms. However, these works base their 
findings on the private selling process.  The main aim of this chapter is to examine whether 
bidding in auctions has a causal impact upon bidder returns at the public-phase competition 
where bidders are more aggressive when there is more than one bidder bid for the same target 
firms. Therefore, the possibility for the winner’s curse to exist is high. 
 
3.5.1. Average Bidder Returns in the Short and Longer Event Windows   
 
Table 15 reports the results of bidder returns in auction and negotiation sub-samples for a 
narrow CARs (-1, +1) window, and longer event periods: for (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) as 
suggested by (Boone & Mulherin, 2007a).  The analysis applies the Market Adjusted Returns 
model by using the CRSP value-weighted index in order to calculate the estimate CARs. As a 
further robustness check, the results of the cumulative abnormal returns with CRSP equally 
value-weighted index and S&P Composite index will be reported. Moreover, the Market Model, 
the Fama-French model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model are used as alternative 
measures to model the expected returns in order to calculate bidder returns.  
Panel A reports the return of bidders for (-1, + 1) window in auction and negotiation 
subsamples. For robustness, this part calculates bidder returns for the (-2, +2) window.  The 




first row of Panel A reports the CARs, by using the Market Adjusted Returns model with the 
benchmark index CRSP value-weighted index of the whole, the auction and the negotiation 
sub-samples, respectively. For the full sample, bidders, on average, gain significantly positive 
abnormal returns from acquisitions at 1.669% (p value =0.000) for the (-1, +1) window. This 
finding is consistent with Moeller et al., (2004) who document that bidders obtain highly 
significant returns which means that bidders in this study benefit from acquisitions. From the 
other side, these findings are quite different from the results that show bidders do not gain from 
acquisitions, since the samples that are used in the previous research are restricted to 
acquisitions of public companies (Eckbo, 2009). 
 
One observation of this simple statistical comparison is that auction bidders have negative 
returns at an average of -0.434% (0.000), compared to negotiation bidders who have positive 
returns at an average 1.711% (0.000). Boone & Mulherin (2008b) document that the average 
abnormal returns of auctions over the (-1, +1) window is -0.69%, the negative return of auctions 
is approximately close to the result obtained by this analysis. The differential result indicates 
an interesting result in the U.S. market, whereby negotiation bidders, on average, significantly 
outperform auction bidders in the short-term value. Such result could be an evidence confirms 
that a winner’s curse exists in corporate finance and it is consistent with Thaler (1988),Kagel 
& Levin (1986),and Bazerman & Samuelson (1983). Furthermore, the gain of negotiation 
bidders increases by, on average, 2.017% (0.000) while the auction has less negative returns at 
an average of -0.389 % (0.000) in cases where the return over the (-2, +2) window is measured.  
 
The same results have been achieved by using different market indexes: CRSP equally value-
weighted index and S&P Composite index for the (-1, + 1) and (-2, +2) windows. Moreover, 
by using different models to calculate the expected return such as the Market Model, the Fama-
French model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model it is clear that auction has a significant 
negative impact upon the shareholder’s wealth, while negotiation firm’s shareholders gain a 
significantly positive return in the short-term windows. In conclusion, the results are consistent 
and in general not sensitive to using different indexes or models. 
 
This finding refutes that of Boone & Mulherin (2008b) as they show that there are no 
statistically significant differences in the average abnormal returns between those bidders who 
participate in an auction and those who do one-to-one negotiation around the date of 




announcement. Therefore, the winner’s curse based on their findings does not exist in the U.S. 
takeovers. It is important to point out that there is a main difference between this study and 
Boone and Mulherin’s study.  This analysis focuses on the number of bidders who announce 
their intention to make a bid and mark deals as an auction when there is more than one bidder. 
On the other hand, Boone and Mulherin focus more on the private selling process. Modelling 
an auction at the level of the private selling process leads most of the empirical literature to 
conclude that increasing the level of competition in the takeover activities does not encourager 
a bidder firm to overbid for a target firm. However, the preliminary result of this chapter could 
confirm that bidders gain from reducing the competition level, which could answer the 
following question: “why is an auction not a popular selling process in a takeover?”   
 
Panel B reports the impact of using different selling mechanisms (auction versus negotiation) 
upon shareholder’s wealth by using longer event windows as suggested by Boone and Mulherin 
(2007:2008).  This section examines the bidder’s performance relative to the (-20, +20) and (-
63, +126) windows using the Market Adjusted Returns model with the CRSP value-weighted 
index. For the full sample, bidders, on average, generate significantly positive abnormal returns 
at 4.009% (0.000) for the (-20, +20) window. Auction and negotiation bidders gain 
significantly positive abnormal returns at an average of 0.687% (0.000) and 4.075% (0.000) 
respectively. By comparison, negotiation bidders earn significantly positive abnormal returns 
at, on average, of 3.388% (0.000) more than auction bidders. Over the (-63, +126) window the 
gain of auction and negotiation bidders respectively increases to averages of 7.463% (0.000) 
and 11.966% (0.000) respectively. However, the differential information indicates that there is 
no significant difference between the generated returns in auction and the negotiation sub-
samples. The results remain the same with the S&P Composite index. 
 
However, in the case of estimate bidder returns with the CRSP equally value-weighted index, 
auction bidders have significantly negative returns by, on average, -0.777% (0.000) compared 
to negotiation bidders who significantly gain 2.464% (0.000) over the (-20, +20) window. The 
differential information indicates that bidder firms lose significantly returns when they bid in 
auction. Auction and negotiation bidders gain significantly positive abnormal returns at an 
average of 0.632% (0.000) and 4.804% (0.000) over the (-63, +126) window, respectively. 
However, there is no significant difference between the gains that are generated by either 
auction or negotiation bidders.  





The following section will investigate the effect of using auction and negotiations upon bidder 
returns by applying alternative models to calculate unexpected returns, such as the Market 
Model, the Fama-French model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Across all the 
models, auction bidders lose significantly returns, while negotiation bidders gain significantly 
positive returns over the (-20, +20) window. Once again, the differential information shows 
that there are significant differences between the average abnormal returns in auction and the 
negotiation sub-samples and that the negative returns of auction bidders is larger over the (-20, 
+20) window. Boone & Mulherin (2008b) report a positive and insignificant relation between 
auction and bidder returns over the (-20, 20) window.  Over the (-63, +126) window, bidders 
of auction and negotiation lose returns with different models. However, there is no statistical 
difference in the average abnormal returns between auction and negotiations subsamples.  
Some results in Panel B are sensitive to using different indexes and models. For example, the 
estimated returns with the CRSP equally value-weighted index and the S&P Composite index 
have opposite sign to returns with the CRSP equally value-weighted index and the other models.   
 
In conclusion, auction bidders lose significantly returns, while negotiation bidders create 
significantly positive returns in the short event windows, irrespective of the CRSP indexes and 
models. This finding provides an evidence that show auctions increase the possibility of a 
winner’s curse. If the unexpected returns are calculated by using the CRSP equally value-
weighted index as in Boone & Mulherin (2008b), the auction and negotiation significantly 
create a value for their shareholders over the (-20, +20) window.  
 
Table 16 reports information on bidder returns in auction and negotiation sub-samples for the 
(-1, +1) window, after controlling the size effect and the main deal characteristics. Table 4 
reports the CRSP value-weighted index abnormal retunes.109  
Panel A presents the results of small and large firms in auction and negotiation sub-samples. 
In general, small firms have significantly positive abnormal returns irrespective of the selling 
process at, on average, of 2.537% (0.000). Around 73 small auction firms and 6,428 negotiation 
firms generate positive and significant returns at, on average, of 0.993% (0.000) and 2.554 
                                                          
109 The results remain the same, irrespective the indexes or models are used to measure the unexpected returns. 
To save the space this section presents the results that are obtained from the CRSP value-weighted index as 
suggested by Boone & Mulherin (2007:2008) 
 




(0.000), respectively. This finding is consistent with Moeller et al., (2004) who show that small 
firms earn positive and significant returns in the short event period. Although small 
negotiations earn more than double the small auction returns, there is no statistical difference 
on bidder returns across the small firm’s sub-groups.  
Large firms in general generate positive and significant returns. However, large auction firms 
significantly lose returns at, on average, of - 0.924% (0.000), while negotiation firms earn 
significant and positive returns at an average of 1.027% (0.000). The differential test shows 
that large negotiation firms significantly outperform large auctions.  
Over the (-1, 1) window, the differential test shows that small firms outperform the large ones 
in general by an average of 1.560% (0.000), irrespective of the selling process. This result is 
consistent with Moeller et al., (2004) who show that when acquisitions are announced, small 
firms outperform significantly large firms. It is interesting to note that small negotiation firms 
generate significantly more value than large bidders. Moreover, although small auction firms 
earn significantly positive returns and large auction firms destroy the shareholders’ wealth, 
there is no statistical difference between bidder returns in small and large auction firms. This 
finding concludes that engaging in one-to-one negotiation process is better for bidder firms 
than engaging in competitive processes, regardless of the firm’s size. More specifically, small 
bidders enjoy higher returns in negotiation.  
To capture the size effect more, Panel A displays the results that examine whether bidder 
returns differ between small auction and large negotiation firms, and vice versa. There is no 
statistical difference between small auction and large negotiation firms. However, small 
negotiation firms create a significant value for shareholders than large auction firms at an 
average return of 3.479% (0.000). This finding is again consistent with the fact that small 
bidders enjoy a significant and positive return with negotiations 
In light of the above, the event of the winner’s curse exists if large firms bid in auction. In cases 
where the competition level increases between bidders, there is a negative relation between 
bidder’s size and returns. These results could evidence that a hubris effect plays a role when 
the firm is large, where the large bidders overbid for the target to deter other bidders, as argued 
by Bulow & Klemperer (2002b),Moeller et al., (2004),  and Boone & Mulherin (2008b) 
Panel B compares bidder returns in auction and negotiation sub-samples across deal 
characteristics. For the whole sample, acquisitions create significantly value for bidder’s 




shareholders if they successfully complete the transactions. However, 148 winners in auction 
lose significantly returns at an average of -0.677% (0.000), while 13,730 winners in negotiation 
create significantly positive returns at, on average, 1.718% (0.000). The statistical deferential 
test shows that there is a difference in bidder returns between auction and negotiation winners. 
These results seem once again to provide evidence that the winner bidders in auction could 
suffer from the winner’s curse. Failure bidders in auction lose significant returns at, on average, 
of -0.174% (0.000); while failure bidders in negotiation create significant returns at, on average, 
1.548% (0.000). However, there is no difference in the announcement returns if bidders failed 
in auction or negotiation.  
111 auction firms use all-cash as the method of payment and such transactions generate a 
significantly negative return at only -0.019% (0.000), while a number of 3,671 negotiation 
firms create significant value for shareholders by, on average, 1.627% (0.000) in cases where 
they use all-cash. The statistical difference between the two sub-samples is significant.   
Moreover, an auction bidder loses substantially larger returns if they use all-stock offers 
compared to all-cash offers (-0.019% versus -1.942% respectively), while negotiation bidders 
gain significantly positive returns irrespective of the method of payment they use. This results 
consistent with Hansen (1987b)and Boone & Mulherin (2008b) who argue that using stock 
offers as a method of payment in auction transactions will have a negative impact on bidder 
returns. 
The statistical information shows that negotiation bidders significantly outperform auction 
bidders, whether the former use all-stock or all-cash. This could once again provide evidence 
of the winner’s curse in auctions whereby bidders who pay with all-stock perform even worse.  
 
Generally, acquiring public targets creates significantly negative abnormal returns for auction 
and negotiation bidders. More specifically, bids for public targets in auction are worse than 
bids in negotiation. This is not a surprising result because publicly traded firms consider 
common -value items which could potentially increase the winner’s curse (Boone & Mulherin, 
2008b). On the other hand, acquiring private and subsidiary targets generates positive and 
significant returns for auction and negotiation bidders and this is consistent with Fuller et al., 
(2002). However, the organisational forms of target assets cannot explain the variation in the 
abnormal returns between auction and negotiation sub-samples.     




In light of the empirical findings of Travlos (1987) and Fuller et al., (2002), there is a relation 
between payment method and the organisation’s forms of target assets.  For example, acquiring 
public targets and paying with equity are associated with lower the abnormal returns, while 
acquiring private firms and being paid with equity will result in higher bidder’s returns.  
Therefore, it is important to continue to investigate the relation between the method of payment 
and the target status in auction and negotiation sub-samples.  
85 auction bidders lose significant returns at an average of -0.277% (0.000), while 618 
negotiation bidders gain significantly positive returns at, on average, 1.264% (0.000) in cases 
where there is an all-cash offer to publicly traded firms and the difference between the two sub-
samples is statistically significant. On the other hand, 54 auction bidders who offer all-stock to 
bid for public targets lose significantly substantial returns at an average of -4.104% (0.000), 
while 1,133 negotiation bidders lose significantly at -1.833% (0.000). However, the difference 
in bidder returns between the two subsamples is not significant.  
Once again, auction and negotiation bidders generate significant value for the shareholders in 
bids for private and subsidiary firms, irrespective of the method of payments. The highest 
significant abnormal returns are, , on average, , 8.182 % (0.000) when auction bidders bid for 
private targets and offer all-stocks, while negotiation bidders create the highest positive 
abnormal returns at an average of 3.038% (0.000), in the case of bids for subsidiary targets and 
the offer of all-stocks. However, the statistical information shows that there is no significant 
difference in bidder returns between auction and negotiation, irrespective of the organisation 
forms (privates or subsidiaries) of target assets and the method of payments (all-cash or all-
stock). In conclusion, over the (-1, 1) window, bidding for private and subsidiary targets that 
are stratified by method of payments (cash versus stock), does not explain the wealth variations 
in the auction and negotiation sub-samples.  
As predicted by Aktas et al., (2010a), if a target firm initiates a deal, this will weaken the target 
firm’s position during the negotiation process which could affect the shareholders’ wealth. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that initiating the deal creates significantly positive 
abnormal returns for the whole sample. However, 33 bidders lose significantly -0.472%(0.000) 
returns if they engage in an auction bid that is initiated by target firms, while 154 negotiation 
bidders create significantly 3.084%(0.000) value for the shareholders. A significant difference 
exists in bidder returns between auction and negotiation if target firm initiated the deal. This 




could be further evidence that bidding in an auction could heighten the prospect of the winner’s 
curse, irrespective of who initiates the deals. 
In regards to the whole sample, tender offer acquisitions create significantly positive returns at, 
on average, 1.009% (0.000) and this consistent with (Moeller et al., 2004). However, bidding 
in the form of a tender offer in case of there are other public potential bidders bid for a target 
firm lead to reduce the acquirer returns by, on average, -1.037% (0.000). Bidding in the form 
of a tender offer in cases where there are no other public potential bids for a target firm generate 
positive returns for acquirers by, on average, 1.400%(0.000). By comparison, there is a 
significant difference in the abnormal returns between auction and negotiation if bidders bid in 
the form of a tender offer. Such results provide further evidence of the winner’s curse in 
auctions.  This results consistent with Offenberg & Pirinsky (2015) who argue that a bidder 
firm in a tender offer are more likely to bid more in order to acquire quickly a target firms, 
essentially when there are more than one bidder for the same target.  
55 hostile bids generate negative and significant returns, 25 hostile deals do even worse when 
competition exists between bidders, while a number of 30 hostile deals create significant 
positive returns with negotiation. However, the statistical information shows that there is no 
difference between bidder returns between auction and negotiation if the acquirer’s bid is 
hostile.   
Moreover, bidding for a target in bankruptcy can create significant and positive returns at an 
average of 3.112% (0.000) and 2.34% (0.000) for auction and negotiation bidders respectively. 
By comparison, there is no significant difference in bidder returns between auction and 
negotiation. This result consistent with Shleifer & Vishny (2011b) and Hansen & Thomas 
(1998) who argue that bidder firms could obtain a target firm in a bankruptcy at a fire-sale 
discount. As predicted, bankruptcy transactions prevent bidder firms from the winner’s curse 
event.  
Moreover, although a target firm that is located in the U.S. state that has a heavily regulated 
anti-takeover, this could lead to the weakening of the power of the bidder’s negotiation. It is 
surprising to find that, auction and negotiation bidders generate significant and positive 
abnormal returns at, on average, 0.835% (0.000) and 1.976% (0.000), respectively. However, 
there is no significant difference in bidder returns between auction and negotiation.  




Bidders who bid in auction with a toehold lose significant returns at an average of -0.933% 
(0.000), while engaging in a one-to-one negotiation process with a toehold creates positive and 
significant at on average 1.196 % (0.000) returns for bidder firms. As predicted by Bulow et 
al., (1999), bidding in an auction with a toehold would make bidders more aggressive and lead 
them to suffer the winner’s curse. However, the statistical differences in bidder returns between 
auction and negotiations are not significant.     
Panel C reports results for the impact of investment banks on bidder returns for the (-1, 1) 
window in auction and negotiation. Out of the whole sample, hiring investment banks create 
significant value for the shareholders at, on average, 1.320% (0.000). However, auction 
acquirers who employ investment banks lose significant returns at, on average, -1.441% 
(0.000), while negotiation acquirers earn 1.429% (0.000). The statistical information shows 
that there is a significant difference in the abnormal return between auction and negotiation.  
In cases of bidders employ prestigious investment banks, a number of 67 auction bidders again 
lose significant returns at, on average, -0.756%(0.000), while 1,034 negotiation bidders create 
value for the shareholders at, , on average, 1.119%. This finding is in line with Rau (2000) who 
documents that employing prestigious investment banks gives rise to the winner’s curse in the 
auction takeover process. However, there is no statistical difference in bidder returns between 
auction and negotiation. 
Bidders from the whole sample gain significant positive returns at an average of 0.781% (0.000) 
in cases where the target firms employ investment banks. The majority of auction bidders lose 
significant returns at, on average, -1.104% (0.000), whereas 5,646 negotiation bidders earn 
significant positive returns at, on average, 0.860% (0.000). The case is significantly worse for 
auction bidders if target firms employ prestigious investment banks where they lose -2.938% 
(0.000), while negotiations bidders enjoy significantly positive returns at an average of 1,516% 
(0.000). By comparison, there is a significant difference in the abnormal returns between 
auction and negotiation bidders if the target firms employ investment banks with a high quality.  
These results emphasise that using an advisor has a fundamental impact on the acquirer’s 
wealth and it is an important characteristic to explaining what determines takeover outcomes 
in terms of the selling processes (auction versus negotiation). 
Table 17 presents information about how bidder returns differ between auction and negotiation 
depending on acquirer and deal characteristics for the (-2, +2) window. However, this section 




will not discuss the results because the above discussion remains true for the (-2, +2) window. 
There are some significant results appeared in Table 17, small auction firms significantly 
outperform the large ones, bidder firms who fail in negotiation significantly outperform auction 
bidders, at 10% level. Moreover, both bidders in auction and negotiation create negative and 
significant returns at 10%, in cases where they bid for publicly traded targets and offer all-
stock. However, auction bidders perform even worse than negotiation bidders. 
In conclusion, there are significant influences from bidder and target characteristics upon 
bidder returns over the short-run analysis.  For example, bidding in auction gives rise to the 
winner’s curse if the bidder firm is large, has successfully completed a bid, offers all-cash or 
all-stock (does even worse with all-stocks), if bidders bid for publicly traded targets with cash, 
if the target initiated a deal, or if bidders bid in the form of tender offer. Finally, the winner’s 
curse exists in auctions if the bidders or targets employ investment banks as advisors. More 
specifically, a bidder firm loses a substantial return if a target firm uses investment banks with 
a high quality.  
This section will investigate how bidder returns differ between auction and negotiation over 
longer periods depending on acquirer and deal characteristics. Tables 18 and 19 show 
information about bidder returns for (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows, respectively. 
Out of the whole sample, and for both auction and negotiation, small firms still create 
significant and positive returns over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows. However, there 
is no statistical difference in the abnormal returns between small bidders in auction and 
negotiation. Over the (-20, +20) window, large auction firms create positive and negative 
returns at, on average, -0.113% (0.000), while negotiation bidders enjoy substantial positive 
returns at, on average, 3.514% (0.000). By comparison, large negotiation firms significantly 
outperform auction firms. From the whole sample, small bidders significantly outperform large 
ones. More specifically, small negotiation firms create more positive returns than the larger 
ones. However, there is no statistical difference between small and large auction firms. Small 
negotiation firms again significantly outperform large auctions. 
Over the (-63, +126) window, large bidder firms create positive and significant returns on the 
whole sample; large auction and negotiation bidders enjoy a significantly positive abnormal 
return at, on average, 6.728%(0.000) and 13.473% (0.000), respectively. However, negotiation 
bidders create significantly more than double the value that is created by auction. It is 




interesting to note that, large firms significantly outperform the small ones on the whole sample. 
Moreover, large negotiation bidders create positive and significant returns more than small 
ones. Although small auction bidders create a higher value for their shareholders than the large 
firms, there is no statistical significance in bidder returns between small and large auction 
bidders.  
Over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows, auction and negotiation winners who 
successfully complete the transactions enjoy significantly positive abnormal returns. Failed 
bidders in auctions lose significant returns over the (-20, +20) window, while failed bidders in 
negotiation again create significant and positive returns. Over the (-63, +126) windows, bidders 
who fail in auction create positive and significant returns, while bidders who fail in negotiation 
lose the abnormal returns. By comparison, there are no statistical differences in bidder returns 
between auction and negotiation, regardless of whether or not bidders win or fail in the bid 
across the longer event windows.  Bidders who offer all-cash create significant positive returns 
in auction and negotiation over the (-20, +20) window, and the percentage of positive returns 
substantially increases the (-63, +126) window. However, the difference in the abnormal 
returns between bidders who offer all-cash in auction or negotiations is not significant. 
There is evidence for the event of a winner’s curse in auction if a bidder offers all-stock over 
the (-20, +20) window, whereby auctions lose significant returns at, on average, -1.330% 
(0.000), while negotiation bidders enjoy significantly positive returns, at, on average, 4.985% 
(0.000). The statistical information shows that negotiation bidders significantly outperform 
auction bidders in instances where all-stocks are offered, at 10% level. This result again 
consistent with (Hansen, 1987b) who argue that it is better for bidder firms to engage in the 
negotiation process in case they pay by stocks in order to protect their confidential information.  
Over the (-63, +126) window, it is interesting to note that auction and negotiation bidders in 
case they use all-stock create significant and positive abnormal returns at an average of 1.784% 
(0.000) and 17.513% (0.000), respectively. Negotiation bidders gain significantly substantial 
positive returns by, on average, 15.729% (0.024) more than auction bidders.  
Over the (-20, +20) window, if bidders bid for a publicly traded target they lose significantly 
abnormal returns at an average of -1.312% (0.000), while negotiation bidders enjoy significant 
returns at an average of 1.407%. By comparison, negotiation bidder outperformance auction 
bidders in case they bid for a publicly traded target, at 10% level. However, auction create 




significantly positive returns at, on average, 3.953% (0.000) over the (-63, +126) window, 
while negotiation again enjoy significant and positive abnormal returns at, on average, 
9.498 %( 0.000). The statistical difference between auction and negotiation bidders if they bid 
for public target firms shows that negotiation bidders enjoy significantly more positive returns 
than auction by, on average, 5.544% (0.078), at 10% level. Over the longer event periods, 
although all bidders create positive and significant positive abnormal returns in cases of bids 
for private and subsidiaries target firms, there are no statistical differences in bidder returns 
between auction and negotiation bidders  
Offering all-cash for public target forms creates significant and positive abnormal returns for 
auction and negotiation windows over the longer event periods, and more specifically bidders 
create significantly substantial positive returns over the (-63, +126) window. However, the 
difference in bidders’ returns between auction and negotiation bidders who bid for a public 
target firm with all-cash is not significant.  There is another interesting finding that offering 
all-stock for public target forms destroys significantly returns in auction bid, while negotiation 
bidders enjoy significant and positive returns over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows. 
Negotiation bidders do even better by creating significant value for shareholders by, on average, 
11.685% (0.000) over (-63, +126) windows. By comparison, negotiation bidders significantly 
outperformance auction bidders in case they bid for public target firms with all-stock. 
Finally, over the (-20, +20) window, the winner’s curse exists in auctions if a bidder or target 
firm employs investment banks as advisors whereby an auction destroys the shareholders’ 
wealth by, on average, -1.267% (0.000), while negotiation bidders enjoy significant positive 
abnormal returns at, on average, 3.290% (0.000). Negotiation bidders significantly outperform 
auction bidders in cases where they use investment banks. However, there is no difference in 
bidder returns between an auction and negotiations in cases where investment banks with a 
high quality are used. From the other side, bidders who bid for target firms that use investment 
banks lose significantly abnormal returns at, on average, -0.416%(0.000), while negotiation 
bidders gain significantly positive returns at, on average, 2,671%(0.000). By comparison, 
negotiation bidders again significantly outperform auction bidders in cases where target firms 
hire investment banks as advisors. Moreover, auction bidders do even worse if a target firm 
uses investment banks with a high quality, while negotiation bidders enjoy significant and 
positive returns. The statistical difference in bidder returns between auction and negotiations 
is significant at a 10% level.  Over the (-63, +126) windows, there is no statistical difference 




in the abnormal returns between auction and negotiation, irrespective of the characteristics of 
investment banks for bidders or target firms.  
In conclusion, there are significant impacts for some bidders and deal characteristics upon 
bidder returns in auction and negotiation sub-samples, over (-20, +20) window. The winner’s 
curse exists in auction if bidder firms is large, offer all-stock, if a target firm is public, bid for 
publicly traded target firms with all-stock. Finally, the winner’s curse exists in an auction if the 
bidders or targets employ investment banks as advisors. More specifically, a bidder firm loses 
significant returns if a target firm uses investment banks with a high quality.  Over the (-63, 
+126) window, the winner’s curse exists in auctions in cases where bidder firms bid for 
publicly traded target firms with all-stock. 
 
3.5.2. OLS Analysis  
 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate whether bidding in auctions has a causal 
impact on bidder returns using the U.S. M&A Database. The univariate analysis answers such 
a question and reports that auctions reduce bidder returns over the (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows, 
regardless of the models and market indexes that are employed to calculate the abnormal 
returns. Auction and negotiation bidders earn a positive and significant return over the (-20, 
+20) window.110 
In order to examine the relation between bidder returns and auctions, taking into consideration 
other observable bidder and deal characteristics that have been discussed in Table 14, a 
multiple regression will be estimated. OLS estimator will allow for the interaction between 
bidder cumulative abnormal returns and the main explanatory variables (such as firm size, cash 
holdings, and Tobin’s q, leverage, intangible assets, deal outcome (successful or failed deals), 
the target’s status (public, private or subsidiaries), the deal type (tender offer, hostile and 
conglomerate deals), method of payments (cash or stock), and takeover regulations. 
Specifically, this section runs the simple OLS regression, and the results would be compared 
to those in the next section, where the matching method is applied. 
                                                          
110 In case of using CRSP value-weighted index as a main index to calculate the unexpected returns in this 
study, as suggested by Boone and Mulherin (2007:2008). 




Table 20 reports the OLS results of a series of regressions from (1) to (2), stratified respectively 
by the abnormal returns for the short event (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows and the longer event 
(-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows. The OLS results are reported by using CRSP value-
weighted index abnormal retunes. The auction dummy variable in the (-1, +1) and (-2,+ 2) 
windows reflects a negative and significant relationship between bidding in auction and the 
returns experienced. These results are consistent with the univariate finding that confirms that 
auction reduces the bidder shareholder’s wealth in the short event period. Therefore, bidding 
in auction increase the possibility of the winner’s curse in the U.S. takeover market. This results 
consistent with Thaler (1988);Kagel & Levin (1986); and Bazerman & Samuelson (1983) who 
argue that the event of the winner’s curse exists in takeover market.  
These negative results however are contrary again to the earlier literature such as Boone & 
Mulherin (2008b) There is no significant impact for the auction dummy variable over the (-20, 
+20) and (-63, +126) windows, leading the studies to conclude that the winner’s curse exists 
in the U.S. takeover market in the short-term period.  
Model (1) includes the full sample with all the sets of covariates. As predicted, Ln (size) has a 
significant and negative impact upon bidder returns. It could argue that large firms are more 
susceptible to the tendencies of management empire-building or hubris Roll (1986a) and 
Moeller et al., (2004)  
Model (2) uses a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bidder firms is classified as a 
small firm and another dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bidder firm are a small 
firm and bid in auction in order to capture the size effect. After controlling for bidder and deal 
characteristics, the abnormal return is higher by on average 1.3% points if bidder firms are 
small and this consistent with Moeller et al., (2004). However, small firms that bid in auction 
earn positive but insignificant abnormal returns.  
 In Appendix B, the focus of models (1) and (2) in Table B2 is the examination of firm size 
upon wealth creation separately for small and large firms. Although the result of using the full 
sample show that small bidder firms that bid in auction earn positive but insignificant abnormal 
returns, Table B2 reports that auction reduces significantly bidder returns irrespective of 
whether bidders are classified as small or large firms over the (-1, +1) window. Bidding in 
auction reduces significantly large bidder returns over the (-2, +2) window. This is further 
evidence that show the winner’s curse exists when a bidder firm engages in auction bids. 
However, it seems such result is valid only for the short-term period.  




The coefficient of the variable cash holding has a positive but insignificant impact on bidder 
returns over the short-term windows and (-20, 20). This means that free cash flow hypothesis 
cannot explain the variation in bidder returns. However, there is positive and significant 
relation between the level of cash reserve and the abnormal return over the (-63, +126) window. 
 A high level of leverage tends to have a significantly positive impact on bidder returns in the 
short and longer windows, and this results consistent with Robert and Sufi (2009); Gilson (1989, 
1990); and Maloney et al., (1993).Therefore, any significant degree of leverage acts positively 
with bidder return, and restrict managerial hubris and overpayment.  
Although target firms that are located in anti-takeover states have more negotiation power, 
which could give rise to the winner’s curse as suggested by Boone & Mulherin (2008b), such 
a variable does not have a significant impact on bidder returns. As predicted, in model (1) over 
the (-1, 1), (-2, 2) and (-20, 20) windows, the deal initiated by a target firm has a positive and 
significant impact on bidder returns. Aktas et al., (2010a) argue that target firms signal that 
they are under pressure to sell, if they initiated a deal for potential bidders and therefore this 
will weaken their bargaining power   
If bidder firms own a stake in a target firm -six months before the date of announcement, there 
is a significant tendency to reduce bidder returns in the short-term window and model (2) in 
the (-20, 20) window. This result consistent with Bulow et al., (1999) who argue that bidder 
firms will be more aggressive in case they own a stake in a target firm, particularly when there 
are more than one bidder bid for the same target with different stakes.  In the short and longer 
period windows, bidder returns significantly increase if target firms are experiencing 
bankruptcy. This means that bidder firms obtain a target firm at a fire-discount as suggested by 
Shleifer & Vishny(1992c) and Hansen & Thomas (1998). 
For explanatory variables, ROA, Tobin’s Q is shown to be negatively related to bidder returns 
for model (2) in the short period events and (-20, 20). However, the effect of Tobin’s Q in the 
short analysis is economically trivial, consistent with Moeller et al., (2004) More intangible 
assets are associated with positive abnormal returns in the short and longer event windows.  
There is a significant and positive impact on bidder returns in cases where bidder firms employ 
prestigious investment banks in model (1) over the short and longer period windows. On the 
other hand, if the target firms hire prestigious investment banks, this has a positive impact on 
bidder returns in model (1) over the short event period and the (-63, +126) window. However, 




when the size effect is controlled by using a small dummy variable, hiring prestigious banks 
significantly reduces bidder returns over the longer window.  
The relative size variable has a generally positive impact on the abnormal return. However, the 
effect over the short and longer windows is again economically trivial. Consistent with 
(Moeller et al., 2004), bidders gain more in cases where they bid in the form of a tender offer. 
However, the results are mostly valid for the longer windows. As expected by Schwert (2000b), 
hostile bids reduce bidder abnormal returns over the (-1, 1), (-2, 2) and (-20, 20), however, the 
results are not significant.  
Moreover, the abnormal returns of acquirer firms who acquire private targets have a positive 
and significant impact mostly over the short and longer event windows. This is consistent with 
the results of Fuller at el (2001). Using all-stocks as a method of payment has, as predicted by 
Travlos (1987);Heron & Lie (2002) and Boone & Mulherin (2008b) a significant negative 
impact on bidder returns only over the (-1, +1) window in model (1). However, it is surprising 
that all-stock offers increase significantly bidder returns over the longer windows. Finally, 
there is a positive and significant relation between successfully completed a deal and bidder 
returns over the longer period windows. 
3.5.3. Choice of Selling Mechanism  
 
Bulow & Klemperer (2002b) argue that the level of competition is related to a bidder firm’s 
characteristics, where the presence of a strong bidder (for example, large bidders or a bidder 
with a high cash reserve) would create or at least heighten the prospective of the winner’s curse. 
As a result of this, investigating how the choice between the selling mechanisms of auctions 
and negotiations are related to various bidders and deal characteristics is one of the main 
concerns of this chapter.  
Table 21 models the choices of the selling mechanism in the U.S. market using the marginal 
effects from a logit model of the probability for a deal to structure as auction. The analysis 
starts with the limited explanatory variables in model (1) that are typically viewed as potential 
determinants for bidder returns or the selection of selling processes, in Table 14.  These 
variables include the firm’s size (Ln (size)), its cash holding, leverage, target in antitakeover 
state, target-initiated deals, toehold, target in bankruptcy, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s q, 
intangible assets, bidder and target firm hire top-investment banks and relative size. Model (2) 




further includes a set of control variables like tender offer, hostile deal, private target, all-stock 
as method of payment and completed deals.   
There are observable bidders and deal characteristics in models (1) which affect the choice of 
selling mechanism. For example, bidders who choose to bid in auction are more likely to be 
large firms. As predicted, the larger size of bidder firms motivate them to engage in competitive 
selling procedures, where the larger bidder could deter other competitors, and this could reduce 
the level of competition and scuttle the possible gain for target firms from conduction an 
auction Bulow & Klemperer (2002b);Moeller et al., (2004); and Boone & Mulherin (2008b). 
Bidders with a high level of leverage are more likely to engage in the auction process, and the 
result is statistically significant at the level of 10 %. This result is contrary to (Offenberg & 
Pirinsky, 2015)who argue that acquirer firm with a high level of leverage are more likely to bid 
in the form of a friendly merger process.  
It is hardly surprising; bidder firms are more likely to bid in a competitive process if a target 
firm has initiated a takeover deal. Bidders who have a toehold in target firms are more likely 
to engage in a competition process to acquire target firm’s assets. This result is contrary to 
Bulow et al., (1999) who show that auction is not an attractive strategy for bidder firms that 
have a stake in a target firm, because bidder firms are more aggressive in auction with a toehold. 
However, it could be argued that bidder firms are more likely to bid in auction with a toehold 
that less than the threshold of a toehold in negotiation that is documented by Betton et al., 
(2009b). The average of toeholds in the auction subsample is 10%, which is less than the 
threshold (20%) that encourage bidder firms to bid in a negotiation process.  
Bidders are more likely to bid in a competition process for a target firm in bankruptcy. In the 
light of Shleifer & Vishny (1992c) and Hansen & Thomas (1998) argument, bidder firms are 
encouraged to bid in a bankruptcy transaction in order to enjoy win a takeover deal at a fire-
sale discount. The more tangible assets bidder firms have, the more likely they are to motivate 
bidders to bid in auction. It could be argued that bidder firm with a high level of leverage are 
less likely to engage in acquisition transactions as pointed by Uysal (2011). However, Jensen 
& Meckling (1976) argue that leverage is positively related to the level of tangible assets 
whereby bidders can have a great debt capacity by using their assets as collateral for loans. 
This result could explain why firms with a high level of leverage bid in a competitive auction.  
It is interesting to note that, the likelihood of bidders bidding in auction is increased if either 
the target or the bidder firms employ investment banks with a high quality.  




In Model (2), the results remain the same for all of the above explanatory variables, except the 
level of leverage flips to be statistically not significant. In relation to the further explanatory 
variables, it is not surprising that if the competition level between bidders increases, bidders 
strongly prefer to bid in the form of a hostile or tender offer as shown by Offenberg & Pirinsky 
(2015). Bidders are less likely to bid in auction for private targets. In the light of Hansen (1987b) 
argument, bidder firms are less likely to use stock offers in auction in order to protect their 
confidential information , it is surprising to find that bidders are more likely to use stock in 
auction.  As predicted before, an auction is less likely to be successfully completed. It could be 
concluded that auction is not a popular mechanism in corporate finance simply in order to avoid 
the high possibility of a failed transaction. Therefore, bidders might observe the likelihood of 
these types of process to fail and, so, natural lose confidence in this kind of purchasing format. 
Finally, in model (1) and (2), the level of cash reserves, whether the target is in an antitakeover 
state, ROA, Tobin’s q and the relative size do not determine the likelihood of bidding in auction. 
In conclusion, the statistical results show that the choice of bidder firms to bid in auction or 
negotiation is not a random: bidder firms that are large, have high levels of leverage and 
tangible assets typically are more likely to bid in auction. Moreover, bidders are more likely to 
bid in auction if a target firm initiated a takeover deal or it is in bankruptcy, if bidders own a 
toehold in a target firm. Bidder firms also bid in auction if they or target firms use an investment 
bank with a high reputation. Auctions are associated with a tender offer, hostile technique, and 
most surprisingly with all-stock offers.  However, bidder firms are less likely to bid in auction 
for a private firm, and less likely to complete a bid.   
 
3.5.4. Matching  
 
3.5.4.1. Propensity Score Estimation 
 
The main objective of this study is to estimate the casual impact of bidding in competitive 
auction upon bidder returns. However, target or bidder firms are self-selected their selling 
methods.  As discussed previously, a simple comparison or regression on the mean difference 
in the cumulative abnormal return (CARs) between the two sub-groups of bidders who choose 
to bid in auction and negotiation would be biased.  To address the self-selection problem, 
propensity score matching will be applied. The analysis uses the logit regression model to 




estimate the propensity score based on a broad range of conditioning variables that are 
associated with the observable bidder and deal characteristics. Here the analysis will run a logit 
regression to estimate the propensity scores, while just keeping the statistically significant 
variables, in Table 21. Table B3 in Appendix B shows the results of estimating the likelihood 
of choosing scheme of arrangement by using the selective covariates that appears in the linear, 
higher order terms and interaction terms, as suggested by Imbeds & Rubin (2009).   
Then, it is essential to examine whether the overlap assumption is not violated, after calculating 
the propensity score. According to Wooldridge (2010) the overlap assumption is violated when 
there are mass propensity score distributions of 0 or 1.  Figure 6 shows the distribution quality 
of the estimate propensity score by treatment status based on the logit model in Table B3. It 
can be seen that, the quality of propensity score distribution by treatment status satisfies the 
overlap assumption which means that there are no values for the propensity score that have 0 
or 1 in either negotiation deals (the untreated group) or auction (the treatment group).111 
However, there is a poor mass overlapping between the two groups which could affect the 
choice of matching strategies, for example, if there is a large drop in the number of matched 
observations by using matching with caliper (Guo & Fraser, 2015, p.184-185). However, the 
narrow common support does not affect the choice of matching strategies as shown later in 
Table 22. 
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3.5.4.2. Treatment Effects  
 
 
Table 22 reports the results of the treatment effects, after implementing the matching strategies.  
Each row provides the results for both the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average 
treatment effect of the treated (ATT).  The main parameter of interest in this section is ATE. 
This section applies various greedy matching strategies here: nearest neighbour matching (in 
Panel A) and caliper matching (in Panel B). The columns are stratified respectively based on 
the short period windows that are used to calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) :(-
1, +1) and (-2, +2), and longer period (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows.  In general, bidding 
in auction, in line with the general expectation, tends to reduce the wealth of shareholders 
compared with engaging in a negotiation process, for both ATE and ATT. Over the short-run 
analysis, the event of winner’s curse exists in takeover competition, and this consistent with 
Thaler (1988);Kagel & Levin (1986);and Bazerman & Samuelson (1983). However, the 
overbidding results become less clear when examined over the long-event period. 
 
Panel A estimates the treatment effect by matching the bidder firms that choose to bid in 
auction (the treatment group) to respectively either one, two or three bidder firms that choose 
to engage in one-to-one negotiation (the untreated group). In the first row, ATE and ATT are 
estimated by using the cumulative abnormal return over the (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows, 
where each target firm in the treatment group matches with the signal nearest neighbour in the 
untreated group. In the estimation of ATE, 238 bidders who choose to bid in auction match 
with 233 bidders who choose to engage in a negotiation process. Bidding in auction reduces 
significantly shareholder wealth by, on average, - 0.985% and -1.599% over the (-1, +1) and (-
2, +2) windows, respectively. On average, bidder firms lose significantly more returns over the 
(-2, +2) window compared to the narrow one.  This result suggests that the winner’s curse 
exists in auctions. Boone & Mulherin (2008b) document that the average abnormal returns of 
auctions and negotiation bidders over the (-1, +1) window are -0.69% and -0.71%, respectively. 
The negative returns of auction are approximately close to the result obtained by this analysis. 
However, Boone & Mulherin (2008b) do not find a significant difference in bidder returns 
between auction and negotiation, and therefore auctions do not increase the chances of the 
winner’s curse. Such results could suggest that the winner’s curse exists in the public 
competition process, but not in the private process. It could be argued that, bidder firms are 




more likely to be aggressive in a competitive auction whereby they are more than one public 
bidder bid for the same target firm. 
 
In the case of estimating ATT, the match strategy uses 286 number of bidders who choose to 
bid in an auction to be matched with 233 negotiation firms. Bidding in auction reduces 
significantly the wealth of shareholders by, on average, -1.660% over the (-1, +1) window. 
However, although bidding in auction reduces the bidder abnormal return by, on average, -
1.358% over the (-2, +2) window, the result is statistically insignificant.  
 
Moreover, ATE and ATT is estimated by matching each treated target firm to the two nearest 
neighbours in the untreated group. In the case of estimate ATE, 247 bidders that choose to bid 
in auction match with 427 bidders who choose to engage in a negotiation process, and the result 
shows that a bidder firm that bids in auction (significant at a 10% level) reduces the shareholder 
wealth by, on average, -0.860% over the (-1,1) window. Bidders also lose significantly, on 
average, more returns over the (-2, +2). This result is further evidence that auctions give rise 
to the winner’s curse. In the case of estimate ATT, all auction samples are matched to 427 
negotiation bidders over the (-1, 1) and (-2, +2) windows, and the result shows that bidders lose 
returns in auction. However, the result is statistically insignificant.    
 
Finally, if the matched sample is constructed by matching each bidder firm that chooses to bid 
in auction to three bidder firms that choose to bid in negotiation, 284 auction bidders are 
matched to 598 negotiation bidders when estimating ATE. On average, auction bidders lose 
respectively, on average, -0.676% and -0.159% over the (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows. 
However, the negative impact of an auction is statistically not significant. In case of estimate 
ATT, the average abnormal returns over the (-1, +1) window are significantly reduced by, on 
average, -1,125% at a 10% level. Over the (-2, +2) window, bidding in auction also reduces 
significantly shareholder wealth, on average, by -1.961% and the number of negative losses in 
the abnormal returns is larger over the (-2, 2) window.  
 
Although using longer event periods to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns could 
introduce noise relative to the narrow event period (Fama, 1991), for further robustness, this 
section will estimate the effect of using auctions upon shareholder wealth over the (-20, +20) 
and (-63, +126) windows. The main reason for this is that, the longer event window could 




capture more information that could be not reflected at the date of announcement as suggested 
by Boone & Mulherin (2007a:2008b). 
 
Panel A presents the results of ATE and ATT on auctions over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) 
windows based on a different number of neighbours. The results for ATE can be quickly 
summarised as follows: bidding in auction has a negative impact upon the cumulative abnormal 
return in cases where each treatment firm is matched to one or two untreated firms. However, 
the impact of auctions upon bidder returns is positive in cases were each treatment firm is 
matched to three untreated bidders. Regardless of the impact of an auction on bidder returns 
and the matching strategies that are used, the results are statistically not significant over the (-
20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows. The results for ATE show that auction has a negative impact 
on bidder returns over the (-20, +20) window, while auction has a positive impact on bidder 
returns over the (-63, +126) window. However, the results are not statistically significant. 
 
In conclusion, the short run analysis of ATE show that the average abnormal return is inversely 
related to bidding in auctions, in cases where the structured of the matched sample is 
constructed by matching each bidder firm that choose to bid in auction to either one or two 
bidder firms that choose to bid in negotiation. Moreover, where ATT is estimated in the short 
run analysis, auction firms reduce significantly the average abnormal return of bidders mostly 
if the match sample is constructed by matching each auction bidder to one and three negotiation 
bidders. Such results suggest that the event of the winner’s curse exists in the U.S. takeover 
market in case of bidding in a competitive auction. Moreover, the winner’s curse does not exist 
in the long period analysis.  
Panel B shows the implications of using different sizes of caliper to estimate the treatment 
effect of using auction on the level of shareholder’s wealth. In case of estimate ATE, the 
number of treatment and untreated units respectively drops to 203 and 192 with the size of 
caliper (𝜀 = 0.001). Over the (-1, 1) and (-2, +2) windows, it is also the case that the average 
of abnormal returns is significantly negative which means that an auction gives rise to the event 
of a winner’s curse. Auction bidders lose more cumulative abnormal over the (-2, +2) window 
in comparison to the narrow one. In case of estimate ATT, 226 treated firms are matched to 
192 untreated firms in order to structure the matched sample, and the results show that auction 
reduces significantly the cumulative abnormal return at a 10% level over the window (-1,+1). 




However, the negative impact of auction on the bidder return is statistically not significant over 
the (-2, +2) window. 
In cases where ATE is estimated with the size of caliper (𝜀 = 0.001), the auction reduces the 
bidder by, on average, -4.500% and -5,972 % over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows, 
respectively. However, the negative impact of auction upon the cumulative return is 
statistically significant at a 10% level over the (-63, +126) window. In case of estimate ATT, 
the impact of an auction flips to positive upon bidder returns. However, the result is not 
statistically significant.  
If the matched sample is constructed in case of estimate ATE by matching each bidder firm 
that chooses to bid in the auction to one bidder firm that chooses to bid in negotiation with the 
size of caliper (𝜀 = 0.0001), the number of treated and untreated groups respectively drops to 
121 and 125, respectively. The result shows that auction reduces significantly bidder returns 
by, on average, -1.272% over the (-1, +1) window at a 10% level and the negative impact of 
an auction is more and highly significant over the (-2, +2) window. In case of estimate ATT, 
149 treated firms are matched to 125 untreated firms and the results show that auction reduces 
significantly the cumulative abnormal return by, on average, -2,317% and -2,894% over (-1, 1) 
and (-2, +2) windows, respectively. 
In the case of estimate ATE with the size of caliper  (𝜀 = 0.0001), an auction has a negative 
impact over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows, but the result is only significant at a 10% 
level over the (-20, +20). In case of estimate ATT, the sign on the coefficient auction dummy 
is negative over the (-20, 20) and it flips to positive over the (-63, +126) windows. However, 
the result is statistically insignificant.  
 
Finally, the matched sample is drawn with the size of caliper (𝜀 = 0.00001) and 64 bidder 
firms that choose to bid in auction are matched to 60 bidder firms that choose to bid in 
negotiation.  In case of estimate ATE, bidder firms lose their return in auction by, on average, 
-1,159% over the (-1, +1) window at a 10% level. The number of negative returns is larger and 
more significant over the (-2, +2) window. In case of estimate ATT,73 auction bidders are 
matched to 60 negotiation bidders and the results show that bidding in auction has a negative 
impact over the (-1,+1) and (-2,+2) windows. However, the results are statistically not 
significant.  
 




In case of estimate ATE, auction has a significantly negative impact upon the cumulative 
abnormal return over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows if the control sample is structured 
by using the size of caliper(𝜀 = 0.00001). It is interesting to note that, the negative number of 
the cumulative abnormal returns increase in the longer event window.  In case of estimate ATT, 
auction has a negative impact upon bidder returns but the results are not statistically significant 
over the (-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows.  
 
Over the (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows, the negative impact of using auctions upon the 
cumulative abnormal return is high in cases of structured the matched sample by using the 
nearest neighbour with different sizes of caliper, in general either for ATE and ATT. Over the 
(-20, +20) and (-63, +126) windows, there are few significant differences that show that auction 
has a negative impact upon bidder returns in the case of estimate ATE with different sizes of 
caliper. However, there is no significant impact of auction on bidder returns in the case of 
estimate ATT. 
 
3.5.4.3. Robustness Check 
 
This section uses evaluating the matching strategies and sensitivity analysis to the hidden bias 
as the main concern of the robustness check.  First, after applying different matching strategies, 
it is important to evaluate how well the treatment and comparison group are balanced in the 
matched sample. Second, this section will test the sensitivity of matched pairs for the presence 
of omitted variables that may affect the selection of bidding in auction or bidder returns. In 
order to investigate how large the unobservable variables could affect the results of PSM that 
built under the assumption of no hidden bias.  
The parameter of ATE have been calculated by suing different matching strategies with and 
without caliper, and the results always show that bidding in auction reduces significantly bidder 
returns over the short event periods in case of matching each single auction firm to a one or 
two negotiation firms. This negative impact of auction upon bidder returns remains also true 
irrespective the sizes of caliper. In case of estimate ATT, auction still has negative and 
significant impact in case of structure the control sample by matching each single auction firm 
to one or three negotiation firms, or with sizes of caliper (𝜀 = 0.001) and (𝜀 = 0.0001). Over 
the longer event periods, there are few significant differences that show auction reduce bidder 




returns in the case of estimate ATE with different sizes of caliper. However, there is no 
significant impact of auction on bidder returns in the case of estimate ATT. 
 
In the light of the above mentioned, there is an essential question about which set of results that 
obtained by different matching strategies are to be preferred. This section chooses to present a 
result that has a high quality of matching and that does not have a sensitivity to hidden bias.   
This section firstly will show the results that related to the matching evaluation. The preferred 
results of this section are if the matched sample is constructed by matching each bidder firm 
that chooses to bid in the auction to one bidder firm that chooses to bid in negotiation (1-to-1 
matching strategy).112 
 Table 23 and 24 reports the results of the comparison of covariate balance after the estimating 
of ATE and ATT, respectively, by applying nearest neighbour 1-to-1 matching strategy without 
caliper. In case of estimate ATE, in the raw sample, the covariates seems to be balanced 
compared to the treatment units based on Imai & Ratkovic (2014) test. For most of the variables 
that have been used to estimate ATE, the standardised difference is close to zero and the 
variance ratio is close to one. However, the mean of variance ratio of the dummy variables that 
takes the value of 1, if bidder firms bid in the form of hostile technique, if the target and bidder 
hire an investment bank with a high reputation in the raw unit look differ from the matched 
one. Therefore, it is important to check the balance for these dummy variables by using 
histogram as suggested by Guo& Fraser (2015, p.198-200).  Figure 8 show the comparison of 
estimated propensity scores generated by Table B3 for bidders who bid in a hostile technique, 
and for a target and bidder who hire an investment bank with a high reputation.  It can be seen 
that, the matched sample is balanced after matching. Thus, there is no need to increase the 
quality of matching. In case of estimate ATT, the variables have a standardise difference that 
is close to zero and a variance ratio that is close to one. This means that all the variables is 
perfectly matched. 
                                                          
112 Although there are many matching strategies that have a high-quality matching and satisfy the hidden bias test, 
this section will present the result of the estimate ATE and ATT, if the matched sample is constructed by matching 
each bidder firm that chooses to bid in the auction to one bidder firm that chooses to bid in negotiation. The main 
reason to do that to avoid presenting too many tables for each matching strategy and the results are available upon 
request. 
 




The second part of this section concern about the sensitivity of the results to the presence of 
omitted variables that may affect auction and bidder returns. Using matching method removes 
the problem of selection bias between auction and negotiation. However, the bias does not 
remove from unobservable. This section will use the test that is suggested by Becker and 
Caliendo (2007) and explained in section 2.4.2.3 that test how large the effect of the 
unobservable or “hidden bias” needs to be in order to reverse the results found by PSM. Table 
25 shows the result of the sensitivity analysis for the result of ATE and ATT by applying 
nearest neighbour 1-to-1 matching strategy without caliper, over the short and longer event 
period.  Under Γ=1, there is no hidden bias due to omitted factors in case of estimate ATE over 
the short and long windows.  In case of estimate ATT, the result is not sensitive to hidden bias 
due to omitted factors over the short event windows.  
3.5.6. Comparison of Estimated Models of the impact of auction upon bidder 
returns 
 
All the methods (t-test, OLS and PSM) conclude that the average treatment effect of using 
auction is negative and significant. However, this result is influenced by the length of the 
selected window, and this finding valid only for the short-value analysis.    
The normal linear regression analysis as discussed before apparently may involve the selection 
problem, as the selection of a specific selling mechanism would be a self- decision of the target 
firm or bidder firms, which may in turn depend on their specific characteristics.  If the self-
section problem is not properly addressed, the regression will render biased estimates. Because 
of this, the analysis use PSM. It is worth to establish a comparison between the average 
treatment effect before and after controlling the selection-bias problem. Table 26 shows a 
comparison of findings across models estimating the impact of auction on bidder returns, over 
the short and longer window respectively.  First, t-test shows that auction reduces significantly 
bidder returns at, on average -2,146% (0.001) and -2.406% (0.000). 
 
 In OLS, bidding in auction reduce significantly the cumulative abnormal returns -1.7% (0.007) 
and -1.8 %( 0.007) over the short-value analysis. The effect of auction remained significant 
after controlling the selection-bias problem whereby auction reduces significantly bidder 
returns over the short-event analysis by, on average, -0.985%(0.004) and -1.599%(0.004) in 
the short event windows. The coefficient on the auction dummy is more negative before 
controlling the selection-bias problem. The ATE and ATT are estimated by using the 




regression-adjusted model as well. Auction is still negative and significant over the short value 




The choice of selling mechanisms is always matters. The majority of empirical literature 
mentioned in this work argues that auctions do not induce bidders to pay more for target firms 
and that there is no significant difference between auction and negotiation returns either for 
target or for bidder firms. However, these works base their findings on the private selling 
process.  The main aim of this chapter is to examine whether bidding in auctions has a causal 
impact upon bidder returns at the public-phase competition, where bidders are more aggressive 
when there is more than one bidder bidding for the same target firms. Therefore, the possibility 
of the winner’s curse to exist is high. 
 
Moreover, Boone & Mulherin (2008b) have found that the size of the bidder firm is inversely 
related to the level of competition when there is more than one bidder for the same target. More 
precisely, the mere presence of a large firm presents an opportunity to deter small bidders and, 
consequently, it is therefore more beneficial for the target to avoid conducting a full-scale 
auction when the size of the bidders is markedly different.  
The main empirical results show that bidders who chose to conduct takeovers using auction 
frameworks have high levels of leverage and tangible assets, while bidders are more likely to 
bid using an auction if either the target initiates the deals, or is facing bankruptcy, or if the 
bidders already have a stake “toehold” in the target.  Bidders are also more likely to bid using 
an auction if they use (or their target uses) an investment bank with a high reputation. Auctions 
are, then, associated with tender offers, hostile techniques, and, most surprisingly, with all- 
stock offers. Bidders are less likely to bid in auctions for private firms.   
The empirical investigation reveals that the auction process has a negative impact on bidder 
returns during the short-event period when compared to takeovers structured through 
negotiations. This seems to confirm the theoretical prediction that auction, as a selling 
mechanism, is less beneficial to bidders than negotiation due to increasing competition. 
Therefore, this research finds the existence of the winner’s curse in such activates. However, 
the results are less clear across the long-event period.  




Table 13 Sample Construction 
The table shows the main steps that are used to construct the sample, and steps drop the number of deals, as listed below. Thomson One Banker provides all the acquisition 
data from the (SDC) US M&A Database over the periods 1984-2014. The original sample is restricted to meet step one criteria. Deals are subdivided in step two as auction and 
negotiations, based on the information about the main characteristics of the transactions in the file of acquisition technique in the SDC database (based on field 
RANK_MENUACQTECH), which reports on a subset of deals, whether they are conducted through Auction or Privately Negotiated Purchase. Step three follows the criteria 
proposed by Moelle, Schlingeman,& Stulz (2004) and Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn (2009b) , and a deal is classified as a negotiation if there is only one public bidder for the 
same target, and as an auction if there are two or more public bidders. The sample in step three is divided into steps; step three-a, and step Three-b. The Step. Three-a defines 
a new negotiation subset that are labelled by the SDC database as deals that are not related to any another existing deal (field RD) and that, at the same time, have only one 
public bidder as shown (field BIDCOUNT).  The Step Three-b includes all the related deals (field RD) to define extra auction and negotiation deals. The final sample consists 
of 286 auction deals and 14,360 negotiations after deleting data that does not have observations for the event windows in the short and long terms, transactions that announced 
for the same acquirer five days around the date of announcement, transactions that are reported with disclosed bidders, transactions that do not have accounting information, 

















Step one: The main criteria    
-The acquiring firm belongs to all M&As of a domestic acquirer announced between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2014. 289,163 
-Acquirer is a public firm  
 
147,637 
-Target are US firms 
 
125,111 
-Target is a public firm, private and subsidiary 
 
124,024 
-The deal status is flagged as "completed" and “withdrawn", and then restricted the completed deals to gain control of more than 50% of the target 
shares 
74,627 
-the acquirer should have owned before the date of announcement less than 50% of the target shares  73,809  
-The deal is not privatization 73,786 
- Repurchase or buyback, exchange offer, and recapitalisation deals are excluded 73,688 
- Deal value at least $1m 37,680 
Step two:  two groups are created by using Acquisitions techniques  
only transactions that are reported as Auction or Privately Negotiation Purchase in the step (1) will be included   134 
Auction 77 
Privately Negotiation purchase     57 
Step three: Moelle, Schlingeman, and Stulz (2004) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009b) classification 
Step 3a creates a new group of negotiation by using the sample that is created by step one and excluded the sub-sample that is created by step two 37,546 
-The deal is not related to any other deals and the number of bidders should be one  34,187 







Steps  Total observations 
Steps Three-b using the deals that are flagged as related to each other’s to define another auction and negotiation groups 
Step three- b creates a new group of negotiation and auction by using the sample that is created by step one and excluded the sub-samples that are created by step two and 
step(3a)  
- The deal is related to other deals as flagged by SDC 3,359  
-with transaction form ‘‘M’’(merger) or ‘‘AM’’ (acquisition of majority interest) 1,534 
The deal is negotiation if there are only one potential bidder for the same target over the preceding and over the following 6 months. 308 
The deal is auction if there are only one potential bidder for the same target over the preceding and over the following 6 months.  95 




     
726 
Negotiation 
    
34830 
Process the Data  
     
Matching the firm NCUSIP's number of SDC with COMPUSTATA and CRSP  16,025 
Deleting data that does not have observations for the event windows in the short and long terms  15,986 
deleting the transaction of the same acquirer 5 days around the date of announcement   data 15,842 
deleting undisclosed bidders  
   
15,831 
deleting the deals that do not have accounting information  15,567 
Deleting deals that does not present 1% of the acquirer's size  14,646 




    
286 
Negotiation         14,360 



































































































































































Table 14 Summary statistics sorted by the sales process (Scheme of arrangement 
-Tender offer), US market, 1984-2014 
Auction versus negotiation. This table reports summary statistics on bidder firms and deal characteristics of the 
sample consisting of 14,646 U.S. takeover deals. The statistical information is reported for the whole sample and 
for deals that are implemented by auction and negotiations. Of these 286 deals are classified as auction deals and 
14,360 deals are negotiations. Auction refer to a deal where there is more than one pubic bidder bidding for the 
same target, while negotiations deals refer to cases in which there is one public bidder bid for target firms. Panel 
A presents the mean value for the bidder’s characteristics, as sourced by Thomson DataStream. Panel B reports the mean 
value for the proportion of deal characteristics, as sourced by Thomson One Banker (SDC). Panel C reports the mean value 
for the proportion of investment bank characteristics, as sourced by SDC. Table B1 in the Appendix B reports all the 
definitions and database sources of variables that have been presented in Panel A, B, &C. The final column shows 
the differences in the means between the scheme of arrangement and tender offer sub-samples and its significantly 
levels are denoted by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis based on t-tests, ascertaining whether 
there are differences between schemes of arrangement and tender offers.  The statistical significances between 
schemes of arrangement and tender offers at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level are denoted ***, **, *. 
 
 




  Full Sample  Auction  Negotiation  
Difference test  
  Mean  N Mean N Mean N 
Panel A:  Bidder characteristics 
  Panel A': size effect  
Panel A'-1: Overall  
Market value (US$, millions) 1986.782 14,646 3817.159 286 1950.328 14,360 1866.831*** 
Size (Ln MV) 5.736 14,646 6.563 286 5.720 14,360 0.843*** 
Panel A'-2: Small bidders  
Small bidders (%) 44.387 6,501 25.524 73 44.763 6,428 -19.238*** 
Market value of small bidders (US$, millions) 169.139 6,501 181.915 73 168.994 6,428 12.921 
Small bidder Size  4.343 6,501 4.547 73 4.340 6,428 0.206 
Panel A'-3: Large bidders  
Large Firm (%) 55.612 8,145 74.475 213 55.236 7,932 19.238*** 
Market value of large bidders (US$, millions) 3437.549 8,145 5063.041 213 3393.899 7,932 1669.141* 
Large bidder Size 6.848 8,145 7.254 213 6.837 7,932 0.417*** 
Panel B': The Other Bidder characteristics        
Cash holding  0.198 14,646 0.157 286 0.198 14,360 -0.041*** 
Tobin’s q 2.452 14,646 2.075 286 2.460 14,360 -0.384* 
book-to-market value  2.146 14,646 1.754 286 2.153 14,360 -0.399* 
ROA  0.082 14,646 0.110 286 0.082 14,360 0.028** 
Leverage  0.207 14,646 0.266 286 0.206 14,360 0.059*** 
High Debt Dummy 10.241 1,500 13.286 38 10.181 1,462 3.105%* 
Collateral  0.213 14,646 0.281 286 0.211 14,360 0.070*** 
Sales (US$, millions) 1,022.719 14,646 3,044.782 286 982.447 14,360 2,062.335*** 
Total assets (US$, millions) 2,682.314 14,646 8,694.638 286 2,562.57 14,360 6,132.067*** 
Panel B: Deal characteristics 
Transaction value (US$, millions) 229.957 14,646 1,799.455 286 198.698 14,360 1600.757*** 
Small bidder transaction value (US$, millions) 36.374 6,501 118.055 73 35.447 6,428 82.608*** 
Large bidder transaction value (US$, millions) 384.466 8,145 2,375.709 213 330.995 7,932 2044.714*** 
Relative Size  0.654 14,646 1.077 286 0.645 14,360 0.431 
Successful rate  94.756 13,878 51.748 148 95.612 13,730  -43.864*** 
Days to completion 70.567 13,878 143.223 148 69.783 13,730 73.480*** 
Failed rate  5.243 768 48.251 138 4.387 630 43.864*** 
Target-Initiated 1.276 187 11.538 33 1.070 154 10.466** 
Cash in payment (%) 77.816 7,070 84.725 172 77.643 6,898 7.082*** 
Stock in payment (%) 76.836 5,931 79.528 111 76.787 5,820 2.740 
Pure cash deals (%) 25.822 3,671 38.811 111 25.564 3,671 13.247*** 
Pure Stock deals (%) 22.135 3,242 23.426 67 22.110 3,175 1.316 
Public target (%) 19.179 2,809 76.223 218 18.043 2,591 58.180*** 
Private target (%) 53.011 7,764 8.391 24 53.899 7,740 -45.508*** 
Subsidiary target (%) 27.809 4,073 15.384 44 28.057 4,029 -12.672*** 
Tender offer (%) 2.594 380 21.328 61 2.221 319 19.107*** 
Hostile deals (%)  0.375 55 8.741 25 0.208 30 8.532*** 
Bankruptcy target (%) 1.522 223 11.888 34 1.316 189 10.571*** 
Target in antitakeover state 14.413 2,111 13.636 39 14.428 2,072 -0.792 
Owned directly before (%) 19.607 151 10.091 16 20.7351 135 -10.644*** 
Owned directly after (%) 99.512 13,878 99.127 148 99.516 13,730 -0.389 
Panel C: Advisor characteristics 
Bidder hires advisors (%) 31.578 4,625 61.188 175 30.988 4,450 30.199*** 
Bidder hires top IB (%) 16.226 1,101 23.426 67 7.200 1,034 16.226*** 
Target hires advisors (%) 40.154 5,881 82.167 235 39.317 5,646 42.850*** 
Target hires top IB (%) 7.414 1,086 29.720 85 6.970 1,001 22.749*** 
 




Table 15 Summary Statistics for Short and Longer-Term CARs Sorted by the 
Sales Process, US Market, 1984- 2014 
Auction versus negotiation. This table reports summary statistics of cumulative abnormal return over different 
event windows in the short and longer period of the sample consisting of 14,646 U.S. M&A deals.  The statistical 
information is reported for the whole sample and for deals that are implemented by auctions and negotiations. Of 
these 286 deals are classified as auction deals and 14,360 deals are negotiations Auction refer to a deal where 
there is more than one pubic bidder bidding for the same target, while negotiations deals refer to cases in which 
there is one public bidder bid for target firms. Panel A reports the mean value for the cumulative abnormal returns 
in the short analysis window CAR [-1, +1] and CAR [-2,2]. Panel B reports the mean value the cumulative 
abnormal returns in the short analysis window CAR [-20,20]and CAR [-63,126]. The table uses the formula 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure the cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index, CRSP 
equally value-weighted index, and S&P Composite index.  The table calculates the cumulative abnormal returns 
by Market Model, the Fama-French model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  The final column shows 
the differences in the means between the scheme of arrangement and tender offer sub-samples and its significantly 
levels are denoted by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis based on t-tests, ascertaining whether 
there are differences between schemes of arrangement and tender offers. The p-value is reported between brackets.  
The statistical significances between schemes of arrangement and tender offers at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
level are denoted ***, **, *. 
 





All Auction  Negotiation Difference tests 
(Auction-
Negotiation) 
Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N 
Panel A: short- period window       
The Market Adjusted Returns      
 CRSP value-weighted index      
CAR [-1,1] 1.669%*** 14,646 -0.434%*** 286 1.711%*** 14,360 -2.146%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
CAR [-2,2] 1.970%*** 14,646 -0.389%*** 286 2.017%*** 14,360 -2.406%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
 CRSP equally value-weighted index     
CAR [-1,1] 1.586%*** 14,646 -0.444%*** 286 1.627%*** 14,360 -2.071%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
CAR [-2,2] 1.797%*** 14,646 -0.476%*** 286 1.842%*** 14,360 -2.318%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
S&P Composite index       
CAR [-1,1] 1.664%*** 14,646 -0.448%*** 286 1.706%*** 14,360 -2.155%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
CAR [-2,2] 1.966%*** 14,646 -0.398%*** 286 2.013%*** 14,360 -2.412%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Market Model  
CAR [-1,1] 1.253%*** 14,646 -0.371%*** 286 1.286%*** 14,360 -1.657%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007) 
CAR [-2,2] 1.302%*** 14,646 -0.404%*** 286 1.336%*** 14,360 -1.740%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009) 
Fama-French model  
CAR [-1,1] 1.258%*** 14,646 -0.364%*** 286 1.291%*** 14,360 -1.655%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007) 
CAR [-2,2] 1.294%*** 14,646 -0.443%*** 286 1.328%*** 14,360 -1.772%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007) 
The Carhart (1997) four-factor model  
CAR [-1,1] 1.266%*** 14,646 -0.376%*** 286 1.298%*** 14,360 -1.675%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007) 
CAR [-2,2] 1.305%*** 14,646 -0.418%*** 286 1.339%*** 14,360 -1.757%*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.008) 
 





All Auction  Negotiation Difference 
tests (Auction-
Negotiation) 
Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N 
 Panel B: Longer- period window           
The Market Adjusted Returns      
 CRSP value-weighted index      
CAR [-20,20] 4.009%*** 14,646 0.687%*** 286 4.075%*** 14,360 -3.388%** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.018) 
CAR [-63,126] 11.878%*** 14,646 7.463%*** 286 11.966%*** 14,360 -4.503% 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.116) 
 CRSP equally value-weighted index     
CAR [-20,20] 2.400%*** 14,646 -0.777%*** 286 2.464%*** 14,360 -3.242%** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021) 
CAR [-63,126] 4.723%*** 14,646 0.632%*** 286 4.804%*** 14,360 -4.172% 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.139) 
S&P Composite index       
CAR [-20,20] 3.928%*** 14,646 0.574%*** 286 3.995%*** 14,360 -3.420%** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.018) 
CAR [-63,126] 11.525%*** 14,646 6.978%*** 286 11.615%*** 14,360 -4.637% 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.108) 
Market Model  
CAR [-20,20] 0.740%*** 14,646 -2.496%*** 286 0.804%*** 14,360 -3.300%** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011) 
CAR [-63,126] -5.395%*** 14,646 -7.043%*** 286 -5.362%*** 14,360 -1.681% 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.612) 
Fama-French model  
CAR [-20,20] 0.729%*** 14,646 -2.437%*** 286 0.792%*** 14,360 -3.230%** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012) 
CAR [-63,126] -5.362%*** 14,646 -7.395%*** 286 -5.322%*** 14,360 -2.073% 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.530) 
The Carhart (1997) four-factor model  
CAR [-20,20] 0.724%*** 14,646 -2.398%*** 286 0.786%*** 14,360 -3.185%** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013) 
CAR [-63,126] -5.153%*** 14,646 -6.716%*** 286 -5.121%*** 14,360 -1.594% 








Table 16 Short-event [-1, +1] CARs sorted by the Sales Process, US market, 
1984- 2014 
Auction versus negotiation. This table reports summary statistics of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in 
the short analysis window CAR [-1, +1] over bidder and deal characteristics of the sample consisting of 14,646 
U.S. M&A deals. The statistical information is reported for the whole sample and for deals that are implemented 
by auctions and negotiations. Of these 286 deals are classified as auction deals and 14,360 deals are negotiations 
Auction refer to a deal where there is more than one pubic bidder bidding for the same target, while negotiation 
deals refer to cases in which there is one public bidder bid for target firms. Panel A reports the mean value of the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the short analysis [-1, +1] window over small and large bidders. Panel B reports 
the mean value for the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the short analysis window CAR [-1, +1] over the 
deal characteristics; successful(failed) deals, pure cash(stock)deals, public (private or subsidiary) target, public 
bidders with cash (equity), private bidders with cash (equity), subsidiary bidders with cash (equity),target-initiated, 
tender offer, hostility, bankruptcy target, target in antitakeover states, and finally the percentage of shares that 
bidders owned directly before the announcement date. Panel C shows the mean value for the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) in the short analysis [-1, +1] window over the advisor characteristics: if bidder (target) hires 
advisors and if bidder (target) hires top tier advisors. The table uses the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure the 
cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index.  Table A1 in the Appendix A reports all 
the definitions and database sources of variables that have been presented in Panel A, B, &C.  The final column 
shows the differences in the means between the auction and negotiation sub-samples and its significantly levels 
are denoted by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis based on t-tests, ascertaining whether there are 
differences between auction and negotiation deals. The p-value is reported between brackets.  The statistical 
significances between schemes of arrangement and tender offers at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level are 

















Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N  
Panel A: Size Effect   
Small Size Bidder  
2.537%*** 6,501 0.993%*** 73 2.554%*** 6,428 -1.561% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.327) 
Large Size Bidder  
0.976%*** 8,145 -0.924%*** 213 1.027%*** 7,932 -1.952%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Difference (small-large)  1.560%*** 14,646 1.917% 286 1.527%*** 14,360  
 (0.000)  (0.116)  (0.000)   
Difference (small auction -
large negotiation)  
-0.034% 8,005      
(0.972)  
     
Difference (small 
negotiation -large auction) 
3.479%*** 6,641      
(0.000)       
Panel B: Deal Characteristics  
Successful deals  
1.693%*** 13,878 -0.677%*** 148 1.718%*** 13,730 -2.396%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008) 
Failed deals   
1.238%*** 768 -0.174%*** 138 1.548%*** 630 -1.722% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.135) 
Pure cash deals  
1.579%*** 3,782 -0.019%*** 111 1.627%*** 3,671 -1.646%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.019) 
Pure Stock deals 
1.143%*** 3,242 -1.942%*** 67 1.208%*** 3,175 -3.151%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.043) 
Public target  
-0.700%*** 2,809 -1.465%*** 218 -0.637%*** 2,591 -0.819% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.215) 
Private target  
2.066%*** 7,764 3.662%*** 24 2.061%*** 7,740 1.601% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.468) 
Subsidiary target  
2.547%*** 4,073 2.393%*** 44 2.549%*** 4,029 -0.155% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.932) 
Public with cash  
1.078%*** 703 -0.277%*** 85 1.264%*** 618 -1.542%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.045) 
Public with stock  
-1.936%*** 1,187 -4.104%*** 54 -1.833%*** 1,133 -2.271% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.141) 
Private with cash  
1.393%*** 1,686 0.642%*** 8 1.397%*** 1,678 -0.755% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.771) 
Private with stock  
2.908%*** 1,808 8.182%*** 11 2.876%*** 1,797 5.306% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.186) 
Subsidiary with cash  
2.056%*** 1,393 0.906%*** 18 2.071%*** 1,375 -1.165% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.517) 
Subsidiary with stock  
3.019%*** 247 0.744%*** 2 3.038%*** 245 -2.293% 
(0.000)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.789) 
Target-Initiated 
2.457%*** 187 -0.472%*** 33 3.084%*** 154 -3.557%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021) 
Tender offer  
1.009%*** 380 -1.037%*** 61 1.400%*** 319 -2.437%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021) 
Hostile deals  
-0.185%*** 55 -0.537%*** 25 0.108%*** 30 -0.645% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.720) 
Bankruptcy target  
3.524%*** 223 3.112%*** 34 3.599%**** 189 -0.486% 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.814) 
Target in antitakeover state 
1.955%*** 2,111 0.835%*** 39 1.976%*** 2,072 -1.140% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.625) 
Owned directly before 
0.076%*** 151 -0.933%*** 16 0.196%*** 135 -1.130% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.484) 










Negotiation) Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N 
Panel C: Advisor characteristics 
Bidder hires advisors  
1.320%*** 4,625 -1.441%*** 175 1.429%*** 4,450 -2.870%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007) 
Bidder hires top IB 
1.005%*** 1,101 -0.756%*** 67 1.119%*** 1,034 -1.875% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.404) 
Target   hires advisors  
0.781%*** 5,881 -1.104%*** 235 0.860%*** 5,646 -1.965%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008) 
Target hires top IB 
1.167%*** 1,086 -2.938%*** 85 1.516%*** 1,001 -4.455%** 











Table 17 Short-event [-2, +2] CARs sorted by the Sales Process, US market, 
1984- 2014 
Auction versus negotiation. This table reports summary statistics of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in 
the short analysis window CAR [-2, +2] over bidder and deal characteristics of the sample consisting of 14,646 
U.S. M&A deals. The statistical information is reported for the whole sample and for deals that are implemented 
by auctions and negotiations. Of these 286 deals are classified as auction deals and 14,360 deals are negotiations 
Auction refer to a deal where there is more than one pubic bidder bidding for the same target, while negotiation 
deals refer to cases in which there is one public bidder bid for target firms. Panel A reports the mean value of the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the short analysis [-2, +2] window over small and large bidders. Panel B reports 
the mean value for the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the short analysis window CAR [-2, +2] over the 
deal characteristics; successful(failed) deals, pure cash(stock)deals, public (private or subsidiary) target, public 
bidders with cash (equity), private bidders with cash (equity), subsidiary bidders with cash (equity),target-initiated, 
tender offer, hostility, bankruptcy target, target in antitakeover states, and finally the percentage of shares that 
bidders owned directly before the announcement date. Panel C shows the mean value for the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) in the short analysis [-2, +2] window over the advisor characteristics: if bidder (target) hires 
advisors and if bidder (target) hires top tier advisors. The table uses the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure the 
cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index.  Table A1 in the Appendix A reports all 
the definitions and database sources of variables that have been presented in Panel A, B, &C.  The final column 
shows the differences in the means between the auction and negotiation sub-samples and its significantly levels 
are denoted by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis based on t-tests, ascertaining whether there are 
differences between auction and negotiation deals. The p-value is reported between brackets.  The statistical 
significances between schemes of arrangement and tender offers at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level are 
denoted ***, **, *. 
 
 









Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N 
Panel A: Size Effect   
Small Size Bidder  
2.872%*** 6,501 1.590%*** 73 2.886%*** 6,428 -1.296% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.466) 
Large Size Bidder  
1.250%*** 8,145 -1.067%*** 213 1.312%*** 7,932 -2.380%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Difference (small-large)  1.621%*** 14,646 2.658%** 286 1.574%*** 14,360  
 (0.000)  (0.048)  (0.000)   
Difference (small auction -
large negotiation)  
0.277% 8,005      
(0.802)  
     
Difference (small 
negotiation -large auction) 
3.954%*** 6,641      
(0.000)       
Panel B: Deal Characteristics  
Successful deals  
2.002%*** 13,878 -0.280%*** 148 2.026%*** 13,730 -2.307%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.022) 
Failed deals   
1.391%*** 768 -0.506%*** 138 1.806%*** 630 -2.312%* 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.067) 
Pure cash deals  
1.674%*** 3,782 -0.012%*** 111 1.725%*** 3,671 -1.737%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.032) 
Pure Stock deals 
1.651%*** 3,242 -2.310%*** 67 1.735%*** 3,175 -4.045%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.026) 
Public target  
-0.606%*** 2,809 -1.606%*** 218 -0.522%*** 2,591 -1.083% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.130) 
Private target  
2.440%*** 7,764 3.893%*** 24 2.436%*** 7,740 1.456% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.568) 
Subsidiary target  
2.850%*** 4,073 2.306%*** 44 2.845%*** 4,029 0.461% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.815) 
Public with cash  
1.020%*** 703 -0.306%*** 85 1.203%*** 618 -1.509%* 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.094) 
Public with stock  
-1.665%*** 1,187 -4.481%*** 54 -1.530%*** 1,133 -2.950%* 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.072) 
Private with cash  
1.534%*** 1,686 0.900%*** 8 1.537%*** 1,678 -0.637% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.828) 
Private with stock  
3.573%*** 1,808 8.475%*** 11 3.543%*** 1,797 4.931% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.314) 
Subsidiary with cash  
2.174%*** 1,393 0.972%*** 18 2.189%*** 1,375 -1.217% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.563) 
Subsidiary with stock  
3.523%*** 247 -0.300%* 2 3.577%*** 245 -6.582% 
(0.000)  (0.058)  (0.000)  (0.494) 
Target-Initiated 
2.517%*** 187 -0.465%*** 33 3.156%*** 154 -3.621%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.041) 
Tender offer  
1.150%*** 380 -1.038%*** 61 1.568%*** 319 -2.607%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.037) 
Hostile deals  
-0.934%*** 55 -1.525%*** 25 -0.442%*** 30 -1.083% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.598) 
Bankruptcy target  
4.441%*** 223 4.784%*** 34 4.379%**** 189 0.405% 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.857) 
Target in antitakeover state 
2.099%*** 2,111 0.727%*** 39 2.124%*** 2,072 -1.397% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.566) 
Owned directly before 
0.023%*** 151 -0.023%*** 16 0.255%*** 135 -2.630% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.185) 
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted ***, **,* 





All Auction  Negotiation Difference tests 
(Auction-
Negotiation) 
Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N 
Panel C: Advisor characteristics 
Bidder hires advisors  
1.545%*** 4,625 -1.321%*** 175 1.658%*** 4,450 -2.982%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009) 
Bidder hires top IB 
1.363%*** 1,101 -1.727%*** 67 1.563%*** 1,034 -3.290% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.159) 
Target   hires advisors  
0.969%*** 5,881 -1.110%*** 235 1.056%*** 5,646 -2.166%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006) 
Target hires top IB 
1.404%*** 1,086 -3.349%*** 85 1.808%*** 1,001 -5.1581%*** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.005) 




Table 18 longer-event [-20, 20] CARs sorted by the Sales Process, US market, 
1984- 2014 
Auction versus negotiation. This table reports summary statistics of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in 
the longer analysis window CAR [-20, +20] over bidder and deal characteristics of the sample consisting of 14,646 
U.S. M&A deals. The statistical information is reported for the whole sample and for deals that are implemented 
by auctions and negotiations. Of these 286 deals are classified as auction deals and 14,360 deals are negotiations 
Auction refer to a deal where there is more than one pubic bidder bidding for the same target, while negotiation 
deals refer to cases in which there is one public bidder bid for target firms. Panel A reports the mean value of the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the longer analysis [-20, +20] window over small and large bidders. Panel B 
reports the mean value for the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the longer analysis window CAR [-20, +20] 
over the deal characteristics; successful(failed) deals, pure cash(stock)deals, public (private or subsidiary) target, 
public bidders with cash (equity), private bidders with cash (equity), subsidiary bidders with cash (equity),target-
initiated, tender offer, hostility, bankruptcy target, target in antitakeover states, and finally the percentage of shares 
that bidders owned directly before the announcement date. Panel C shows the mean value for the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) in the longer analysis [-20, +20] window over the advisor characteristics: if bidder (target) 
hires advisors and if bidder (target) hires top tier advisors. The table uses the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure 
the cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index.  Table A1 in the Appendix A reports 
all the definitions and database sources of variables that have been presented in Panel A, B, &C.  The final column 
shows the differences in the means between the auction and negotiation sub-samples and its significantly levels 
are denoted by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis based on t-tests, ascertaining whether there are 
differences between auction and negotiation deals. The p-value is reported between brackets.  The statistical 
significances between schemes of arrangement and tender offers at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level are 
denoted ***, **, *. 
 
 









Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N 
Panel A: Size Effect   
Small Size Bidder  
4.749%*** 6,501 3.025%*** 73 4.768%*** 6,428 -1.743% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.613) 
Large Size Bidder  
3.419%*** 8,145 -0.113%*** 213 3.514%*** 7,932 -3.627%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005) 
Difference (small-large)  1.329%*** 14,646 3.138% 286 1.254%*** 14,360  
 (0.000)  (0.218)  (0.001)   
Difference (small auction -
large negotiation)  
-0.489% 8,005      
(0.826)  
     
Difference (small 
negotiation -large auction) 
4.882%** 6,641      
(0.015)       
Panel B: Deal Characteristics  
Successful deals  
4.190%*** 13,878 2.088%*** 148 4.213%*** 13,730 -2.124% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.280) 
Failed deals   
0.737%*** 768 -0.815%*** 138 1.077%*** 630 -1.892% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.457) 
Pure cash deals  
3.505%*** 3,782 0.786%*** 111 3.587%*** 3,671 -2.801% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.104 
Pure Stock deals 
4.854%*** 3,242 -1.330%*** 67 4.985%*** 3,175 -6.316%* 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.082) 
Public target  
1.196%*** 2,809 -1.312%*** 218 1.407%*** 2,591 -2.72%* 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.062) 
Private target  
4.749%*** 7,764 9.854%*** 24 4.733%*** 7,740 5.121% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.324) 
Subsidiary target  
4.539%*** 4,073 5.597%*** 44 4.528%*** 4,029 1.069% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.762) 
Public with cash  
2.180%*** 703 0.494%*** 85 2.412%*** 618 -1.917% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.346) 
Public with stock  
1.373%*** 1,187 -4.952%*** 54 1.675%*** 1,133 -6.627%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.048) 
Private with cash  
3.724%*** 1,686 2.888%*** 8 3.728%*** 1,678 -0.839% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.895) 
Private with stock  
6.883%*** 1,808 19.439%*** 11 6.807%*** 1,797 12.632% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.183) 
Subsidiary with cash  
3.910%*** 1,393 1.230%*** 18 3.945%*** 1,375 -2.714% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.522) 
Subsidiary with stock  
6.733%*** 247 -17.798%* 2 6.933%*** 245 -24.732% 
(0.000)  (0.063)  (0.000)  (0.340) 
Target-Initiated 
5.176%*** 187 3.394%*** 33 5.557%*** 154 -2.163% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.538) 
Tender offer  
3.312%*** 380 1.581%*** 61 3.643%*** 319 -2.061% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.410) 
Hostile deals  
-1.839%*** 55 -1.398%*** 25 -2.220%*** 30 0.807% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.813) 
Friendly deals  
4.024%***  14,462  -0.590%*** 224 4.078%*** 14,238 -3.488%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.031) 
Bankruptcy target  
7.948%*** 223 10.474%*** 34 7.493%**** 189 2.981% 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.505) 
Target in antitakeover state 
3.766%*** 2,111 2.210%*** 39 3.795%*** 2,072 -1.585% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.664) 
Owned directly before 
0.951%*** 151 1.340%*** 16 0.905%*** 135 0.434% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.927) 
Statistically significant at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted ***, **,*















Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N 
Panel C: Advisor characteristics 
Bidder hires advisors  
3.117%*** 4,625 -1.267%*** 175 3.290%*** 4,450 -4.557%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013) 
Bidder hires top IB 
2.570%*** 1,101 -0.585%*** 67 2.775%*** 1,034 -3.360% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.284) 
Target   hires advisors  
2.547%*** 5,881 -0.416%*** 235 2.671%*** 5,646 -3.087%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.025) 
Target hires top IB 
1.794%*** 1,086 -2.583%*** 85 2.165%*** 1,001 -4.749%* 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.076) 




Table 19 . longer-event [-63,126] CARs sorted by the Sales Process, US market, 
1984- 2014 
Auction versus negotiation. This table reports summary statistics of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in 
the longer analysis window CAR [-63, +126] over bidder and deal characteristics of the sample consisting of 
14,646 U.S. M&A deals. The statistical information is reported for the whole sample and for deals that are 
implemented by auctions and negotiations. Of these 286 deals are classified as auction deals and 14,360 deals are 
negotiations Auction refer to a deal where there is more than one pubic bidder bidding for the same target, while 
negotiation deals refer to cases in which there is one public bidder bid for target firms. Panel A reports the mean 
value of the cumulative abnormal returns in the longer analysis [-63, +126] window over small and large bidders. 
Panel B reports the mean value for the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the longer analysis window CAR 
[-63, +126] over the deal characteristics; successful(failed) deals, pure cash(stock)deals, public (private or 
subsidiary) target, public bidders with cash (equity), private bidders with cash (equity), subsidiary bidders with 
cash (equity),target-initiated, tender offer, hostility, bankruptcy target, target in antitakeover states, and finally the 
percentage of shares that bidders owned directly before the announcement date. Panel C shows the mean value 
for the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the longer analysis [-63, +126] window over the advisor 
characteristics: if bidder (target) hires advisors and if bidder (target) hires top tier advisors. The table uses the 
formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure the cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index.  
Table A1 in the Appendix A reports all the definitions and database sources of variables that have been presented 
in Panel A, B, &C.  The final column shows the differences in the means between the auction and negotiation 
sub-samples and its significantly levels are denoted by p-value of the means that tests the null hypothesis based 
on t-tests, ascertaining whether there are differences between auction and negotiation deals. The p-value is 
reported between brackets.  The statistical significances between schemes of arrangement and tender offers at the 




























Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N  
Panel A: Size Effect   
Small Size Bidder  
10.101%*** 6,501 9.607%*** 73 10.107%*** 6,428 -0.499% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.940) 
Large Size Bidder  
13.297%*** 8,145 6.728%*** 213 13.473%*** 7,932 -6.744%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015) 
Difference (small-large)  -3.195%**** 14,646 2.878% 286 -3.366%*** 14,360  
 (0.000)  (0.565)  (0.000)   
Difference (small auction -
large negotiation)  
-3.866% 8,005      
(0.413)  
     
Difference (small 
negotiation -large auction) 
3.378% 6,641      
(0.385)       
Panel B: Deal Characteristics  
Successful deals  
12.516%*** 13,878 11.883%*** 148 12.523%*** 13,730 -0.640% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.871) 
Failed deals   
0.351%*** 768 2.723%*** 138 -0.167%*** 630 2.891% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.548) 
Pure cash deals  
9.090%*** 3,782 11.779%*** 111 9.009%*** 3,671 2.77% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.430) 
Pure Stock deals 
17.188%*** 3,242 1.784%*** 67 17.513%*** 3,175 -15.729%** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.024) 
Public target  
9.068%*** 2,809 3.953%*** 218 9.498%*** 2,591 -5.544%* 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.078) 
Private target  
13.253%*** 7,764 13.401%*** 24 13.253%*** 7,740 0.148% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.988) 
Subsidiary target  
11.196%*** 4,073 21.614%*** 44 11.082%*** 4,029 10.531% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.27) 
Public with cash  
7.670%*** 703 10.306%*** 85 7.307%*** 618 2.998% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.477) 
Public with stock  
10.915%*** 1,187 -5.251%*** 54 11.685%*** 1,133 -16.936%*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009) 
Private with cash  
9.210%*** 1,686 14.232%*** 8 9.186%*** 1,678 5.046% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.698) 
Private with stock  
20.840%*** 1,808 18.969%*** 11 20.852%*** 1,797 -1.882% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.918) 
Subsidiary with cash  
9.662%*** 1,393 17.644%*** 18 9.557%*** 1,375 8.086% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.344) 
Subsidiary with stock  
20.607%*** 247 97.235% 2 19.981%*** 245 77.254% 
(0.000)  (0.974)  (0.000)  (0.120) 
Target-Initiated 
10.270%*** 187 14.363%*** 33 9.393%*** 154 4.969% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.573) 
Tender offer  
9.953%*** 380 14.218%*** 61 9.138%*** 319 5.080% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.290) 
Hostile deals  
4.929%*** 55 3.792%*** 25 5.876%*** 30 -2.084% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.827) 
Bankruptcy target  
21.054%*** 223 18.523%*** 34 21.509%*** 189 -2.986% 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.700) 
Target in antitakeover state 
10.336%*** 2,111 1.862%*** 39 10.495%*** 2,072 -8.633% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.192) 
Owned directly before 
10.725%*** 151 10.346%*** 16 10.770%*** 135 -0.424% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.966) 











Mean DA N Mean DA N Mean DA N 
Panel C: Advisor characteristics 
Bidder hires advisors  
9.938%*** 4,625 7.058%*** 175 10.051%*** 4,450 -2.993% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.374) 
Bidder hires top IB 
9.038%*** 1,101 10.028%*** 67 8.974%*** 1,034 1.054% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.843) 
Target   hires advisors  
9.524%*** 5,881 6.873%*** 235 9.634%*** 5,646 -2.761% 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.313) 
Target hires top IB 
8.420%*** 1,086 3.747%*** 85 8.420%*** 1,001 -4.673% 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.310) 
 




Table 20 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions analysis with a selling 
mechanism, Bidder and deal variables. 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, in which the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) over the short windows: [-1,1]; CAR [-2,2], and the longer event windows [-20,20], [63,126], 
respectively. This table regresses the dependent variables on a set of selective covariates in columns (1) and (2) 
in order to investigate the size effect of bidder firms. The table uses the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure the 
cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index. Table B1 in the Appendix B reports all 
the definitions and database sources of variables. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The statistical 










Variables  CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2] 
CAR[-20,20] CAR[-63,126] 
  
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Auction  
-0.017*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.009 -0.020 0.026 -0.003 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) 
Size (Ln MV)  
-0.008***  -0.010***  -0.021***  -0.042***  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Small   
0.013***  0.013***  0.003  -0.048*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Small Auction  
0.003  0.009  0.009  0.032 
 (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.032)  (0.064) 
Cash holding  
0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.019 0.057** 0.072*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.026) 
Leverage  
0.009* 0.011** 0.014** 0.016** 0.024** 0.026*** 0.050** 0.049** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.024) (0.022) 
Target in antitakeover state 
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.012 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Target-Initiated 
0.017** 0.012* 0.015** 0.010 0.037*** 0.022 0.029 -0.007 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.035) (0.034) 
Toehold  
-0.009* -0.012** -0.012* -0.016** -0.022 -0.032** -0.007 -0.032 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.014) (0.032) (0.031) 
Bankruptcy target  
0.017** 0.018** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.039** 0.045*** 0.106*** 0.122*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.028) 
ROA  
-0.003 -0.017** -0.001 -0.019** -0.027 -0.078*** -0.048 -0.177*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.023) (0.034) (0.038) 
Tobin’s q 
-0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.002 -0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Collateral  
0.010** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.016* 0.033*** 0.060*** 0.094*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) 
Bidder hires top IB 
0.017* 0.008 0.022** 0.011 0.036*** 0.006 0.086*** 0.0147 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) 
Target hires top IB 
0.012** 0.003 0.013** 0.002 0.013 -0.015* 0.031** -0.037** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) 
Relative Size  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender offer  
0.006 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.028*** 0.019* 0.040** 0.017 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) 
Hostile deals 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 -0.022 0.042 0.026 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.049) (0.050) 
Private target  
0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.009** 0.016*** 0.010 0.030*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
All Equity  
-0.004** -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
Successful deals  
0.006 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.049*** 0.036*** 0.169*** 0.135*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant  
0.052*** 0.000 0.056*** -0.001 0.098*** -0.009 0.133*** -0.042* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.027) (0.023) 
N 14,646 14,646 14,646 14,646 14,646 14,646 14,646 14,646 
 Adj R-squared  0.024  0.010  0.026 0.010 0.032 0.010 0.036 0.016 
 




Table 21 Choice of takeover method regressions. 
This table reports the calculation of the marginal effects from logit regressions of the probability of a deal in the 
U.S. takeover market to be structured as auction deals on size (Ln MV), cash holding, leverage, target in 
antitakeover state, target-initiated, toehold, bankruptcy target, Tobin’s q, collateral, bidder(target)hires top 
advisers, relative size tender offer, hostile deals, private target, pure equity deals, successful deals. Dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bidder firm bids in a competitive process to implement 
a takeover deal. Table B1 in the Appendix B reports all the definitions and database sources of variables. The p-
value are reported in brackets. Each regression in the last rows reports the total number of observations and pseudo 
R-squared. The statistical significances between auction and negotiation deals at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 




































Size (Ln MV)  
0.001*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.005) 



























Bidder hires top IB 
0.016*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Target  hires top IB 
0.008*** 0.001* 
(0.002) (0.078) 
Relative Size  
0.000 0.000 
(0.467) (0.555) 
Tender offer   
0.009*** 
 (0.000) 
Hostile deals  
0.004** 
 (0.024) 
Private target   
-0.008*** 
 (0.000) 
All Equity   
0.002** 
 (0.022) 




 -5.278***  -2.638*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
N 14,646 14,646 
Pseudo R-squared 0.113 0.342 
 




Table 22 Estimated Treatment Effects from Propensity Score Matching based on 
Logistic Model in Table B3 using different numbers of ‘neighbours’ and calipers 
 
This table reports the results of estimated parameters on auction dummy from propensity score matching based 
on the logistic model in Table A3. The results of estimate the average treatment effect of bidding in auction upon 
bidder returns (ATE) and the average treated effect of bidding in auction upon bidder returns for bidder firms that 
actually used auction method (ATT) are reported based on the calculated cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
over the short windows: [-1, +1]; [-2, +2], and over the longer windows [-20, +20]; [-63, +126]. This table uses 
the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0   to measure the cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index. 
Panel A reports the ATE and ATT results by matching bidder firms that choose to bid in auction (the treatment 
group) to the one, two and three target firms choose to bid in negotiation (the untreated group). Panel B reports 
the ATE and ATT results by matching bidder firms that choose to bid in auction (the treatment group) to the one 
nearest neighbour firm that choose to bid in auction (the untreated group) with caliper size ( 𝜀 =
0.001,0.0001, & 0.0001 ). Each row reports the total number of observations in treated and untreated groups. 
Robust standard errors are given in brackets. The statistical significance of at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 





























Panel A: Neighbours CAR [-1,1] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-20,20] CAR [-63,126] 
Number of Matches         
1 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
-0.985%** -1.599%*** -3.371% -4.302% 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.040) (0.034) 
 Treated Observation 238 238 238 238 
 Untreated Observations 233 233 233 233 
 Average Treatment Effect for the 
Treated (ATT) 
-1.660%** -1.358% -1.398% 2.441% 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.023) (0.044) 
 Treated Observation 286 286 286 286 
 Untreated Observations 233 233 233 233 
2 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
-0.860%* -1.406%*** -4.149% -2.565% 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.038) (0.034) 
 Treated Observation 247 247 247 247 
 Untreated Observations 427 427 427 427 
 Average Treatment Effect for the 
Treated (ATT) 
-1.057% -0.017% -0.660% 3.195% 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.018) (0.033) 
 Treated Observation 286 286 286 286 
 Untreated Observations 427 427 427 427 
3 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
-0.676% -0.159% 5.714% 3.891% 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.095) (0.052) 
 Treated Observation 284 284 284 284 
 Untreated Observations 598 598 598 598 
 Average Treatment Effect for the 
Treated (ATT) 
-1.125%* -1.961%** -0.054% 3.292% 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.015) (0.029) 
 Treated Observation 286 286 286 286 
 Untreated Observations 598 598 598 598 
Panel B: Calipers     
  CAR [-1,1] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-20,20] CAR [-63,126] 
0.001 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
-1.273%** -1.879%*** -4.500% -5.972%* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.031) (0.0034) 
 Treated Observation 203 203 203 203 
 Untreated Observations 192 192 192 192 
 Average Treatment Effect for the 
Treated (ATT) 
-1.679%* -1.634% 1.883% 4.403% 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.043) 
 Treated Observation 226 226 226 226 
 Untreated Observations 192 192 192 192 
0.0001 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
-1.272%* -1.791%*** -5.037%* -4.688% 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.029) (0.034) 
 Treated Observation 121 121 121 121 
 Untreated Observations 125 125 125 125 
 Average Treatment Effect for the 
Treated (ATT) 
-2.317%** -2.894%** -1.645% 1.645% 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.040) 
 Treated Observation 149 149 149 149 
 Untreated Observations 125 125 125 125 
0.00001 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
-1.159%* -2.194%** -5.692%** -7.267%** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.030) 
 Treated Observation 64 64 64 64 
 Untreated Observations 60 60 60 60 
 Average Treatment Effect for the 
Treated (ATT) 
-0.254% -1.527% -1.312% -.0.851% 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.042) (0.065) 
 Treated Observation 73 73 73 73 








Table 23 Comparison of covariate imbalance after estimating ATE by applying nearest 
neighbour 1-to-1 matching strategy without caliper 
This table shows the results of the test that check the balances of the covariates after applying the strategy that 
matches a bidder firm that chooses to bid in auction to one a nearest neighbour bidder firm that chooses to bid in 
negotiation tender offer (1-to-1) to estimate the average treatment effect of bidding in auction upon bidder returns 
(ATE). This table uses tebalance as a technique in STATA to calculate the standardized difference and variance 
ratio for the sample before (raw) and after applying the matching strategy whereby the covariates are well-
balanced if matched sample has zero standardized difference and the variance ratio close to one in comparison to 
row sample.  The standardized difference ratio and the variance ratio are reported for the sample before and after 
applying the matching strategy. The last row shows the total number of treated and untreated (control) 
observations.  Table B1 in the Appendix B reports all the definitions and database sources of variables. 
 
Variable  
Standardised Differences  Variance Ratio 
Raw Matched Raw Matched 
Size (Ln MV) 0.443 -0.043 1.069 0.868 
Target-Initiated 0.440 -0.014 9.654 0.875 
Toehold  0.263 0.062 5.690 1.702 
Bankruptcy target  0.435 0.040 8.092 1.336 
Bidder hires top IB 0.532 -0.089 3.564 0.679 
Target hires top IB 0.345 -0.106 2.854 0.593 
Tender offer  0.619 0.105 7.751 1.725 
Hostile deals 0.421 0.060 38.395 2.309 
Private target  -1.127 0.047 0.310 0.992 
All Equity  0.031 0.038 1.045 1.051 
Successful deals  -1.146 -0.006 5.973 1.025 
Size (Ln MV) x Tender offer  0.591 0.749 7.811 1.400 
Private target x All Equity  -0.320 0.037 0.338 1.087 
N 14,646    
Treatment observations 286    

















Table 24 Comparison of covariate imbalance after estimating ATT by applying 
nearest neighbour 1-to-1 matching strategy without caliper 
This table shows the results of the test that check the balances of the covariates after applying the strategy that 
matches a bidder firm that chooses to bid in auction to one a nearest neighbour bidder firm that chooses to bid in 
negotiation tender offer (1-to-1) to estimate the average treated effect of bidding in auction upon bidder returns 
for bidder firms that actually bid in auction (ATT). This table uses tebalance as a technique in STATA to calculate 
the standardized difference and variance ratio for the sample before (raw) and after applying the matching strategy 
whereby the covariates are well-balanced if matched sample has zero standardized difference and the variance 
ratio close to one in comparison to row sample.  The standardized difference ratio and the variance ratio are 
reported for the sample before and after applying the matching strategy. The last row shows the total number of 
treated and untreated (control) observations.  Table B1 in the Appendix B reports all the definitions and database 
sources of variables. 
Variable  
Standardised Differences  Variance Ratio 
Raw Matched Raw Matched 
Size (Ln MV) 0.443 0.007 1.069 0.958 
Target-Initiated 0.440 0.056 9.654 1.155 
Toehold  0.263 0 5.690 1 
Bankruptcy target  0.435 -0.072 8.092 0.852 
Bidder hires top IB 0.345 -0.076 2.854 1.069 
Target hires top IB 0.532 0.050 3.564 0.868 
Tender offer  0.619 0.034 7.751 1.051 
Hostile deals 0.421 0.064 38.395 1.226 
Private target  -1.127 0.109 0.310 1.455 
All Equity  0.031 0.024 1.045 1.032 
Successful deals  -1.127 -0.013 5.973 1.001 
Size (Ln MV) x Tender 
offer  0.591 0.040 7.811 1.073 
Private target x All Equity  -0.320 0.102 0.339 1.8 
N 14,646    
Treatment observations  286    
Control observations 14,360       




Figure 8 The Distribution of Propensity Score for the variables if bidder (target) 
hires top investment banks and hostiles deals after Matching by Applying Nearest 
Neighbour 1-to-1 Matching Strategy without Caliper 
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Table 25 Result of sensitivity analysis to hidden bias 
This table shows the results of the sensitivity analysis for the impact of bidding in auction upon bidder returns in 
the case of applying the matching strategy that matches a bidder firm that chooses  to bid in auction to a nearest 
neighbour bidder firm that chooses to bid in negotiation (1-to1) to estimate the average treatment effect of bidding 
in auction of upon bidder returns (ATE) and the average treated effect of bidding in auction upon bidder returns 
for bidder firms that actually bid in auction (ATT). The table uses the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure the 
cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index. Γ starts at 1, with increments (Γ=1.25, 
1.5, 1.75, 2, 2.25, 2.5, 2.75, 3). This table provides statistical information that shows the minimum and maximum 
of the p-value by using STATA command (rbounds).  












   CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-63,126] 
Matching 
Strategy 






1 0.0001 0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
1.25 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 0.036 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.967 
1.5 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 0.221 <0.0001 1 
1.75 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2.25 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2.5 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2.75 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 






1 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.283 0.283 0.131 0.131 
1.25 0.196 <0.0001 0.042 <0.0001 0.013 0.856 0.002 0.696 
1.25 0.678 <0.0001 0.336 <0.0001 0.0001 0.991 <0.0001 0.967 
1.75 0.943 <0.0001 0.751 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 0.998 
2 0.994 <0.0001 0.949 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 
2.25 0.999 <0.0001 0.993 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2.5 0.999 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
2.75 1 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 
3 1 <0.0001 0.999 <0.0001 <0.0001 1 <0.0001 1 




Table 26 comparison of finding across models estimating the impact of auction on the CAR  
 
This table shows a comparison of findings across models that estimate the impact of bidding on auction upon bidder returns. The table reports the average treatment effect of 
bidding on auction upon bidder returns (ATE) and the average treated effect of bidding on auction upon bidder returns for bidder firms that actually bid in auction (ATT) over 
the short event windows [-1, +1]: [-2,+2], and over the longer event windows [-20,+20]: [-63,+126] across independent-sample t-test, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), propensity 
score matching (PSM) and Regression adjustment. The estimate average treatment effect of bidding in auction upon bidder returns in case of applying OLS regression is 
reported by using regression (1) in Table 20. The estimate average treatment effect of bidding in auction upon bidder returns in case of applying PSM is reported by using 
matching strategy that matches a bidder firm that chooses to bid in auction to a nearest neighbour bidder firm that bid in negotiation (1-to-1).  The table uses the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure the cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-weighted index. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The statistical significances 





Estimated Average  
ATE ATT 
          Short event windows Longer event windows           Short event windows Longer event windows 
 CAR [-1,1] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-20,20] CAR[-63,126] CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-20,20] CAR[-63,126] 
Independent -sample t test (Difference 
test) 
-2.146%*** -2.406%*** -3.388%** -4.503% 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.116) 
OLS regression Model (1) 
-0.017** -0.018** -0.009 0.026 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.0305) 
propensity score matching (1-to-1)  
-0.985%** -1.599%*** -3.371% -4.302% -1.660%** -1.358% -1.398% 2.441% 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.040) (0.034) (0.007) (0.009) (0.023) (0.044) 
Regression adjustment 
-2.185%** -2.196%** -3.160% -4.963%  -1.625%*** -1.729%** -0.525%  3.246% 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.049) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.024) 






Table B1 variables definitions and Sources 
The variables   Definitions Sources  
Panel A: Bidder characteristics 
Panel A': size effect 
Panel A'-1: Overall 
Market value (US$, millions) Acquirer’s stock price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding in billions of dollars at the end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the announcement date 
COMPUSTAT 
Size (Ln MV)  The natural logarithm of acquirer’s market value of equity. COMPUSTAT 
Panel A'-2 and Panel A'-3 
Large (Small) bidders A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bidder firm is 
larger (smaller) if its equity market value is greater (equal or less) 
than the market value of the 25th percentile of NYSE firms during 
the year of the announcement date. 
COMPUSTAT 
Market value of small(large) 
bidders (US$, millions) 
The small (large) acquirer’s stock price multiplied by the number 
of shares outstanding in billions of dollars at the end of the fiscal 
year immediately prior to the announcement date 
COMPUSTAT 
Small (large) bidder Size The natural logarithm of the small (large) acquirer’s market 
value of equity 
 
Panel B': The Other Bidder characteristics 
 
Cash holding the ratio of the acquirer’s cash and short-term investments (item 
1) all divided by the book value of total assets (item 6) as a 
measure for cash reserves at the end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the date of announcement. 
COMPUSTAT 
Tobin’s q The ratio of the market value of assets over the book value of 
assets (item 6—item 60+item25-item 199)/item 6) 
COMPUSTAT 
Book- to -book value The ratio of firm book value of equity scaled by market value 
of equity at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the 
date of announcement. 
COMPUSTAT 
ROA The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) over the acquirer’s total assets at the end 
of the fiscal year immediately preceding the announcement date. 
COMPUSTAT 
Leverage  The ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
(item9+item34) all over the total assets (item 6) at the end of the 
fiscal year immediately prior to the date of announcement. 
COMPUSTAT 
High Debt Dummy A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the leverage 
ratio (total debt to total assets) exceeds threshold 0.5, and 0 if it 
is below this figure. 
 
COMPUSTAT 
Collateral The ratio of property, plant, and equipment (item 8) over the 
target’s total asset (item 6), all is measured twelve months before 
the date of announcement. 
COMPUSTAT 
Sales (US$, millions) The acquirer firm’s total sales in millions of dollars at the end of 
the fiscal year prior to the date of announcement. 
COMPUSTAT 
Total assets (US$, millions) 
 
acquirer’s total assets in millions of dollars in millions of 















The variables  Definitions  Sources  
Panel B: Deal characteristics 
Transaction value (US$, 
millions) 
The total value of consideration paid in millions of dollars by 
bidders, excluding fees and expenses. 
Thomson One 
Banker  
Small (large) bidder 
transaction value (US$, 
millions) 
The total value of consideration paid in millions of dollars by 
small(large) bidders, excluding fees and expenses. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Relative Size The ratio of transaction value divided by market value of equity Thomson One 
Banker 
Successful rate a dummy variable that takes the value of one if transactions that 









Failed rate a dummy variable that takes the value of one if transactions that 
are flagged by the SDC as “withdrawn”. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Target-Initiated a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target firm 








Pure cash (stock) deals a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an acquirer firm 




Public target A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bidder firm is 




Private target A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bidder firm is 




Subsidiary target A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bidder firm is 




Tender offer, Hostile deals and 
Bankruptcy target 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if transactions that 
are flagged by the SDC respectively as tender offer, hostile 
deals and target in bankruptcy, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Target in antitakeover state a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target frim is in 
the one of the following U.S. states that have robust anti-
takeover regulations: Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, 





Owned directly before the percentage of target firm’s equity that held by a bidder six 




Owned directly after the percentage of target firm’s equity that held by a bidder 
























The variables  Definitions  
 
Sources  
Panel C: Advisor characteristics 
 
Bidder (target) hires advisors a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bidder (target) 
hires advisors, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Bidder (target) hires Top IB Bidder (target) hires top IB (%) is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if an investment bank that are used by acquirers 
(targets) as its advisors are classified as top-tier if they are used 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs 
& co, Jp Morgan, Citi, the five banks that appear most often in 








Table B2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions analysis with a selling 
mechanism, Bidder and deal variables.  
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, in which the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) over the short windows: [-1,1]; CAR [-2,2], and the longer event windows [-20,20], [63,126], 
respectively. This table regresses the dependent variables on a set of selective covariates separately for small 
and large firms in columns (1) and (2) in order to investigate the size effect of bidder firms upon bidder returns. 
The table uses the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  to measure the cumulative abnormal returns by using the CRSP value-
weighted index. Table B1 in the Appendix B reports all the definitions and database sources of variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets. The statistical significances between auction and negotiation deals at the 
1% level, 5% level and 10% level are denoted ***, **, *. 
 
 







Variables  CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2]                CAR[-20,20] CAR[-63,126] 
  




-0.025* -0.014** -0.026 -0.015** -0.028 -0.006 0.011 0.000 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006 (0.032) (0.012) (0.062) (0.024) 
Cash holding  
 
 
0.003 -0.002 0.007 0.002 -0.034 0.074*** -0.108** 0.263*** 




0.021* 0.002 0.028** 0.004 0.025 0.024** -0.001 0.079** 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.018) (0.010) (0.031) (0.035) 
Target in antitakeover state 
 
 
0.007 0.0004 0.005 -0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.021** 




0.013 0.012* 0.007 0.011 0.019 0.024* -0.140*** 0.031 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.034) (0.015) (0.043) (0.041) 
Toehold  
-0.011 -0.012** -0.017 -0.016** -0.051* -0.028 0.022 -0.055 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.028) (0.017) (0.060) (0.037) 
Bankruptcy target  
0.018 0.017** 0.030** 0.019** 0.055** 0.035* 0.143*** 0.102*** 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.025) (0.018) (0.042) (0.034) 
ROA  
-0.029*** 0.000 -0.029** -0.002 -0.138*** -0.008 -0.311*** -0.061 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.031) (0.025) (0.047) (0.061) 
Tobin’s q 
-0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.000 -0.011*** -0.001* -0.020** 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.009) (0.003 
Collateral  
0.027*** 0.004 0.035*** 0.006 0.042** 0.021** 0.114*** 0.081*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.017) (0.009) (0.033) (0.021) 
Bidder hires top IB 
0.068 -0.002 0.072 0.000 0.047 -0.002 0.057 0.001 
(0.061) (0.003) (0.060) (0.004) (0.064) (0.007) (0.076) (0.016) 
Target hires top IB 
0.039 -0.003 0.028 -0.002 -0.009 -0.019** -0.030 -0.044*** 
(0.038) (0.003) (0.037) (0.004) (0.046) (0.007) (0.059) (0.015) 
Relative Size  
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.007** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
Tender offer  
0.012 -0.000 0.018 -0.001 0.043 0.005 0.000 0.009 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.033) (0.009) (0.046) (0.020) 
Hostile deals 
0.000 -0.001 0.015 -0.014 -0.030 -0.004 0.055 0.041 
(0.027) (0.010) (0.034) (0.010) (0.047) (0.020) (0.176) (0.044) 
Private target  
0.013*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.023*** 0.010** 0.051*** 0.008 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.014) (0.009) 
All Equity  
0.010** -0.014*** 0.014** -0.011*** 0.036*** 0.001 0.086*** 0.056*** 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.005) (0.021) (0.011) 
Successful deals  
-0.002 0.012** -0.002 0.016*** 0.0210 0.066*** 0.128*** 0.167*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.017) (0.011) (0.031) (0.023) 
Constant  
0.012 -0.002 0.010 -0.006 0.027 -0.051*** -0.015 -0.119*** 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.020) (0.012) (0.037) (0.028) 
N 6,501 8,145 6,501 8,145 6,501 8,145 6,501 8,145 
 Adj R-squared 0.014 0.010 0.014 0.009  0.021  0.012 0.028 0.030 
R-squared 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.011  0.024 0.014  0.030  0.032 




Table B3: Variables Means & Parameter Estimates used to estimate Propensity Score 
This table reports the calculation of logit regression of the probability of a deal in the U.S. takeover market to be 
structured as auction deals on size (Ln MV), cash holding, leverage, target in antitakeover state, target-initiated, 
toehold, bankruptcy target, Tobin’s q, collateral, bidder(target)hires top advisers, relative size tender offer, hostile 
deals, private target, pure equity deals, successful deals. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if a bidder firm bids in a competitive process to implement a takeover deal. Table B1 in the Appendix 
B reports all the definitions and database sources of variables. The p-value are reported in brackets. Each 
regression in the last rows reports the total number of observations. The statistical significances between auction 
and negotiation deals at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level are denoted ***, **, *. 
Variable name Logit Estimates  
Acquirer Characteristics 










Bankruptcy target  
2.218*** 
(0.294) 
Bidder hires top IB 
0.394* 
(0.224) 
Target hires top IB 
0.761*** 
(0.191) 






Private target  
-2.043*** 
(0.323) 
All Equity  
0.161 
(0.181) 
Successful deals  
-2.925*** 
(0.160) 
Interactions and Squares 
Size (Ln MV) x Tender offer  
-0.199* 
(0.113) 




















Chapter 4. Conclusion 
 












There are various selling mechanisms which can be initiated or utilised in effecting takeovers. 
Further, the choice of selling mechanism always matters, for both target and bidder firms.  The 
main objective of this thesis is to explore the impact of selecting a specific selling mechanism 
upon bidder and target returns. It has done so using two important data in the U.K. and the U.S. 
markets. respectively.   
This thesis studies two separate empirical works that have contributed to the literature review 
in two significant ways. First, the thesis investigates how the choices of different selling 
mechanisms are eventually related to various target, bidder and deal characteristics. Second, 
this thesis examines the causal effect of selecting a specific selling method on target and bidder 
returns by using propensity score matching techniques to control for the consequence of self-
selection problem into the treatment group.  
The first empirical work in this thesis sets out to explore the impact of using scheme of 
arrangement to implement takeover bids in the U.K. market on the bid premium. The chapter 
investigates the main target and deal characteristics that determines the choice of scheme of 
arrangements and tender offers. As predicted, the results show that target firms that adopt 
schemes are typically larger and older than those adopting tender offers. Target termination 
fees are higher for schemes.  Acquisitions through tender offers and schemes are both likely to 
be financed using cash as a means of payments; yet the frequency of using cash in tender offers 
is higher. Schemes of arrangement are a favoured takeover method during periods of financial 
instability or crisis, and schemes remain the mainstay of the U.K. takeovers, even after 
amendments to the Takeover Codes in 2011. Acquisitions by schemes of arrangement prevail 
when the bidders are private, and bidder firms are less likely to use a stake-building strategy to 
affect the takeover. 





This study is the first empirical literature to provide evidence show that target firms who accept 
to implement a takeover bid by the way of scheme of arrangement gain premiums which are 
significantly less than target firms who accept tender offer, and using propensity score 
matching techniques to control for the consequence of self-selection problem into the treatment 
group.  This evidence is consistent with the concerns expressed in the press and among U.K. 
regulators about schemes of arrangement. Particularly those schemes involving large 
companies with a concomitant financial worth which manifests a risk at more than merely at 
company or even market lever. These debates have focused on whether bidders can acquire a 
target firm for a low premium in comparison with tender offers. This concern arises because 
of the low threshold of the value of the shareholder votes required for schemes, which then 
allow the bidder more certainty in the acquisition of all the issued shares of the target firm.  
One possible explanation for the low premium level in scheme bids could be that schemes are 
more amenable to the establishment of a firm and provide more certainty to the bidder of 
obtaining 100% of the target’s stock shares.  This is particularly true in acquiring large-sized 
target firms.  The empirical evidence in the extant literature, such as (Officer, 2003), (Bargeron 
et al., 2008), and (Betton et al., 2009b) normally reports a negative relationship between bid 
premium and the target size.  Another explanation may lie in the observation that a majority of 
the deals of schemes (66.17%) are associated with private acquirers, which may also lower the 
bid premiums. (Bargeron et al., 2008) and (Fidrmuc et al., 2012) found that private acquirers 
normally pay less for a target firm, compared to public acquirers, in part at least because the 
latter could be expected to gain from the expected synergies with the target from the transaction. 
The main results in this chapter suggest that U.K. law should take into consideration the 
concerns raised in the press and among the regulators about implementing takeover bids by the 
way of schemes of arrangement. This concern increases particularly for shareholders in large 
target firms where accepting scheme offers could have a strong effect on their premium in 
comparison with tender offers.  Larger firms have larger numbers of tendered shares, and this 
increases the uncertainty for a bidder in obtaining 100% of the target company. In particular, 
the likelihood of a target’s acquisition decreasing with the increase in target size, because of 
the difficulty in financing such large transactions. Bidders under a scheme can effectively 
reduce the risk of rising leverage, as they can more achieve 100% control of the target firm, 
because schemes are considered an “all or nothing” transaction. Then bidder firms can use the 
target’s assets as collateral for loans, or alternatively, can be used to obtain financial assistance 
by re-registering the target as private firm. However, if the bidders intend to own 100% of the 





target firm under tender offers, they must receive approval of at least 90% of the target voting 
share, such that it can squeeze-out the remaining minority shareholders. Therefore, if the offer 
cannot reach the 90% “squeeze-out” threshold, this means that the bidder will fail to take 100% 
control of the target company. In light of the above, schemes endow the bidders with more 
bargaining power, and they are more certain to obtain 100% of the target shares, which could 
affect target shareholder wealth.   
As in all such work, there are a number of limitations in this study. The concern about 
implementing schemes of arrangement it not uniquely English, other common law jurisdictions 
which take similar legal and regulatory approaches have the same concerns, such as Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong and India. However, the main results of this chapter are 
truly valid for the U.K. takeover market because the legal provisions that control the takeover 
methods are different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction endowing each with unique facets. 
Moreover, the U.K. takeover law is based firmly on the self-regulatory institution, whereby a 
target’s board is strictly prohibited by the Code from using certain defensive tactics such as 
‘poison pills’ against any bids. The impact of a scheme of arrangement upon bid premium 
could, indeed likely would, be different in a country that employed the method of schemes and 
at the same time allowed for directors to engage in any activities which are deemed to help 
reduce their firm’s attractiveness to potential offerors.  
 
The second empirical work in this thesis sets out to explore the impact of bidding in a 
competitive auction in the U.S. market on bidder announcement returns. The main motivation 
of this study is to examine whether the event of the winner’s curse exists in takeover activities, 
particular when a high level of competition exists between bidders. The chapter investigates 
the main bidder and deal characteristics that determines the choice of whether to bid in a 
competitive auction or whether to engage in a one-to-one negotiation process. As predicted, 
bidders who chose to conduct takeovers using auction frameworks have high levels of leverage 
and tangible assets, while bidders are more likely to bid using an auction if either the target 
initiates the deals, or is facing bankruptcy, or if the bidders already have a stake (a “toehold”) 
in the target.  Bidders are also more likely to bid using an auction if they use (or their target 
uses) an investment bank with a high reputation. Auctions are, then, associated with tender 
offers, hostile techniques, and, most surprisingly, with all- stock offers. Bidders are less likely 
to bid in auctions for private firms.   





This study examines the evidence for the Bermuda Triangle of M&A, the fabled winner’s curse, 
where bidders who bid in a competitive auction suffer a significant loss in returns in the short-
analysis period. However, the results are less clear across the long-event period. This chapter 
uses the propensity score matching techniques to control for the consequence of self-selection 
problem into the treatment group.  This results are consistent with (Kagel & Levin, 1986),and 
(Bazerman & Samuelson, 1983) who argue that one important factor that may exacerbate the 
winner’s curse problem is the number of competitors in the auction with the likelihood of the 
winner’s curse increasing as the number of bidders increases.  
The main results in this chapter suggest that bidding in a competitive auction could be one of 
the main explanations for the negative impact of M&A activates upon bidder announcement 
return.  This result could answer the question of why auction is not a popular mechanism in 
corporate finance, because simply bidders avoid bidding in a competitive bid in order to avoid 
the high possibility of the winner’s curse. Rational bidders might (it could be argued, should) 
observe that the mechanism of competitive bidding leads them to be more aggressive and 
overbid for target’s assets, so, naturally they lose confidence in bidding in this kind of 
purchasing format. This is consistent with the Warren Buffett, the Sage of Omaha who stated 
that “[W]e don’t want to waste our time ...We don’t participate in auctions”  
  
It is important to clarify the parameters of this second part. This study is truly relevant to the 
U.S. market, because the legal and regulatory regimes that control the competition between 
bidders and the fiduciary requirements that give the right to target board a certain time to 
respond to rival offers.  
This thesis sets out to explore the impact of schemes of arrangement on bid premium in the 
U.K. market, and the impact of bidding in auction upon bidder returns in the U.S. market. This 
study is grounded very firmly in what has been encountered in the real market either in the U.K. 
or .US. markets. An interesting adjunct to this study would be an investigation into how the 
media and news reporting could affect bidder and target returns, with a specific selling 
mechanism. Moreover, the legal structure of selling mechanisms are different from between 
jurisdictions. It will be interesting to compare the effect of a particular takeover method such 
as scheme of arrangement in different countries.   
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